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Abstract 
This thesis analyzes and compares the motivations and opportunities that drove Arabs to par-
ticipate in the so-called Arab Spring in the countries of Algeria, Jordan, Tunisia and Yemen. I 
employ a rather unique bottom-up approach of identifying the factors that moved individuals 
to take to the streets – an approach that has been mostly neglected by scholarly works focus-
ing on Arab Spring participation. By quantitatively analyzing the most recent survey data of 
the Arab Barometer, I find that motivations and opportunities play a complementary role in 
determining protest participation. More specifically, I show that participation in the Arab up-
risings was most consistently motivated by perceptions of unequal treatment and simultane-
ously facilitated by opportunities afforded through membership in political parties and/or civil 
organizations as well as the usage of the internet for political matters. Furthermore, attending 
religious gatherings, such as Friday prayers, seemed to have facilitated protest participation 
only in countries that experienced regime leadership change, such as Tunisia and Yemen. 
Overall, the robustness of my findings suggests that future research on social movements 
should continue to use motivations (based on grievances) and opportunities in a complemen-
tary approach. 
 
Key words: Arab Spring, motivations, relative deprivation, opportunities, regime change, 
quantitative research, binary logistic regression  
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1  Introduction  
 
 
 
The sudden onset and intensity of the wave of the Arab uprisings that began in late 2010 has 
puzzled many political scientists (Lynch, 2011). The Arab Spring is often seen as a reaction to 
authoritarian rule based on civil and democratic values, such as inclusive citizenship, demo-
cratic governance, participation in civil society, demands for human rights, social justice and 
dignity, anti-corruption and so forth (Breisinger, 2012:1).
1
 After events unfolded, scholars 
like Brownlee et al. (2013) have argued that the uprisings were unavoidable because of a mix-
ture of various factors, such as demographic shifts, limited social mobility, cronyism and elit-
ism, and unemployment. Thus, there exist a vast number of factors that arguably moved Ar-
abs to protest, but there is still no clear consensus on which factors actually played a determi-
nant role. 
The reason for this lack of a coherent explanation for the origins and outcomes (so far) of the 
Arab Spring can be traced to two aspects. First, scholarly work on social movements in Arab 
societies is limited to mostly descriptive accounts (Wiktorowicz, 2004). In other words, there 
exists a lack of theoretical analyses on collective action in the Arab world. Wiktorowicz 
(2004:3) states, for instance, that “the study of Islamic activism has […] remained isolated 
from the plethora of theoretical and conceptual developments that have emerged from re-
search on social movements’ contentious politics.” Thus, social or protest movements in the 
Arab world have often been misunderstood by scholars because these movements were not 
commonly analyzed within the traditional (Western) sense of critical citizenship and its role 
in social movements. For example, regional politics have often been simply referred to as the 
Arab Street – which denotes an image of angry mobs and unruly hordes that spark mayhem 
and are easily manipulated (Ben Moussa, 2013:47-8). This interpretation posits a challenge to 
an adequate understanding of the developments in the Arab region. This is because the conno-
tation of the term Arab Street undermines any reasonable analysis of Arab protest participants 
                                                          
1
 For pragmatic and readability reasons, I use the terms Arab Spring, Arab uprisings, revolutions, protests, 
demonstrations and so forth interchangeably. I am aware, however, that it would be more appropriate to distin-
guish between terms such as revolution and revolt (see for instance: Perthes, 2012:67).  
“The Arab Spring was caused by a multitude of factors (economic, political, 
social, cultural and religious), but its origins also lay in belief. Not a singular 
belief, but a collective, multifaceted belief that liberation is not only needed, 
but also possible.” (Eghdamian, 2014) 
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as rational actors. Such conceptualization distorts the reality of the Arab public sphere, be-
cause Arab protesters are diminished to angry mobs that constitute irrational subsets of Arab 
society (Regier and Khalidi, 2009). Eickelman (2003:1) further argues that “the term ‘street’, 
rather than ‘public sphere’ or ‘public’, imputes passivity” and Bayat (2003:226) further adds 
that the term suggests “a reified and essentially ‘abnormal’ mindset.” Harik (2006) points out 
that this misunderstood conceptualization of Arab protests is also often the reason behind the 
contention that Arab countries’ social and cultural foundations are incompatible with demo-
cratic and liberal values (e.g. Huntington, 1996). Hence, without accrediting Arabs as rational 
actors within a public sphere, a proper comprehension of the recent transformations in the 
Arab world appears to be impossible. 
The second aspect relates very much to the first one, entailing the fact that the outcomes of 
the Arab movements have been mostly explained by governmental action. In other words, a 
clear account of the participants’ attitudes and behavior in protest movements in Arab coun-
tries appears to be missing.  
My thesis attempts to overcome these challenges and identify potential micro-level factors 
that explain protest participation in the Arab Spring. To that effect, I analyze protest behavior 
from a unique bottom-up perspective. Unlike existent literature that focused on structural fac-
tors like oil wealth, hereditary monarchism, security apparatus loyalty, and foreign support, I 
investigate the feelings, perceptions and attitudes of actual protest participants. I do so by em-
ploying the most recently published data of the Arab Barometer (AB, 2014). While I regard 
Arab citizens as rational actors, I am going to theorize that both relative deprivation theory 
and opportunity-based mobilization theory should be used in a complementary approach to 
explain protest participation. Correspondingly, I am going to hypothesize that both grievances 
as well as opportunity structures facilitated the likelihood of protesting. Thus, I connect the 
motivational aspects that initially drove Arabs to participate in movements with the opportun-
istic factors that enabled them to do so more easily. By individually analyzing these motiva-
tions and opportunities in different Arab countries and subsequently comparing the results 
with each other, I hope to uncover the factors that explain participation. More specifically, as 
I unravel the motivations and opportunities that spurred protest participation in countries that 
experienced regime leadership change vis-à-vis countries that did not, I hope to investigate 
the underlying mechanisms that explain the discrepancy in the “outcome” (regime change 
versus resilience) of Arab protest activity.  
3 
 
This bottom-up approach attempts to fill a gap in social movement literature, as it provides a 
complementary approach to scholarly works in explaining when movements are “successful” 
(in bringing about change) and when they are not. In other words, my approach attempts to 
complement the existent literature on social movements: while most academic work has fo-
cused on the macro or structural factors when explaining Arab Spring developments and out-
comes, the micro or individual-level perspective of actual protest participants has been largely 
ignored (Hoffman and Jamal, 2014:605). These individual-level factors should provide a 
complementary assessment of reasons for Arab Spring participation to macro-factors like oil 
wealth or foreign support. Moreover, to further investigate if regime durability (change versus 
resilience) can be explained with this bottom-up analysis, I select two countries that experi-
enced regime leadership change (Tunisia and Yemen) and two countries that did not (Algeria 
and Jordan). Thus, my research question and sub-question can be formulated as follows: 
Research Question: To what extent did motivations and opportunities play a complementary 
role in facilitating protest participation in the Arab Spring? 
Sub-R.Q.: Are there significant differences in these motivational and/or opportunistic factors 
between countries that experienced regime leadership change vis-à-vis those that did not? 
My overall findings support my hypotheses that both motivations and opportunities play a 
determinant role in explaining Arab Spring participation. In particular, I find that perceptions 
of unequal treatment were the most consistent motivation for Arab Spring participation, and 
being a member of a political party and/or civil organization or using the internet for political 
purposes were the most prevalent opportunity factors in promoting Arab Spring participation. 
Moreover, in countries that experienced regime leadership change, a more frequent attendance 
at religious gatherings, such as Friday prayers, appears to have increased the likelihood of 
protest attendance. On the other hand, attending Friday prayers had no significant effect on 
protest participation for countries in which the regime remained resilient (did not undergo 
regime change). These findings are robust to a variety of standard robustness and sensitivity 
checks. Potential limitations include endogeneity and limited external validity.    
This chapter is structured as follows. The ensuing section will briefly outline the develop-
ments and status quo of the Arab Spring uprisings. Then, I review the macro factors that at-
tempt to explain the discrepancy in “outcomes” of the Arab uprisings. Thereupon, I argue for 
the utility of my bottom-up approach which should complement our understanding of that 
discrepancy. Since I investigate the motivation and opportunity factors in four countries – two 
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of which experienced regime change and two that did not – in the fourth section of this chap-
ter, I expand on the developments that led up to the Arab Spring in these four cases. Finally, a 
brief conclusion reviews the main arguments and provides an overview of the structure of this 
thesis.   
1.1 Laying the Ground: Regime Overthrow vs. Regime Survival 
The regional uprisings commonly referred to as the Arab Spring arguably began when Mo-
hamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor, set himself on fire in protest against unfair treat-
ment by the police (The Guardian, 2011). The Arab Spring has been argued to be the peak of 
discontent and unrest that manifested in the Arab world for over a decade (Noueihed and 
Warren; 2012:57). Indeed, Ottaway and Hamzawy (2011) argue that protests, strikes, and 
demonstrations have been increasing over the past decade and eventually escalated in late 
2010.
2
 More particular, they connote that  
“The uprising that started in Tunisia in late 2010 was not a completely new develop-
ment, but rather a more dramatic example of the unrest common across the region, 
particularly in Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, and Jordan.” (Ottaway and Hamzawy, 
2011:4) 
Ottaway and Hamzawy (2011:2) further argue that the Arab Spring was mostly rooted in so-
cial and economic grievances. However, these grievances also translated into political impli-
cations, such as demands for more freedom of speech, as protests dispersed across countries 
(Ibid:8; Lynch, 2013). This is most evident in the fact that protest activities – which are usual-
ly strictly controlled if not even outright banned in authoritarian regimes – actually occurred.  
Figure 1.1 serves as a visual reminder of the initial events of the Arab Spring, providing a 
timeline of regional protests and developments from December 2010 until August 2011.
3
 As 
is evident from the figure, protest movements happened to some extent in almost all countries 
of the Middle East/North-Africa (MENA) region. Furthermore, Figure 1.2 illustrates how 
complex the situation of the MENA-region remains after almost four years of the eruption of 
the Arab Spring. 
                                                          
2
 For a review on protest movements in key Arab states before late 2010, see Ottaway and Hamzawy, 2011:2-7. 
3
 It is noteworthy that the four regimes which underwent regime change experienced quite substantial amounts of 
deaths from unrest. But while Syria did so as well, Syrian President al-Assad was able to remain in power de-
spite international pressure and ongoing civil war. Thus, the death toll from unrest might play a role in explain-
ing more intense grievances, but it cannot explain the outcomes of social movements by itself. 
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Figure 1.1: One Year onwards - The Arab Spring's Initial Phase (2010-11) 
 
Source: Daily Mail, 2011. 
Figure 1.2: Map of the MENA-Region (July, 2014) 
 
Source: The Economist. 2014. 
Figure 1.2 highlights that more than four years after the onset of the Arab Spring, the prospect 
of Arab countries transitioning into stable democracies remains dim (Totten, 2014). Syria and 
Iraq remain embroiled in civil war, with the terrorist group ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant) contesting security and state sovereignty (Al Jazeera, 2014).  
6 
 
Libya is a failing state, embroiled in civil war ever since al-Gadaffi was removed from power. 
The power vacuum in Libya, which was created after NATO’s success in supporting rebels to 
oust al-Gadaffi, left the country divided, without state security services and with rival militias 
fighting in a civil war scenario (DW, 2014; CNN, 2015).  
In Yemen, Shia-led Houti rebels from the North took over the capital Sana’a and other cities 
earlier this year, contesting state power vis-à-vis the Sunni movement led by the President-
elect al-Hadi (Al Jazeera, 2015c; Daily Mail, 2015). The recent developments of violent 
clashes between Sunni-Southerners and Shia-Houthis, as well as the Saudi-led coalition con-
ducting air strikes against the Houthi rebels undermine the prospect of stability and peace in 
Yemen (Al Jazeera, 2015d).  
On the other hand, Egypt experienced two regime changes as a result of popular discontent 
and active protesting in Tahir Square among many places. With the initial ousting of former 
President Mubarak, the new democratically elected President Mohamed Morsi came to power 
in 2012 but was removed from power by a military coup d’état in 2013 – putting former mili-
tary marshal Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in power (BBC, 2013; The Guardian, 2014a).  
Other countries, like Jordan, Algeria, Morocco, and Oman pursued paths of limited reform 
and other tactics to succeed in largely avoiding a change in leadership, for now.  
Tunisia is arguably the only success story of the Arab Spring so far. Tunisians not only suc-
ceeded in the ousting of President Ben Ali in January 2011, which gave other Arab countries 
the hope of change being possible. Tunisia is also the first and only Arab country with fairly 
democratic elections and relative stability (The Guardian, 2014b). But even in contemporary 
Tunisia “the threat of violence hangs over a fragile democratic process” (The Guardian, 
2014b; Al Jazeera, 2015a; Al Jazeera, 2015b).  
Thus, the Arab Spring protests had a different impact on individual Arab countries. Figure 1.3 
provides an overview of the divergent developments by illustrating the Freedom House Index 
for each Arab country over a time period of the last 10 years. While the rating of the Freedom 
House improved for countries like Tunisia after the onset of the Arab Spring protests in 2010, 
the index did not change at all for other countries (e.g. Algeria), or worsened for yet others 
(e.g. Yemen).  
  
Figure 1.3: Freedom House Index, MENA countries, 2004-2014 
 
Source: Freedom House, 2015.  
Note: The Freedom House Index ranks levels of political rights and civil liberties in each state on a scale from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). The status of each country can be 
free (1.0-2.5), partly free (2.51-5.5) or not free (5.51-7.0). A status is determined by the evaluation of countries’ sub-categories on political rights (electoral process, political 
pluralism and participation, functioning of government) and civil liberties (freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, personal auton-
omy and individual rights). Figure 1.3 depicts aggregate scores of political rights and civil liberties, which are ranked on a scale from 1 to 7. 
I excluded some MENA-countries to make the Figure readable. Nonetheless, the “aggregate” line in Figure 1.3 is based on an average score of all MENA countries. Respective 
values for all MENA-countries are depicted in Table A.12 in the Appendix 
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The overall tendency of the Freedom House Index appears to be relatively consistent, depict-
ed by the fairly horizontal “aggregate” line in Figure 1.3. This average consistency in the 
Freedom House score might be due to the fact that the quite large improvement for Tunisia 
and the slight decline for several MENA countries (e.g. Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait) bal-
ance each other out. After all, Dunham (2015) contends that “global press freedom is at its 
lowest rate in more than 10 years, with the Middle East and North Africa showing the biggest 
fall.” As most of the Arab countries remain being ranked as “partly free” or “not free” until 
today, the continuing average index of about 5.25 suggests that a lot of Arab leaders continue 
to use tactics like limiting citizen’s rights and freedoms in order to cling to power. In fact, 
only four countries experienced the overthrow of former rulers, and all of them were presi-
dents of authoritarian governments: Ben Ali of Tunisia, al-Gaddafi of Libya, Mubarak of 
Egypt and Saleh of Yemen (The Economist, 2011 and 2014b). But while Tunisia held argua-
bly relative free democratic elections in late 2014, transformative development was less suc-
cessful in the other three countries – as previously discussed above (BBC, 2014).  
What explains why the presidents from Algeria, Jordan, Tunisia and Yemen were forced to 
resign, while other regional leaders remained in power? Williamson and Abadeer (2014) ar-
gue that most academic work on this phenomenon has attempted to explain regime change or 
persistence by alluding to macro or structural factors; and I will briefly review the main find-
ings in the following section.
4
 Then, I explain why I am using a bottom-up, micro-level ap-
proach to explain protest behavior – which is, I argue, complementary to the macro explana-
tions.  
1.2 Macro-Level Explanations for Regime Durability 
The macro-level theories explain regime durability in terms of the responses to protests by the 
people in power. While responses to protests varied from country to country, leaders usually 
used all means available to remain in power. The main macro-level factors found to affect the 
durability of regional regimes are hereditary monarchy, oil wealth, security apparatus loyalty 
and foreign support. In addition, other country-specific characteristics, such as small territory 
or homogenous populations, make it easier for leaders to stay in power. 
                                                          
4
 Note that there is no clear consensus on the factors that contributed to Arabs participating in the uprisings or on 
the foundations that enabled some leaders to remain in power while others did not. 
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Geddes (1999) argues that authoritarian regimes can be categorized in three types: military 
regimes, personalist regimes, and single-party regimes. Based on empirical evidence, Geddes 
(1999) contends that some of these regimes are more resilient than others because they are 
subject to different pressures. Some of the most relevant pressures relate to the trend of eco-
nomic development and elite alignment or split, as these appear to greatly impact transition to 
democratization or regime collapse (Ibid). Geddes (1999) argues, for instance, that single-
party regimes are more likely to resist change compared to the other two types of authoritari-
an regimes, because they are usually more likely to have strong elite alignments and better 
chances to withstand economic crises. Yom and Gause (2012) have argued that authoritarian 
monarchies are more resilient than other authoritarian regimes.
5
 After all, none of the eight 
monarchies (Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain) expe-
rienced regime change in the wake of the Arab Spring.
6
 Geddes (2009:15) argues that “mon-
archies that have ended since 1946 have all been ousted by their own armed forces.” Howev-
er, “coups and coup attempts are less common in monarchies than in other kinds of dictator-
ship.” (Ibid:33). This monarchal exceptionalism can be explained by cultural and institutional 
factors (Ibid). 
The cultural explanation suggests that Arab monarchs enjoy more religious and historical le-
gitimacy and that this legitimacy induces more loyal support from citizens of kingdoms than 
republics (Geddes, 2009; Menaldo, 2012). As each country is different, a combination of var-
ious legitimizing factors enabled rulers to stay in power. In some countries, this legitimacy is 
rooted in religion. For example, the kings of Jordan and Morocco both claim links to the 
prophet Mohammed, and Saudi Arabia portrays itself as protector of the holiest places of Is-
lam: Mecca and Medina (Vidino, 2013). In other countries, the legitimacy might derive from 
monarchs protecting the stability of a country through the preservation of its traditional tribal 
system (Ibid).  
The institutional explanation for monarchal exceptionalism suggests that the monarchs can 
defuse public dissatisfaction by introducing popular, but limited reforms (Menaldo, 2012). 
Indeed, regional presidents attempted to appease protesters by introducing socio-economic 
reforms, too. However, presidents did not possess the institutional legitimacy of residing 
above the law. Thus, they could not enact reforms in such a rapid, efficient and strict top-
                                                          
5
 For a comprehensive review on the debate of the Arab monarchies’ resilience, see also: Matthiessen (2013), 
Gause (2013), Ramady (2014), Yom (2012), Colombo (2012), Bank and Richter (2012), Guzansky (2014), Basar 
(2013), Echagüe (2013), Tétreault (2011).  
6
 However, Bahrain experienced the most violent upheaval among these countries, causing Saudi intervention. 
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down manner in which monarchs were able to (Ibid). Therein, the monarchs enjoyed more 
flexibility. The kings of Jordan and Morocco, for instance, both introduced reforms as soon as 
the Arab Spring appeared to spread to their countries (Ibid). Although these promised reforms 
enjoyed vast credibility, they were often never fully realized (Jamal and Lust-Okar, 2002). 
Beyond that, monarchs also avoided citizens’ blame by scapegoating unpopular elected offi-
cials for their countries’ problems. Last but not least, incremental liberalization as well as 
nepotism, extended family ruling and royal relatives occupying key public institutions ap-
peared to have further helped as stabilizing institutional factors in kingdoms (Herb, 1999; 
Basar, 2013).    
The so-called “resource curse” relates to the argument that countries which possess an abun-
dant amount of natural resources, such as oil, can preempt revolutionary change by paying off 
their citizens (Ross, 1999; Rosser, 2006).
7
 Oil-wealthy regimes are able to increase public 
salaries, supply work opportunities in an often already bloated public service, or provide sub-
sidies on various goods. As the culture of rent-seeking usually involves corruption, it allows 
for the cooption of both elites and wider social groups; for example, by enabling rulers to 
provide their citizens – often those that oppose the regime – with financial means (Petras, 
2011).  For example, shortly after the Arab Spring spread from Tunisia through the region, the 
Kuwaiti regime paid every citizen $3,500 (Vidino, 2013). Thus, distribution of extensive 
amounts of resources has probably contributed to helping some rulers stay in power.  
A third element that contributes to a regime’s durability is the loyalty of the regime’s coercive 
apparatus, e.g. the elite or army and security forces (Nepstad, 2011; Bellin, 2012). If the mili-
tary is more likely to remain loyal to the regime, revolutions are less likely to succeed and 
authoritarian leaders have greater chances to remain in power (el-Meehy, 2014, Lutterbeck, 
2011). This is because military loyalty enables rulers to repress challengers, reduce social 
tensions, and undermine internal contradiction levels, such as intra-elite conflict (Korotayev, 
2013). Authoritarian regimes use security means to organize social connections, as they are 
vertically linked with society, preventing any horizontal ties within civil society itself. This 
means that there are no established rules for society to connect without the strict supervision 
of the authoritarian system. The vertical connections functions through elite alignment that 
                                                          
7
 Karl (2004: 2-3) states, for example, that “countries dependent on oil as their major resource for development 
are characterized by corruption and exceptionally poor governance , a culture of rent-seeking, often devastating 
economic, health, and environmental consequences at the local level, and high incidences of conflict and war. In 
sum, countries that depend on oil for their livelihood eventually become among the most economically troubled, 
the most authoritarian, and the most conflict-ridden in the world.” 
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ensures the authoritarian state’s security and stability by connecting it to citizens through 
well-established, but controlled, institutions (McAdam et al., 1996). el-Meehy (2014:16) ar-
gues, for instance, that “political grievances are likely to play a larger role in instigating upris-
ings where elite splits are present that create the space for greater politicization among citi-
zenry [… and] politically driven mobilization in opposition to ruling regimes” (my emphasis). 
On that note, militaries that share ethnic, tribal or sectarian connections with the regime are 
more prone to remain loyal to the latter than military personnel that mainly rely on individual 
incentives, such as material benefits or increased repression (McLauchlin, 2010; Dalacoura 
2012). 
Lastly, foreign support or intervention appears to have been important. This becomes evident 
when comparing the cases of Syria and Libya, for instance. Syrian’s leader al-Assad was able 
to remain in power, while Libya’s President al-Gadaffi was removed. However, Syrian mili-
tary was not particularly more loyal to its regime than the Libyan military to its counterpart, 
while both countries possessed oil resources and neither was a hereditary monarchy (William-
son and Abadeer, 2014). The discrepancy in regime resilience is thus arguably explainable by 
the fourth factor of foreign support or intervention, as al-Gaddafi might have held on to power 
longer without NATO intervention and al-Assad might not have fared so well without contin-
uous Iranian support (Brownlee et al., 2013). Similarly, Bahrain might not have “survived” 
the pressure of the intense Shia protests without Saudi-led GCC actions interfering and stabi-
lizing the Sunni government (Yom, 2012). Moreover, external ties and influences from other 
countries are also increasingly relevant when accounting for the death toll caused by protests, 
as increased death rates can attract foreign media attention that can motivate human rights 
agendas and subsequent pressure from other countries, such as demanding the protection of 
civilians (Korotayev, 2013; The Economist, 2011).  
These macro factors undoubtedly played an important role in the Arab Spring uprisings, but I 
argue that this view is only one part of what determines whether regime change actually 
comes to a country. Analyzing only the few people in power is not sufficient in explaining 
social movements, because the grassroots dynamics of social movements themselves are im-
portant, too. These dynamics portray the action taken by protesters and their coordination ef-
forts linked to the sharing of socio-economic and political grievances (Ottaway and Ham-
zawy, 2011:13). Indeed, protest participants’ behavioral and motivational part in influencing 
social movement outcomes has been highly under-researched (Hoffman and Jamal, 
2014:605). Thus, the perspective of participants’ point of views is the focus of my thesis.  
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1.3 Micro-Level Factors that explain Regime Durability 
While I acknowledge the importance of the macro-level factors in explaining social move-
ments, I believe that the role of the protest participants themselves is often neglected.  
The social movements that began in late 2010 in the Arab world were influenced by both 
people in power and citizens. By not only understanding the mechanisms that enabled leaders 
to stay in power, but also acknowledging the importance of the motivations and opportunities 
that led Arabs to actually participate in protests, we can widen our knowledge of the dynamics 
of social movements. This is in line with the argument of Hoffman and Jamal (2014:604) and 
Eyadat (2012:9), who contend that there is a lack of academic work on who the actual persons 
were that participated in the Arab movements. The motivations that move people to take to 
the streets, I argue, are mostly associated with political, social, and economic forms of relative 
deprivation. This is because although protests among the MENA-countries “shared a common 
call for personal dignity and responsive governments […they also] reflected divergent eco-
nomic grievances and social dynamics” (Anderson, 2011:1). While motivations then provide 
the initial stimulus for protest participation, opportunities allowed for the channeling of these 
feelings through the sharing of them by continuously interacting with other motivated citi-
zens.    
In particular, I argue that citizens who were relatively politically (lack of democracy, free-
dom, and justice), economically (standard of living, unemployment, and inequalities), and/or 
socially (reclaim identity, dignity, and voice) deprived were more likely to participate in the 
protest movements known as the Arab Spring than those who were not. This is because rela-
tive deprivation leads to an active desire to change the status quo. While this contention refers 
to the motivational aspect of promoting protest participation, I contend that opportunities 
complemented these motivations in facilitating Arab Spring participation. Therein, I argue 
that citizens who made use of opportunities such as gaining access to certain social platforms 
(which allowed for the coordination/sharing of feelings) were more likely to have participated 
in the protest movements known as the Arab Spring, as well. This is because opportunities 
and motivations reinforce each other in making it possible for dissatisfied citizens to find so-
lutions to overcome their status of relative deprivation.  
By using micro-level data to attain insight into the thoughts, perceptions and behavior of the 
people that actually participated in protests, I hope to complement our understanding on the 
origins, developments and outcomes (so far) of the Arab Spring movements. Verwimp et al. 
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(2009:307-308) recognize the importance of these micro-foundations, as they argue that these 
reflect the fundamental level in which civil uprisings originate. After all, protest movements 
shape and are shaped by individuals who partake in protests. To make inferences of social 
behavior such as protesting based on macro-level data alone possibly entails introducing bias 
(Freedman, 1999). This fallacy relates to aggregation bias and the assumption that relation-
ships observed for groups necessarily hold for individuals (Ibid). Thus, I employ survey data 
instead of the commonly used aggregate country-level data to complement existent arguments 
for our understanding of protest participation. In doing so, I also hope to find potential differ-
ences in the factors that contributed to participation in demonstrations in countries that expe-
rienced regime change vis-à-vis countries that did not experience such change. I investigate 
the motivations and opportunities that drove Arabs to participate in the demonstrations in two 
countries that experienced regime leadership change, Tunisia and Yemen, and two that did 
not, Algeria and Jordan.  
1.4 Recent Developments in Four Cases  
Ottaway and Hamzawy (2011:4) argue that Jordan and Algeria should have been prone to 
change since they are geographically very closely located to countries that experienced re-
gime change. By comparing the motivations and opportunities of protest participation for 
these two cases vis-à-vis two countries that experienced regime change (Tunisia and Yemen) 
might help us understand what explains the durability of some regimes over others. This sec-
tion provides a brief descriptive account on the developments that led up to the Arab Spring 
for the four cases of Tunisia, Yemen, Algeria, and Jordan.  
Former Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali was the first Arab president to be ousted 
from power in the Arab Spring (Anderson, 2011). The Tunisian revolution, also referred to as 
the Jasmine revolution, was the initial onset of the Arab Spring that spread through the 
MENA-region (Ibid). Tunisia had long established the region’s “best educational system, 
largest middle class, and the strongest organized labor movement” (Ibid). Behind these estab-
lishments, however, Ben Ali’s government was highly corrupt and undermined free expres-
sion and political competition (Ibid). For instance, the Tunisian constitutional referendum in 
2002 established a two-chambered parliament, but also enhanced the power of the president 
by allowing unlimited terms in office and increasing the incumbent’s age limit. Those 
measures allowed Ben Ali to get re-elected in 2004 as well as 2009 with high margins, despite 
allegations of election fraud (Nucifora et al., 2014). Ben Ali also created an image of Tunisia 
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as a modern and tourist-friendly state, but behind this façade the infrastructure and economic 
conditions of most of the country remained underdeveloped (Ibid). Furthermore, Ben Ali’s 
government was entrenched by cronyism and nepotism, as “more than half of Tunisia’s com-
mercial elite were personally related to Ben Ali” – a network called “the Family” (Ibid). 
Eventually, events escalated in late 2010. Demonstrations broke out over unjust law enforce-
ment and brutal security crackdowns, which spread to even remote areas by social media cov-
erage (Anderson, 2011). Demonstrators and activists were often arrested. Shortly before his 
ousting in January 2011, Ben Ali pledged to improve economic conditions, promising to cre-
ate over 300,000 jobs, as well as allow for more press freedoms – unsuccessfully (Ibid).  
Yemen is one of the least developed countries in the Arab world (GIZ, 2013). As a result of 
confined oil reserves that are expected to deplete by 2017, as well as the lack of a diversified 
economy, Yemen is facing overall economic hardship (Ibid). The challenges that Yemen is 
facing include dire poverty, unemployment, a “poor education system and a low literacy rate, 
lack of access to health care and extreme water shortages” (Ibid). Besides these problems, 
Yemen’s situation is even more complicated by the ongoing conflict between Shia-minority 
of Houthi rebels in the North of the country facing the Sunni Yemenis in most of the rest of 
the country. The underdeveloped state structure remains prone to cronyism and corruption. 
For instance, an amendment in 2001 allowed former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, in power 
since 1990, to remain in office subject to re-election until 2013 (Carnegie Endowment, 2008). 
Besides also extending the duration of presidential terms from five to seven years, Saleh’s 
governmental institutions were very prone to corruption due to the government’s inability to 
provide adequate salaries to its employees (Ibid). Overall, Saleh governed strictly authoritari-
an through centralizing and concentrating political power. In February 2012, Saleh resigned 
under protest pressure and Abd Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi took office. This transition occurred 
under a deal brokered by Saudi Arabia, which granted Saleh immunity from prosecution and 
allowed al-Hadi to run unopposed elections (Al Arabiya, 2012). Various political challenges 
that Yemen continues to face include “a strong Al-Qaeda presence, tribal conflict, a seces-
sionist movement in the south, a Shia insurrection in the north, […] and a refugee influx from 
Somalia” (Ibid).  
When Algerian governmental officials refused to accept an Islamist victory in the 1991 elec-
tion, a civil war broke out between the Algerian government and various Islamist groups (The 
Economist, 2014a). In 1999, Abdelaziz Bouteflika became the Algerian president and he pre-
sided over the end of the Algerian civil war in 2002. Since then, Bouteflika has kept Algeria 
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rather peaceful for over more than a decade (Ibid). However, Bouteflika’s governance re-
mained highly corrupt (Ibid). Re-elections in 2004 were highly contested due to fraud allega-
tions (NYTimes, 2004). In addition, two constitutional amendments allowed Bouteflika to run 
for a third and fourth term in 2009 and 2014, respectively. While promising economic re-
forms, the Algerian economy still remains mostly dependent on depleting oil reserves. Pro-
posed economic diversification has had little, if any, success in improving employment and 
living standards (Robbins, 2014). Unsurprisingly, protests demanded regime change and an 
overall improvement in political and economic conditions. But despite some protests, the Ar-
ab Spring has largely ignored Algeria. Algerian President Bouteflika appeared to have man-
aged to appease public dissatisfaction in 2011 by lifting a 19-year-old state of emergency – a 
key demand of anti-government protesters (BBC, 2011). 
Unlike the former three cases of presidential systems, Jordan is a constitutional monarchy. 
As in any other Arab monarchy, the Jordanian king enjoys vast legitimacy and power and is 
“immune from any liability and responsibility” (Constitution, Article 30). Criticizing the 
monarch is often punishable with the death penalty, for instance. In comparison to the Jorda-
nian king and his Royal establishments, institutions like the parliament have almost no power 
(Tobin, 2012). Jordan’s monarchal rules facilitate the prosecution of peaceful dissidents or 
activists, as demonstrations are mostly prohibited. Economically, Jordan is a quite small 
economy in the region and remains heavily reliant on foreign trade and assistance (CIA 
Factbook, 2014). This is because Jordan lacks sufficient water, oil, or other natural resources 
(Ibid). Nonetheless, the country experienced economic growth since King Abdullah II came 
to power in 1999 and introduced economic reforms to attract foreign investment and create 
jobs, which subsequently led to growth (Ibid). Conservative bank policies helped Jordan to 
remain quite stable despite the global financial regression that began in 2008/9 (Ibid). Despite 
of overall economic well-doing, problems such as chronic high rates of poverty, food and fuel 
price inflation, increased unemployment, and corruption sparked protests in early 2011 (To-
bin, 2012). Jordanians were dissatisfied “with the rising price of essential products like fuel, 
and the slow pace of promised political and economic reforms” (Al Arabiya, 2012). The Jor-
danian economy is further struggling by the increasing numbers of Syrian and Iraqi refugees, 
while not receiving adequate international aid to support them (Ibid). The conflict in Syria has 
also undermined “tourism in Jordan – a vital revenue source – as well as external trade, with 
many of its export routes cut when its neighbor closed its borders” (Ibid). These develop-
ments have led to many Jordanians fearing that chaos will spread in their country, even mov-
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ing some protesters to demand the abdication of King Abdullah II and an end to monarchial 
rule (NYTimes, 2012). King Abdullah II initiated a successful response (for now) to these 
protests by using the parliament and prime ministers as scapegoats, dissolving the former for 
new elections and reappointing the latter (CNN, 2012). 
All in all, protests in the four selected countries appeared to have three forms of sources: po-
litical, social, and economic factors.
8
 Politically, protesters demanded enhancements in the 
rule of law, transparency of the government, freedom of speech, and civil and organizational 
rights. Social demands included improvements in social justice and dignity, as well as limit-
ing corruption and nepotism. Economically, protesters pursued demands for better living con-
ditions, enhanced employment opportunities, equal income distribution, and less poverty. 
1.5 Concluding Remarks and Structure 
To recapitulate, this thesis seeks to investigate the factors that contributed to the occurrence of 
protest movements in the Arab world more closely. I argue that traditional literature on social 
movement cannot fully explain the Arab uprisings because of various limitations, such as the 
lack of theoretical work on Arab social movements, the misconception of perceiving Arab 
protesters as irrational actors, and a prevalent neglection of attempting to study social move-
ments from the bottom-up. Thus, I study the Arab Spring movements from such a more in-
trinsic, bottom-up approach to fully understand why some leaders remained in power (at least 
until now) while others did not. My theoretical foundation builds on the grievance-
opportunity debate and expands it from its common association with civil war context to the 
concept of (non-violent) social movements. In particular, I theorize that both relative depriva-
tion and opportunity-based mobilization theory should be used in a complementary approach 
to explain protest participation. Accordingly, I hypothesize that both motivations and oppor-
tunities played a determinant role in Arab Spring participation. In order to uncover if motiva-
tions and opportunities played a divergent role in impacting regime leadership change versus 
resilience, I investigate two countries that experienced the ousting of a former ruler (Tunisia 
and Yemen) vis-à-vis two countries that did not (Jordan and Algeria). I find that perceptions 
of unequal treatment served as the most consistent motivation for Arab Spring participation in 
all four cases, while being a member of a political party and/or civil organization and using 
the internet for political purposes are the most prevalent opportunity factors in promoting Ar-
                                                          
8
 For a more comprehensive review on the timeline of the Arab uprisings, see amongst others Al Jazeera, 2013; 
Al Arabiya, 2012; HIIK, 2014:145-75; Totten, 2014. 
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ab Spring participation in all four cases. In addition, attending religious gatherings appears to 
play a role in explaining the discrepancy in regime durability. More frequent attendance at 
Friday prayers seemed to have contributed to an increased likelihood in Arab Spring partici-
pation in countries that experienced regime leadership change (Tunisia and Yemen), while the 
frequency of such attendance did not significantly relate to protest participation for countries 
that experienced no leadership change (Algeria and Jordan). Although the results are overall 
robust, potential limitations include endogeneity bias and lack of external validity.    
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 establishes the theoretical framework for my 
analysis by reviewing relative deprivation and opportunity-based mobilization theories. Here, 
I argue that both theories should be used in a complementary way to explain social move-
ments. I establish falsifiable hypotheses for both motivations and opportunities that were like-
ly to have promoted Arab Spring participation. Chapter 3 outlines my methodological ap-
proach and research design. This includes a depiction of the data and model, independent and 
dependent variables, as well as assumptions for my binary logistic regression model. This 
chapter also reflects on some potential challenges associated with my research design. In 
Chapter 4, I present and discuss the findings of my statistical analyses, and subsequently con-
duct various goodness-of-fit tests. Chapter 5 tests and confirms the robustness of the findings 
from the previous chapter. Chapter 6 concludes with remarks on potential limitations, policy-
recommendations, as well as suggestions for future research. 
 
  
18 
 
2  Theoretical Framework 
This chapter establishes the theoretical framework for my analysis of protest participation in 
the Arab Spring. First, I briefly highlight why the general field of social movement theories is 
adequate for analyzing the Arab movements. Second, I review the evolution of relative depri-
vation theory and establish corresponding hypotheses relating to the Arab Spring. Third, an 
outline of resource mobilization theory depicts the main criticisms of relative deprivation the-
ory. Here, I establish falsifiable hypotheses as well. Fourth, I address the critique of relative 
deprivation and explain how it still matters today. Fifth, I justify why I use a complementary 
approach of motivational elements of relative deprivation theory with opportunity-based parts 
of resource mobilization theory to explain Arab Spring participation. While both motivations 
and opportunities are important for explaining protest participation, I argue that these theories 
do not necessarily contradict but rather complement each other.  
2.1 Theorizing the Arab Spring: Why Social Movement Theory? 
Why do people protest? There exists a wide range of theories that explain the emergence, de-
velopments and outcomes of social movements. Some of the most commonly known of these 
theories are relative deprivation theory, resource-mobilization theory, political process theory, 
and new social movement theories.
9
  
Social movements originate when a group of people within a community – a group that is 
usually without much influential power in society – employs unconventional means to pro-
mote or resist social change (Monnier, 2010). Therein, social movement implies collective 
action.10 Tarrow (1998) argues that every society experiences times when social movements 
are rare and other times when many movements occur, referring to the latter as waves of pro-
tests. These waves are often the result of various external factors, such as conflict, economic 
depression, societal crises and other developments (Ibid). In the last half century, transnation-
al protest movements emerged on issues concerning social, economic and political conse-
quences of globalization, such as Greenpeace for example (Zald, 1992).11  
                                                          
9
 For a review on social movements: McAdam et al. (1996), Davis et al. (2005), Kirmani (2008), Monnier 
(2010). 
10
 For a comprehensive overview on revolution, collective action and social movements, see among others: 
Skocpol (1979), McAdam et al. (1996), Giugni et al. (1999), Walker and Smith (2002), Meyer (2004), Goodwin 
and Jasper (2009), Earle (2011), Blee (2012).  
11
 Transnational movements can cut across different lines of actors and regions (state, region and global). See for 
instance: Smith et al. (1997); Tarrow (2003). 
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Social movements can be divided into different types. Depending on the kind of change de-
sired as well as the target, there exist four types of social movements: alternative, redemptive, 
reformative and revolutionary-transformative (Monnier, 2010). Table 2.1 depicts these types 
of movements. 
Table 2.1: Types of Social Movements 
                                                                      Type of Change 
 
Target 
 Partial/Limited Radical/Total 
Individual Alternative Redemptive 
Society Reformative Revolutionary 
Source: Monnier, 2010. 
Since the Arab Spring reflected protest movements with desired change in society as a whole, 
this thesis focuses on reformative and revolutionary-transformative social movements.   
Naturally, it is impossible to know exactly what another person is thinking. To know with 
absolute certainty the factors that move a person to participate in protest movements is impos-
sible, since one would have to know that person’s exact thoughts and perceptions. But while it 
is – for obvious reasons – ethically and morally infeasible to physically evaluate the minds of 
protesters, there has been much work done in the area of social psychology that helps us un-
derstand the thought processes of individuals (Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2010). 
Klandermans (2004:269), for example, focuses on such an approach in explaining why social 
movements emerge and why people participate in them. He argues that social psychology 
provides the best answers to the question on why individuals choose to partake in costly so-
cial movements (Ibid). While not understanding the motives and perceptions of protest partic-
ipants with a hundred percent certainty, academic works like these allow us to identify rele-
vant factors that contribute to explaining individuals’ participation in social movements.      
In order to fully conceptualize and understand participation in the Arab Spring, I analyze the 
psychological attitudes and perceptions of protest participants through social movement theo-
ry. Using social movement theory to interpret collective action in the Arab countries helps to 
understand the “social, cultural and political rootedness of political advocacy and activism” 
better (Ben Moussa, 2013:62).  
I analyze the factors that encouraged Arabs to participate in the protest movements through a 
combination of two theories of social movement. The first is relative deprivation theory, 
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which takes into account people’s motivations through feelings, ideas and perceptions. The 
Arab movements have been argued to be grounded in grievances and frustration, revolving 
around the lack of dignity and unfair living conditions (Eyadat, 2012). This argument of 
grievances being the causal determinant is relevant because the mechanisms that are essential 
for sustaining social movements (e.g. organizational capabilities or a vibrant political sphere) 
are mostly missing in the Arab world (Ibid).  
The second theory is resource mobilization, which relates to the opportunity structures for 
protest participation. Opportunistic calculations such as participants’ cost-benefit analyses of 
using available resources are argued to play an essential role in coordinating protest participa-
tion. For example, new social media, political parties or religious venues allow information to 
flow more easily, making it easier for the population to overcome collective action problems 
(Lichbach, 1995; Spier, 2011).  
By using a hybrid approach of those two social movement theories, I base my theoretical 
framework on Klandermans’ argument for grievances, resources and opportunities being 
complementary rather than opposing explanations for protest participations. He states that:  
“Social Movements come into being because people who are aggrieved and have the 
resources to mobilize seize the political opportunities they perceive.[…] Grievance 
theory attempts to understand the demand side of political protests; resource mobili-
zation theory the supply side; and opportunity theory the interaction between the re-
sulting social movement activity and its political environment.” 
Klandermans (2004:276,281) 
Accordingly, this chapter connects the elements of the motivations caused by grievances (rel-
ative deprivation) with the resource-based opportunistic behavior, and establishes correspond-
ing hypotheses for Arabs participating in the protest movements.  
2.2 A Review of Relative Deprivation Theory 
Relative deprivation (RD) theory belongs to a broader category of interdisciplinary work 
called social movement theory, which relates to the study of social mobilization.
12
 The con-
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 Relative deprivation theory has received widespread attention in various fields of social sciences, including 
psychology, economics and sociology. Accordingly, there exists nowadays no unambiguous definition of the 
theory, as it is “the foundation of multiple theories of social psychology including frustration-aggression theory, 
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cept of RD has been used to both measure social justice and inequality and conduct research 
on grievance, social hostility and aggression (Rummel, 1977).  
The theory of relative deprivation was mostly developed in the 1960s and 1970s. As the name 
suggests, RD refers to feelings of deprivation or discontent which relate to a desired point of 
reference (Flynn; 2011:100). According to RD theorists, the theory can be divided into two 
forms of feeling relatively deprived: egoistic (or personal) and fraternalistic (or group) rela-
tive deprivation (Walker and Smith, 2002:3). While the former refers to feeling deprived as a 
unique individual as a consequence of intrapersonal or interpersonal social comparisons, the 
latter relates to feeling deprived as a representative group member which results from inter-
group comparisons (Ibid:2-3). This distinction is essential because “fraternalist deprivation 
uniquely generates agitation for or against structural change” (Ibid:15). This is because frater-
nalist deprivation includes a normative element relating to reference groups – something that 
Runciman (1966:34) identifies as “lateral solidarity” or a feeling of kinship with other mem-
bers of someone’s membership group. Without this normative concept, the perceived lack of 
eligibility or entitlement moves an individual to find personal rather than collective solutions 
to overcome the state of deprivation. I focus on fraternalistic RD because the feelings of rela-
tive deprivation had to be shared among a large group to spur Arab protest participation.  
But what exactly is relative deprivation? Flynn (2011:100) argues that “feelings of relative 
deprivation arise when desires become legitimate expectations and those desires are blocked 
by society.” Therein, the feeling of deprivation must always be associated with an assessment 
of one person or group in comparison to another person or group. Davis (1959) established a 
limited rational choice model with certain assumptions that explains how citizens experience 
relative deprivation.
13
 He distinguished between an Ego system which relates to one’s own 
assessment relative to one’s own past or future and an Alter system which describes one’s 
own assessment relative to a reference group (Ibid). If a person (ego) is deprived in compari-
son to a non-deprived person (alter) – and ego is aware of this discrepancy – then the resulting 
state is called relative deprivation (Ibid:283).  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
equity theory, social comparison theory, and reference group theory” (Flynn, 2011:101). For more in-depth in-
formation see also Walker and Smith (2002).  
13
 The most essential of these assumptions include the fragmentation argument (a society is divided into multiple 
dichotomous classes, with at least one of these being divided into deprived and non-deprived citizens), the refer-
ence group argument (everyone in the society compares with everyone else; constantly over time) and the depri-
vation argument (the comparisons between different groups can lead to hostile feelings); (Davis, 1959).   
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Because the feeling of relative deprivation entails social dissatisfaction, RD scholars argue 
that collective feelings of relative deprivation eventually lead to social movements, as feelings 
of deprivation over status, wealth or power can push people to attend protest movements and 
demand social change (Morrison, 1971; Taylor, 2002:14). Dube and Guimond (1986:207) 
argue that perceptions of intergroup inequality and feelings of group discontent reflect essen-
tial causal mechanisms that can lead to social movements. More specifically, they “explicitly 
acknowledged affect [of fraternal deprivation] when they examined perceptions of inequality 
as one precursor of group discontent, which then motivates social protest” (Taylor, 2002:18).  
The salience of protest movements is often caused by dissatisfaction reinforced through 
cleavages, such as ethnic, religious, socio-economic and others (Ascher and Mirovitskaya, 
2012:169). An increase in the intensity of cleavages is a trigger of transforming these into 
political unrests, implicating perceptions of changed conditions or expectations (Ibid:169-
170). Therein, Ted Gurr (1970:23) states that “relative deprivation theory is the tension that 
develops from a discrepancy between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’ of collective value satisfaction, 
and that disposes men to violence.” RD theory thus encompasses motivations for actions, as 
feelings can - but not necessarily must - be transformed into behavioral effects of deprivation 
(such as joining protest marches, participating in sit-ins or even conducting violent acts). 
The initial argument of RD leading to collective action entailed that the deprived citizens act-
ed on emotions rather than rationality, resembling irrational actors or angry mobs, over-
whelmed by a collective mentality and perceived as threats to society (Park, 1927; Caren, 
2007:1). This perception of irrationality changed with the introduction of the work of Olson 
(1965), who explored the rational and deliberate choices individuals made before participating 
in collective action such as protest movements. By building on the works of Olson (1965), 
Davis (1959) and Davies (1962), Gurr (1970) published the probably best-known work on the 
theory of relative deprivation in the book “Why Men Rebel.” Specifically, Gurr (1970:24) 
defines “relative deprivation (RD) […] as actors’ perception of discrepancy between their 
value expectations and their value capabilities.” Therein, values relate to “desired events, ob-
jects, and conditions for which men strive” (Ibid:25). While value expectations thus relate to 
the goods and conditions of life that people believe themselves to be rightfully entitled to, 
value capabilities are the respective goods and conditions they think they are capable of at-
taining and keeping (Ibid:24-28).  
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The essential part to note is that RD entails an actor’s perception, which alludes to an individ-
ual’s state of mind. This is, in my opinion, important because as perceptions are subjective so 
must be deprivation. It is the subjective perception of some kind of exclusion that causes feel-
ings of relative deprivation. This means that something that causes relative deprivation for 
one person must not necessarily cause relative deprivation for another person. The subjective 
act of comparison allows individual assessments of what someone perceives to be good or 
bad. A person is individually assigning values and subjective meaning through thoughts and 
experiences. Hence, relative deprivation is a person’s subjective assessment of a matter.  
Recalling Gurr’s definition above, the state of mind of being relatively deprived exists when 
there is a discrepancy between two things: value expectations and capabilities. Basically, Gurr 
argues that there is an essential link between what one thinks one can justly (as in “one is enti-
tled to”) expect to have and what one thinks one is capable of attaining. This is not simply a 
comparison between what one possesses and what one wants to possess. Instead, one consid-
ers what one should expect to have by comparing one’s past and present conditions with an 
expected future scenario which builds upon justified perceptions through societal norms. This 
means that expectations entail a normative element of rightful entitlement, as they must be 
justifiable in that most citizens should be entitled to receive them as a collectivity, and not 
reflect individualistic illusions of unrealistic expectations (Taylor, 2002:14). An unrealistic 
expectation could be, for example, someone wanting a million dollars, while not being justly 
entitled to that amount of money due to low education, a low-paying job, etc. Contrary to the 
expectations, the capabilities relate to the values that one is capable of keeping and/or enhanc-
ing by one’s own skills and surroundings.14 Gurr (1970) correspondingly links subjective de-
sires with perceived justice and capabilities; arguing that frustration is caused by not attaining 
justifiable desires, which in turn creates the potential for collective violence or aggression.   
In other words, if the gap between capabilities and expectations widens, people become unsat-
isfied - which can lead to frustration, anger, and resentment. This frustration is thereby a con-
sequence of being incapable of attaining justified desires. When expectations are not met, a 
person gets frustrated and tries to change the status quo, channeling the anger and frustration 
towards the people that are to blame, potentially taking action in the form of protest move-
ments. But Gurr (1970:46) contends that since “RD is a psychically uncomfortable condition, 
men tend over the long run to adjust their value expectations to their value capabilities.” Thus, 
                                                          
14
 As one would naturally never expect to get less than what one is (or believes to be) capable of getting, value 
capabilities are always below (or at least equal to) value expectations. This is also depicted in Figure 2.1. 
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value capabilities and value expectations have a normal relationship of parallel lines. Only if 
they diverge from each other, creating a gap, does relative deprivation occur. In that, Gurr 
(Ibid:46-56) distinguishes between three patterns of relative deprivation: decremental, aspira-
tional and progressive deprivation. While all three patterns explain political violence to some 
extent, the most cited pattern is progressive deprivation which follows the so-called j-curve 
effect developed by Davies (Ibid:46). The graph below depicts Gurr’s progressive pattern. 
Figure 2.1: The Progressive Pattern of Relative Deprivation 
 
As Figure 2.1 illustrates, relative deprivation occurs when there is a disparity between expec-
tations and reality. As time passes, the gap between what people expect and what they get 
suddenly widens, which leads to stress, frustration, and potentially even participation in social 
movements. This progressive pattern follows Davies’ j-curve effect, which relates to the con-
cept of social uprisings being more likely to occur after long-lasting socio-economic growth, 
followed by a harsh backdrop – and this might be caused, among other factors, by a financial 
crisis (Davies, 1962:6). In Gurr’s (1970:46) words, there “is substantial and simultaneous 
increase in expectations and decrease in capabilities.” The gap between expectations and re-
ality then leads to frustration; and frustration in turn leads to aggression – resembling a frus-
tration-aggression mechanism (Ibid:30). This does not mean that every form of frustration 
must lead to aggression, but rather indicates its increased likelihood when expectations are not 
met. 
                     Source: Modified Graph based on Davies’ j-curve effect (Davies, 1962:6) 
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Similar to Gurr, Davies (1973:246-47) also connects deprivation to violence, stating that “vio-
lence is always a response to frustration.” He further argues in regards to the j-curve effect 
that “the psychological basis lies in the frustration of basic needs, a frustration induced by the 
sudden reversal in gratifications” (Ibid:251). The prevalence of this j-curve effect or progres-
sive deprivation over the other patterns of relative deprivation is indeed not that surprising if 
taking into account that the historical empirical record indicates that “revolutions and rebel-
lions do not appear when people are most deprived or oppressed, but when there has been a 
period of improving conditions” (Akpeninor, 2012:537).15  
2.2.1 Motivations leading to Arab Spring Participation 
Based on the motivational aspects elaborated so far, it is reasonable to establish corresponding 
falsifiable hypotheses on the actual factors that explain participation in the Arab Spring. The 
probably most prevalent argument for the occurrence of Arab protests lies in economic pres-
sures caused by changes in the global economy. As illustrated by Figure 2.2, the world reces-
sion of the late 2000s led to a rise in global prices such as wheat, corn and rice. This posed a 
problem to Arab countries because “of the top 20 wheat importers for 2010, almost half are 
Middle Eastern countries” (Ciezaldo, 2011).16 Therein, food became a powerful symbol of 
everything citizens could not have (Ibid).
17
 Further, global recession also led to lower work 
remittances as well as domestic fuel and fiscal crises in the region (el-Meehy, 2014:5). As a 
result, Ncube and Anyanwu (2012:2) show that the MENA countries have had “gross socio-
economic inequality perpetuated by long-entrenched ‘elite’ in power”, fuelling the feelings of 
resentment of already high food prices. Indeed, as Figure 2.3 indicates, GDP growth in the 
Arab world has been comparatively high during the last decade. Thus, the governing elite was 
not necessarily much worse off than in previous years, while the average citizens felt more 
and more deprived. Thus, factors such as increased food prices, price inflation and overall 
income inequality are argued to have all played substantial parts in inciting the Arab protests. 
As hunger and inequality seemed to have motivated protest participation, the first hypothesis 
follows citizens’ perception of unjust living conditions:  
                                                          
15
 Note Figure A.7 in the Appendix: The divergent level of satisfaction with government over time in Yemen and 
Tunisia vis-à-vis Jordan and Algeria, which is a first sign of discrepancy in outcome (regime change/resilience).  
16
 The World Bank estimated, for example, that price of wheat, which the MENA-region heavily imports, dou-
bled between March 2010 and February 2011 (el-Meehy, 2014:5). 
17
 For more specific information on food insecurity in the region, see Table A.9 in Appendix.  
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Hypothesis 1: Citizens who perceived themselves as being treated unequally compared to 
other citizens were more likely to participate in the protests known as the Arab 
Spring. 
Figure 2.2: Global Food Price Index, 2006-2014
18
 
 
Note: The Food Price Index weighs export prices of a variety of food commodities around the world in nominal U.S. dollar 
prices, 2010 = 100. Note that the previous base, 2005 = 100, has now been changed to 2010.  
Source: World Bank, 2014.  
Figure 2.3: GDP growth in the MENA-region, 2000-2010 
(by region, percent change, constant prices) 
 
Source: O’Sullivan et al., 2011:10 
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 Figure 2.2 shows the development of food prices from 2006 to 2014. Acknowledging the spike in prices in 
early 2008, one might wonder why the Arab Spring did not occur back then. Indeed, some countries like Tunisia 
and Egypt experienced protests in 2007 and 2008 (Ansani and Daniele, 2012:8). While the answer to the ques-
tion why these protests did not develop into movements as big as in 2010-2011 might be manifold, one part of 
the explanation could be that the food price increased rather gradually in a positive manner before 2008. Thus, 
expectations might have been closer to reality, as the overall tendency has already reflected a growing price over 
some time. In late 2010, however, there is a sharp reversion of prices (especially in grains) after a substantial 
period of declining prices. Here, citizens might have expected a continuous trend of prices decreasing further (or 
at least remaining stable), but the drastic return to higher prices in a short period of time increased the gap be-
tween expectations and reality too much, signifying a progressive deprivation pattern.   
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An increase in unemployment usually leads to feelings of dissatisfaction, too. Increased un-
employment is often grounded in demographic changes, particularly resulting from growing 
segments of youth.
19
 el-Meehy (2014:5) argues, for example, that although broad segments of 
society participated in protests, the most dominant segment appeared to be the youth. This 
might not least be because of the demographics of the MENA-region as on average approxi-
mately twenty percent of the population are between 15 and 24 years old (Mulderig, 2013:5). 
And with just over half of the Arab population being under the age of 25, the changing age 
structure of the region has created challenges to governments, especially regarding the em-
ployment sector and corresponding issues such as the lack of job creation (Mirkin, 2013).  
Figure 2.4: Youth Unemployment as Percentage of Total Unemployment (2008-9) 
 
  Source: Cordesman, 2011:11 
 
Figure 2.4 indicates that in most Arab countries more than half of the unemployed citizens 
were young Arab citizens. The empirical trends therein suggest a deepening of relative depri-
vation due to unemployment among citizens. Attaining middle class status was most often 
only achieved by working for the government (Springborg, 2011:87). However, the lack of 
job opportunities in the already bloated public services, as well as rigid labour market struc-
tures and social insurance policies led to more and more dissatisfaction among non-employed 
citizens (el-Meehy, 2014:12). In accordance, Diwan (2012:5) argues that the Arab regimes, 
often prone to crony capitalism, are “perceived to have generated unacceptable inequalities, 
directly by supporting the growth of a class of super-rich, and indirectly by being unable to 
                                                          
19
 For a comprehensive literature review on the role of demographic changes in general and the deprived seg-
ment of the youth (the “youth bulge”) in particular generating political turmoil and instability, see: Choucri, 
1973; Huntington, 1996; Urdal, 2004; Goldstone et al. 2012; Ben Moussa, 2013. 
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create sufficient good jobs for the newly educated middle class.”20 Further, Mulderig 
(2013:22) and Noueihed (2012) assert that Arab youth have been prohibited from fully ac-
cessing civil society with fair access to quality education, sustainable and adequate employ-
ment, and so forth, despite vast cultural and economic development in the region. The feeling 
of social exclusion in form of being rejected from the labour market facilitated feelings of 
dissatisfaction, as young Arabs had no opportunity to improve their living conditions. Without 
a job many struggled to maintain living standards, relying mostly on loans they could not pay 
back (Abdel-nour, 2012:159). These developments fostered feelings of resentment, which 
were further enhanced by overall growing economies.
21
 Assaad and Roudi-Fahimi (2007:1) 
argue, for example, that “despite a wealth of oil resources and major improvements in health 
and education over the past few decades, this region’s political, social, and economic systems 
have not evolved in a way that effectively meets the changing needs of its rapidly growing 
young population.” Thus, the second hypothesis includes an interaction term of unemploy-
ment and youth. 
Hypothesis 2: Citizens who were both unemployed and young (< 25) were more likely to par-
ticipate in the protests known as the Arab Spring than those who were not.  
A related factor to the unemployed youth hypothesis is education. Urdal (2004:4) argues that 
educated people may engage in protest activity and potential violent acts if their expectations 
of influence in society and access to elite positions are not met. Assaad and Roudi-Fahimi 
(2007) equally noticed the importance of education, as they contend that increased education 
raises the expectations and aspirations of young people, therein enhancing frustration if un-
employed. As increased education is usually associated with increased employability expecta-
tions, these expectations were not met in the MENA-region. With changing demographics and 
improvements in education, the regional governments did too little to simultaneously provide 
sufficient and adequate jobs (Ibid.).
22
  
                                                          
20
 Cronyism undermines growth, jobs and competition (The Economist, 2014b).  
21
 Indeed, Momami (2013) states that the “Arab Spring started in countries that had economic growth and were 
leading economic reformers: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and even Syria were ‘successfully liberalizing’ their econo-
mies, according to the World Bank, the IMF, and rating agencies.”  
22
 The governments tried to appease the public by finding solutions to the problem of increased unemployment. 
el-Meehy (2014:14) argues, for example, that “both Egypt and Tunisia promote[d] Micro-Small and Medium 
Enterprises (MSME) as a solution to rising unemployment. However, the agencies entrusted with the extension 
of subsidized credit for small entrepreneurs and the development of this sector of the economy were ineffective.” 
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Figure 2.5: (Estimated) Informal Employment in selected Arab countries 
(as percent of total non-agricultural employment, 2000-2007) 
 
 
The low official employment rate of young Arabs shown by Figure 2.4 combined with the 
relative high estimated employment rate in the informal sector depicted by Figure 2.5 indi-
cates that educated Arabs probably looked for alternative ways to improve their conditions, as 
official employment such as well-paid jobs hardly existed and low-paid jobs were hard to 
come by. The statement of a Tunisian graduate highlights this job-related dilemma: 
“If you apply for a low-paid job they don't take you because you have a degree, 
 so you have to work for yourself.” (Noueihed, 2012) 
The essential problem in regards to education relates to the argument that the Arab youth is 
over-educated, but not well-educated (Mulderig, 2013:13-4; Brookings Institution, 2014). 
While being educated but not possessing the necessary skills to stay competitive in the rapidly 
changing global market, the educational achievements are often not internationally recognized 
– thereby not only diminishing domestic job opportunities but also often inhibiting the edu-
cated Arab segment to migrate for work (Adams and Winthrop, 2011). Thus, education ap-
pears to have played a role in causing frustration and therein motivating protest participation. 
Hypothesis 3:  Citizens who attained higher education were more likely to participate in the 
protests known as the Arab Spring than those who attained less education. 
While recognizing the relevance of these socio-economic sources of relative deprivation, I 
turn now to the political sources. Political grievances based on issues like the suppression of 
basic freedoms like voting in free and fair elections might play an additional role in explain-
ing the protest movements. For example, being politically deprived can entail the following: 
Source: O’Sullivan et al., 2011:4 
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First, a person experiences a period of liberalization with enhanced political rights. Then, that 
person expects further liberalizing reforms towards more democratization. However, these 
expectations are not fulfilled. Accordingly, the person feels relatively politically deprived. 
The MENA countries did indeed partially liberalize in the decades prior to the Arab Spring 
(Brumberg, 2002; Lust-Okar, 2003). In order to protect their power, act against various 
movements or simply attract foreign trade and investment (conditionality of “good govern-
ance”), regional leaders established liberal mechanisms in their states, such as elections. 
However, the states remained authoritarian and the liberalization efforts appeared to be rather 
façade than reality, as liberal elements such as elections were mostly non-democratic and 
highly corrupt (Ibid). These regimes are referred to illiberal democracies, as they represent 
“democratically” elected regimes that deprive their citizens of basic rights and freedoms (Za-
karia, 1997).
23
 Indeed, Banik (2010:110) argues that elections “held in 2007 in Egypt, Jordan, 
Algeria, Syria, Morocco, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia appear […] to have largely benefited 
authoritarian rulers who have used the event of organising an election to strengthen their 
claims of legitimacy.” In such, electoral fraud and intimidation are no rarity in the region 
(Ibid). Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that Arab Spring participation involved relative 
political deprivation as well. Egypt’s original protest movement on January 25th, 2011 en-
tailed a political rationale, for instance, namely shaming the brutal police apparatus by show-
ing slogans like “Freedom and human dignity” or “We are all Khaled Saeed” (el-Meehy, 
2014:14-5).
24
 In Tunisia, political demands transformed after economic ones, as violent gov-
ernmental actions against citizens eventually turned into movements demanding more civil 
rights and the resignation of Ben Ali (Ibid). Therein, political and socio-economic forms of 
relative deprivation appear to have complemented and potentially even reinforced each other. 
Hence, relative deprivation as a cause of political grievances facilitates another hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4:  Citizens who perceived their freedom of expression to be guaranteed were less 
likely to participate in protests known as the Arab Spring than those who did 
not.  
 
                                                          
23
 See also Beetham (1999) who argues that substantial democracy requires both negative freedom (absence of 
external interference in personal life) as well as positive freedom (state-generated opportunities to provide better 
conditions for citizens to enjoy their freedom). 
24
 The brutal police crackdown leading to Khaled Saeed’s death arguably sparked the protests in Egypt. 
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2.3 Resource Mobilization Theory and Opportunity Structures 
As the name suggests, resource mobilization theory focuses on resources, with the outcome of 
social movements being mainly dependent on the capacity to mobilize and efficiently manage 
resources (Oberschall, 1973). In that context, resources can relate to finances, equipment, 
networks, coordination, alliances, and so forth (Ibid). Resource mobilization theory is usually 
regarded as criticism to relative deprivation theory.  
Following the resource mobilization argument, McCarthy and Zald (1977) argue that citizen’s 
support for a social movement does not solely depend on oppression and feelings of resent-
ment or deprivation, but that social movements require particular resources, such as connec-
tions to other institutions, parties or movements, and potential external links. Tilly (1978) 
expanded on these thoughts, arguing that collective violence is the result of certain opportuni-
ty structures which enhance group competition for power in a society. By introducing the ra-
tional element of a cost-benefit analysis, citizens thereby – instead of acting on emotion-based 
grievances – consciously weigh their chances of collective action being successful or not 
(Ibid; Tarrow, 1998). Thus, resource mobilization emphasizes the role of the reactions by the 
state and its institutions, which arguably play a greater part in the occurrence of social move-
ments than feelings of relative deprivation. Collective action is argued to be more of a con-
scious choice to improve one’s conditions for particular reasons (e.g. for higher causes in the 
name of “God”, for personal glory or friendship, or as a cause of greed), instead of the for-
merly assumed more emotional (and often irrational) response of aggression and frustration.  
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue for just such a conscious decision-making process in civil 
war onset. They contend that citizens join rebellions because of greed-based calculations ra-
ther than grievances. This argument has led to vast academic attention during the last decade, 
igniting the so-called greed-grievance debate.
25
 However, instead of explaining social move-
ments, this debate focuses mostly on the causes of civil war. 
Nevertheless, I argue that the debate on greed versus grievances as causes of civil war onset 
can be transferred to similar thoughts on causes of social movements. After all, Gurr’s frustra-
tion-aggression mechanism reflects very much the grievance argument, while the greed argu-
ment appears to resemble much of the rational choice element of cost-benefit calculations 
highlighted by resource mobilization theory.  
                                                          
25
 For a review on the greed-grievance debate, see among others: Fearon and Laitin (2003), Murshed and Tad-
joeddin (2009), Cederman et al. (2013). 
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The core of greed theory consists of the so-called collective action problem which grievance-
based explanations appear to ignore (Olson, 1965). Collier (1999) specified this collective 
action problem by dividing it into the free-rider problem, the coordination problem, and the 
time-consistency problem – each constituting essential parts in the explanation of why people 
rebel and more importantly, why they so often fail to rebel.
26
  
Critics have also pointed to the indirect link between relative deprivation and social move-
ments. Morrison (1971), for example, argues that while absolute deprivation can certainly be 
associated with feelings of dissatisfaction and the consequent potential for action, feelings of 
being relatively deprived can, but not must, cause social movements and collective identity. 
Indeed, the question arises on why so few revolutions occurred throughout history despite the 
fact that a lot of people must have felt relatively deprived (Kornblum, 2012:218). Cases of 
inaction allow for easy falsification of the theory of relative deprivation causing collective 
action against the state. This empirical evidence is probably the biggest criticism against rela-
tive deprivation theory.  
The mixed empirical results also put Gurr’s theory of the frustration-aggression mechanism 
explaining collective violence into question. Thereby, frustration can cause aggression but can 
equally likely lead to non-aggression. Indeed, Akpeninor (2012:536) underlines this possibil-
ity of non-aggressive behavior, stating that “a frustrated person may regress; he may withdraw 
from human interaction associated with the frustration, absorb it into a higher goal, or try to 
cope with it.” 
2.3.1 Opportunities facilitating Arab Spring Participation 
These opportunity-based structures allow us to establish corresponding falsifiable hypotheses 
of factors that arguably facilitated participation in the Arab Spring. One of these relates to 
political affinity. Naturally, a person that is more affiliated with politics and part of a political 
party is more likely to be interested in political affairs. Politically affiliated citizens are more 
likely to critically assess their governance, independent of supporting or opposing it. A highly 
                                                          
26
 The free-rider (a), coordination (b), and time-consistency (c) problems refer to the lack of incentive for citi-
zens to join a rebellion, mostly because of the lack of economic rewards, thereby (a) letting others fight instead 
of risking one’s own life, (b) the need of recruiting sufficient rebels to achieve one’s cause which is often unlike-
ly due to the high risk of death (it becomes easier the more people participate in an uprising, but the first few 
hundred recruits are the most difficult to convince), and (c) fighting and risking one’s life before justice (e.g. 
overthrown of government) is achieved. Collier thereby argues that economic rewards are more likely to over-
come these problems as people have a material incentive to join a rebellion other than grievance or hatred.    
For more information, see also Cederman et al. (2010).  
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traditional and religious person could, for example, support the rule of an authoritarian state 
that enacts strict governance through Shari’a law. If a party exists that supports this form of 
governance, this person will most likely join that party. On the other hand, a person that is 
more critical of Shari’a law enforcement and supports more democratic liberalization in ac-
cordance to the governance of Western states might join a political party to support those 
views (if such a party exists/is allowed). Hence, a politically affiliated person will have a lot 
to win and lose when dealing with political issues. Politically interested persons are then more 
likely to participate in social movements in order to support their political preferences. Fur-
thermore, political parties or other civic organizations establish essential links for citizens to 
connect, exchange their views, and actively participate in civil society. These measures in-
clude various resources, such as the provision of venues for people to meet, interact and po-
tentially plan rallies and demonstrations. Thus, the political platforms enable citizens to over-
come potential collective action problems and subsequently increase the likelihood of protest 
participation. The following hypothesis reflects this assumption. 
Hypothesis 5: Citizens who were a member of a political party and/or civil organizations were 
more likely to participate in protests known as the Arab Spring than those who 
were not. 
New social media provides a further explanation on how Arabs shared their grievances. Inter-
net access through mobile devices and worldwide television broadcast has connected the 
world’s urban citizens with those of even very remote areas, providing instant communication 
to any number of people (Frieden, 2007:396; Assaad and Roudi-Fahimi, 2007:4). Unsurpris-
ingly, scholars have often stated the significance of new social media, especially Facebook, in 
organizing Arab citizens’ protest movements.27 Social media is argued to have created a plat-
form for the rapid formation of mass protests, creating “a cybernetic ecology of civil society 
[… that allows] coordinating the masses and neutralizing governments’ narratives” (Chorev, 
2012:138). However, new social media remains an under-researched topic in the political 
sphere in general and largely ignored by academic work on collective action in the context of 
Muslim/Arab societies in particular (Ben Moussa, 2013:48-9). Accordingly, there exists no 
clear consensus on the actual impact social media had on the regional developments. 
                                                          
27
 For various contributions, see Price, 2008; Joffé, 2011; Khondker, 2011; Comunello and Anzera, 2012; Khan, 
2012; Wolfsfeld et al., 2013. 
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On the one side, the Egyptian uprising was perceived as a prime example of how social media 
can mobilize collective action among vast amounts of citizens, pushing them to protest for 
their rights and demands (Lynch, 2011; Ben Moussa, 2013; Pew Research Center, 2013a).
28
 
Tarzi (2011:21) identified social media, and especially Facebook, as “a game changer in 
Egypt primarily because it bridged the gap between social classes.” New social media has 
experienced exponential growth over the last decade (ASMR, 2012, Chorev, 2012:121). 
While scholars admit social media being relevant, it is arguably less of a determinant factor 
but rather an accelerator to general structural conditions (Khan, 2012; Chorev, 2012:120; Al-
Momani, 2011:159). Moreover, governments use the internet as well, mostly to undermine 
protests movements by banning and blocking internet pages or spreading false news.
29
 Jones 
(2013) argues, for example, that the Bahraini regime used social media tactics like naming 
and shaming, offline intelligence gathering and passive observation to suppress both online 
and offline dissent. 
On the other side, social media’s connection to protests is denied altogether (Aljabre, 2013). 
For example, Aday et al. (2013:1) argue that “new media [… like Twitter] did not appear to 
play a significant role in either in-country collective action or regional diffusion.” Samin 
(2012:3) contends that the underlying dynamics of a society rather than internet explain the 
emergence and persistence of opposition movements. He highlights that the “complicated 
conflicts in Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, and Libya have demonstrated [that] underlying social and 
political dynamics continue to dictate political outcomes, with technology playing a more 
complex and less determinant role than is conventionally ascribed to it” (Ibid:3). 
I argue that new social media contributed essentially to the movements. New technology 
promotes social movements through three mechanisms, namely reduction of participation 
costs, promotion of collective identity, and creation of a community (Garrett, 2006). New 
social media has not only given Arab citizens a channel to make their voice heard – which 
strict government regulations and surveillance otherwise inhibits – but also enabled them to 
evade repressive governments’ crackdowns caused by proactive demands for more freedoms 
and rights. By creating an alternative political space for public discussion online which re-
mained “one step beyond that of law enforcement capabilities”, Arab citizens were now able 
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 Frangonikolopoulus (2012:17) states that “the uprisings were just the boiling point reached after several years 
of increasing dissent and efforts to change from below, both virtual (through the mushrooming of the blog-
osphere and digital activism) and real (through social non-movements).” 
29
 Nevertheless, “net-savvy Internet users used proxies and mirror sites and worked with fellow activists abroad 
to bypass state censorship” (Noueihed and Warren, 2012:45). 
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to connect both on a personal as well as on a diffuse level at the same time (Wade, 2003:112). 
Unlike old media, internet is more anonymous and therein safer to use. New social media 
helped citizens to become connected and organized by a number of skillful activists who used 
the platforms to foster subaltern and oppositional politics, support linkages between different 
political groups, and thus promote mass rallies (Howard et al., 2011; Ben Moussa, 2013:51). 
It connected people from different segments of society to share their feelings of frustration 
and dissatisfaction through a collective identity. The most prevalent new media platforms in 
the region are Facebook, Twitter and Youtube. I use the former because of data availability 
and representativeness (see for instance Figures A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix). Also, Ben 
Moussa (2013:61) stated that “prior to the eruption of street protests and popular uprisings in 
Tunisia and Egypt, […] social media, mainly Facebook, were the main arena of political dis-
sent and mobilization” (my emphasis). Thus, new social media provides another hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 6: Citizens who were a member of or a participant in a Facebook page/used inter-
net for political matters were more likely to participate in protests known as the 
Arab Spring than those who were/did not. 
Finally, Kirmani (2008:26-7) argues that scholars have often been neglecting the role of an-
other relevant factor in explaining social movements: religion. In a recent study, Hoffman and 
Jamal (2014) addressed the issue of religion in the Arab social movements. They used Arab 
Barometer wave 2 data on Tunisia and Egypt to investigate if motivational or opportunity-
based explanations are more likely to promote participation (Ibid). The conclusion was that 
personal piety, namely Qur’an reading, rather than mosque attendance is associated with 
greater political activism, such as protest participation (Ibid).
30
 I analyze if Hoffman and 
Jamal’s findings hold up with the new data (wave 3) that includes a more direct question on 
Arab Spring participation. Thus, the following two hypotheses are included.  
Hypothesis 7:  Citizens who attended religious meetings (such as Friday Prayers) more fre-
quently were more likely to participate in the protests known as the Arab 
Spring than those who attended them less often. 
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 Qur’an reading increased motivation for protest but did not provide the resources for easier access to protest 
participation, thus putting the relative deprivation above a resource mobilization explanation. (Hoffman and 
Jamal, 2014:604).  
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Hypothesis 8:  Citizens who were more religious (read the Qur’an more frequently) were more 
likely to participate in the protests known as the Arab Spring than those who 
were less religious. 
2.4 Addressing the Criticism: Why RD still matters today 
While the criticisms of RD carry some validity, their argumentative strength fades when being 
analyzed more closely. This section takes a closer look at the critique and highlights why rela-
tive deprivation theory is still relevant in explaining social movements today. 
First, let us consider the argument regarding the lack of empirical evidence, namely those 
cases that should have promoted social movements due to relative deprivation, but did not. 
While this critique carries some validity, I argue that most of the work on relative deprivation 
has been imperfectly researched, predominantly investigating data with economic focus and 
consequently neglecting political and social aspects. Some of the most prevalent measures 
used in empirical analyses of relative deprivation include GDP/capita, household income, 
overall living costs and employment.
31
 A lot of work on RD has thereby neglected social and 
political factors which can play a critical role in causing relative deprivation. But even more 
important to notice is that the economic variables that have been used appear to measure ab-
solute and not relative deprivation. The economic variables accounted for aggregate facts of, 
for example, household income while not directly investigating the individual perceptions of 
economic hardship.
32
 Instead of identifying the actual perceptions and assessments of citizens, 
those absolute measures identify simply aggregate conditions individuals are situated in. 
Thus, the traditional measurements appear to be flawed, since relative deprivation is neither a 
necessary nor sufficient condition for absolute deprivation. This is because an absolutely de-
prived person can, but not must, also be a relatively deprived person, and vice versa. This 
does not mean that relative and absolute deprivation exclude each other by necessity: a rela-
tively deprived person can also be an absolutely deprived person. But the person can also only 
be relatively deprived. Miller, Bolce and Halligan (1977:981) summarized this flaw by stating 
that scholars tend to “test a theory based on individual perceptions with aggregate and objec-
tive data.” Thus, most of the empirical work on relative deprivation has been measured at 
least to some extent imperfectly. Since feelings of (dis-)satisfaction depend rather on relative 
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 See for instance: Gurr and Duvall (1973), Panning (1983), Muller and Weede (1994), Crosby (1979). 
32
 Notice that the most influential works addressing grievance vis-à-vis greed/opportunity theory have been de-
veloped and tested with macro data level as well; e.g. Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon and Laitin (2003). 
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than absolute criteria, the criticism regarding the lack of empirical evidence (vast amounts of 
relatively deprived citizens and yet disproportional few protest occurrences) seems mitigated 
(Alain, 1985).  
Concerning the greed over grievance critique, the argument that grievances assume a substan-
tial part in explaining civil war (or social movement) onset has again received scholarly atten-
tion in recent years. Academic works by scholars such as Smith et al. (2011) and Cederman et 
al. (2013) have challenged the premature rejection of grievance-based explanations in ex-
plaining social movements. They argue that proper RD measurement, appropriate conceptual-
ization and the inclusion of theoretically relevant situational appraisal can show actual causal 
effects (Ibid). More specifically relating to the Arab Spring, Doorn (2013) argues, for exam-
ple, that “while grievances seemed to play an important role as a motivation in Libya, ‘greed’ 
does not provide a convincing explanation.” This is not to say that we should dismiss the op-
portunity-based explanations for collective action entirely, as these help explain the occur-
rence and maintenance of social movements partly too. My emphasis here is, however, that 
grievances play at least an equally important role in explaining the protest participation.    
If we then allow grievance theory to assume an explanatory role in protest participation again, 
there is no need to equally dismiss the rational choice element of actors performing cost-
benefit analyses in order to overcome collective action problems. Unlike the dependent varia-
ble of civil war used by Collier, my dependent variable is measuring protest participation. 
Thereby, I do not discriminate between violent and non-violent action, as participation in 
movements can also be (and mostly is) non-violent. This drastically reduces the problem of 
Collier’s collective action dilemma which is built upon the assumption that participating in 
the violent act of rebellion is more costly than abstaining. After all, protest participation does 
not entail violence or the threat of death by necessity, although it might still be costly.  
2.5 A Complementary Approach: RD and Opportunities  
Based on the discussion above, I argue that both RD and opportunity structures play an essen-
tial part in explaining participation in the Arab Spring. This is because motivations and oppor-
tunities complement rather than contradict each other. The feeling of relative deprivation 
functions as a motivational mechanism to spur action through rational choice behavior of op-
portunistic thoughts. This means that although Arabs felt relatively deprived, they still acted 
upon rational thoughts of weighing their costs and benefits of participating in the protests. 
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2.5.1 Establishing a RD framework for Arab Spring participation 
Building on the last sections, my theoretical framework of relative deprivation assumes the 
underlying foundations of Gurr’s and Runciman’s concepts. Accordingly, I define a person as 
being relatively deprived if the following conditions are fulfilled. 
 First, a person must perceive herself as being treated unequal in comparison to anoth-
er group.
33
 But to be relatively deprived means not only that people perceive differences, but 
also that they regard these differences as unfair and resentful. Furthermore, there has to exist a 
psychological connection with an ingroup (Wright and Tropp, 2002:228). This ingroup identi-
fication serves as basis for feelings of collective relative deprivation, since we have a propen-
sity to make group-level comparisons with dominant outgroups (Ibid:228). If this comparison 
leads to the perception of an unfair discrepancy, we will feel relatively deprived. This unfair 
or unjust element usually implies the “assessment of, and subsequent rejection of, the possi-
bility for individual upward mobility […and] the assessment of the ingroup’s low status posi-
tion as illegitimate and controllable” (Ibid:228). Hence, feelings of collective relative depriva-
tion arise, which spur collective actions. Feelings of relative deprivation do not necessarily 
trigger frustration but at least some kind of dissatisfaction. This does not exclude manipula-
tion of minds as in “wrongly” perceiving oneself as being deprived.34 The essential part is that 
a person perceives herself as being deprived, independent of actually being deprived or not.  
 Second, I focus on upward comparisons. As everyone compares with everyone else 
constantly, presidents and monarchs also compare themselves with the average citizen in a 
downward comparison.
35
 Scholars have argued for the importance of the latter, as “Crosby 
(1984), Kahneman (1992), and Williams (1975) have suggested that losses may be more psy-
chologically poignant than blocked gains, [… or in other words] that losing ground is more 
painful than failure to gain” (Taylor, 2002:17,38). While acknowledging this argument and 
being aware of both directions of comparisons, this thesis focuses on upward comparison on-
ly. This is because changes in social order depend primarily on collective actions of disadvan-
taged groups (Wright and Tropp, 2002:228). Also, the upward comparison reflects my re-
search question itself. 
                                                          
33
 For gender-neutral language I use the feminine form (she/her/herself) in this essay.  
34
 The influence of another person can have great impact on one’s understandings and perceptions. In public 
meetings, the internet, and other platforms that serve for social interactions, some proficient narrators can use 
their skills to rally up persons for their cause; motivating people that might not feel actually deprived otherwise.  
The causes leading to feelings of relative deprivation will not be addressed here. I simply address the question on 
whether a person was feeling relatively deprived or not – for whatever reasons that might be.  
35
 While the application of the relative deprivation construct to upward comparisons is more common, various 
authors have treated dominant group reactions to encroachment by a subordinate group as relative deprivation 
(Taylor, 2002:16-7). 
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 Third, there are different ways of comparisons for a person. 
(a) She can compare herself with another person or group.  
According to the argumentation in the first condition, this comparison is made with a group 
rather than a single person. This group can be geographically close or far from her. For exam-
ple, she can feel relatively deprived in comparison to her neighbors or citizens in another 
state. But she can also feel relatively deprived compared to citizens in another country. Inven-
tions like the internet make such cross-border comparison very easy nowadays, as ideas and 
values travel from one country to another in an instant. Various channels like Twitter, Face-
book, etc. allow Arab citizens to compare themselves with foreign citizens.  
(b) She can compare herself with herself. 
This form of self-reference is a comparison of a previous or anticipated future situation with 
her current self. Krahn and Harrison (1992) argue, for example, that “self-referenced relative 
deprivation influences economic beliefs, political attitudes, and voting behavior and ultimate-
ly can influence and lead to social action” (Flynn:108). However, I argue that self-referenced 
relative deprivation only has a limited impact on social action. While self-referencing is a 
subconscious and constant process, the element of “justified” is rather elusive in a comparison 
with oneself. For example, one is more easily ready to forgive one’s past self for not doing 
something than forgiving another group in society for the same lack of action. The same ap-
plies for utopian comparisons of a future self that oneself is not likely to achieve, thus con-
tributing little justification for not achieving it. Hence, it is rather unlikely that someone par-
takes in collective action due to feeling relatively deprived compared to a past or future self. 
Accordingly, it is the group comparisons of section (a) that I focus on. 
 Fourth, I include all three sources of relative deprivation, namely political, economic 
and social forms of RD. In doing so, I move away from the disproportionately extensive use 
of economic factors explaining social movements. el-Meehy (2014:4) argues, for example, 
that “economic grievances were not always the primary driving dynamic of protests, [… as] 
the cases of Bahrain and Egypt exhibit higher influence of political grievances in triggering 
collective action at the initial stages.” While I argue that any of the sources can lead to feel-
ings of relative deprivation causing social action, I also assume that there is a reciprocal ele-
ment inherent in the potentially interwoven relationship of two or more sources of relative 
deprivation (although I will not test this theory). For example, if a person is both economical-
ly and politically (and maybe even socially) relatively deprived in comparison to the same 
group at the same point of time, then that feeling of being deprived will be stronger and cause 
more dissatisfaction than a feeling that was based on only one source of relative deprivation.  
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 Fifth, I associate relative deprivation mainly with the pattern of progressive depriva-
tion. The reason for this decision lies in the empirical fact that demand for social change is 
most likely to appear after a distinct period of improving conditions (Akpeninor, 2012:537). 
Noueihed and Warren (2012:57) highlight that the Arab Spring came after a decade of activ-
ism. Protests and violent actions against repressive regimes have been taking place in the Ar-
ab world at least a decade before the Arab Spring started and the everyday struggles of citi-
zens even continue today (Ottaway and Hamzawy, 2011; Frangonikolopoulus, 2012:17). This 
continuous and unchanging trend of protest activity suggests that only the widened gap be-
tween value expectations and capabilities in form of the progressive pattern can reasonably 
explain why the Arab Spring occurred in late 2010 and not earlier.  
2.5.2 Connecting Opportunity Structures with RD 
In addition to motivations, opportunities may also play a part in explaining protest participa-
tion. Certain opportunity structures enable citizens to overcome potential collective action 
problems. For instance, new social media like Facebook can help citizens to overcome the 
coordination problem, such as being aware of low numbers of members participating in pro-
tests. A pro-democratic Facebook group with several thousand members can show potential 
participants that their grievances are shared among many others, making them aware of their 
large numbers. Hence, collective action problems are mitigated as costs and fears of participa-
tion decrease significantly because Arabs communicate information and transfer skills more 
efficiently. While relative deprivation plays an important part in identifying the motivations 
that lead to protest participation, these opportunistic arguments complement the former by 
highlighting the channels through which motivations become coordinated and executed.  
The choice of making use of specific opportunities underlies a rational decision-making pro-
cess. Touraine (2004:437) argues that rational choices are made consciously and that social 
movements are not only based on political and economic demands, but also socio-cultural 
parts like knowledge, recognition, a model of morality and so forth. Touraine (Ibid) therein 
asserts that this conscious thinking involves a quest for identity and social coherence, making 
collective action both interpretative (subjective assessment) and integrative (shared objec-
tives). 
We conduct cost-benefit calculations mostly when we are not relatively deprived because, as 
Gurr (1970) argues, the feeling of relative deprivation is an abnormality. However, once such 
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feelings of relative deprivation arise, we make calculations based on the influence of those 
feelings. To feel relatively deprived entails a feeling of dissatisfaction that one wants to 
change. What calculations does one make if one feels relatively deprived? Naturally, to 
change the unpleasant status quo of being relatively deprived, one would seek the easiest 
(least costly) way possible. If a legal opportunity exists, one is likely to prefer it over illegal 
alternatives – as the latter would mean a high risk of imprisonment or other punishment. 
Thus, one employs legal means until these prove to be inefficient. As citizens continuously 
evolve over time and reconsider the outcomes of their past actions, they rationally think of 
new ways and means to achieve their goals. For example, a relatively deprived person, who is 
incapable of changing her status quo through legal means, might learn that illegal means 
helped to overcome relative deprivation for another person in a neighboring country. Such 
illegal means could involve protest movements, which are usually banned (or strictly super-
vised) in authoritarian states. By identifying with the cross-border relatively deprived person 
or group, she might be more willing to join a protest in her own country despite the risk of 
punishment. This might explain the apparent contagion effect of the Arab uprisings which 
relates to protests dispersing from original protests in Tunisia to other countries in the Arab 
world. Arabs might have learned through various channels like television or internet plat-
forms that protest movements in Tunisia “worked”, and correspondingly took to the streets in 
their country.  
2.6 Conclusion 
In summary, I illustrated how motivational as well as behavioural accounts of the Arab Spring 
entail relevant information about who the protesters actually were and how they were able to 
protest. Perceptions of unequal treatment and political oppression, as well as youth unem-
ployment, the level of educational achievement, and religiousness (frequency in Qur’an read-
ing) might all serve as motivations for Arab Spring participation. Public interaction at reli-
gious venues, the use of social media, and membership in political or civil organizations pro-
vide citizens with the corresponding opportunities to share their feelings of deprivation and 
act upon them. Both motivations and opportunities ultimately complement each other in ex-
plaining what moves individuals to participate in protest movements. As Hoffman and Jamal 
(2014:605) stated, this “systematic analysis of individual-level political behaviour is a crucial 
step towards improving our understandings of the recent Arab uprisings.” The Table 2.2 be-
low provides an overview of the established hypotheses in this chapter.  
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Table 2.2: Hypotheses 
 
Motivations 
 
 Hypothesis 1 Citizens who perceived to be treated unequally compared to other citizens 
were more likely to participate in the protests known as the Arab Spring. 
 Hypothesis 2 Citizens who were both unemployed and young were more likely to partici-
pate in the protests known as the Arab Spring than those who were not. 
 Hypothesis 3 Citizens who attained higher education were more likely to participate in the 
protests known as the Arab Spring than those who attained less education. 
 Hypothesis 4 Citizens who perceived their freedom of expression to be guaranteed were 
less likely to participate in protests known as the Arab Spring than those who 
did not. 
 Hypothesis 8 Citizens who were more religious (read Qur’an frequently) were more likely 
to participate in the protests known as the Arab Spring than those who were 
less religious. 
Opportunities  
 Hypothesis 5 Citizens who were a member of a political party and/or civil organizations 
were more likely to participate in protests known as the Arab Spring than 
those who were not. 
 Hypothesis 6 Citizens who were a member of or a participant in a Facebook page/used in-
ternet for political matters were more likely to participate in protests known as 
the Arab Spring than those who were/did not. 
 Hypothesis 7 Citizens who attended religious meetings (e.g. Friday Prayers) more frequent-
ly were more likely to participate in the protests known as the Arab Spring 
than those who attended them less often.  
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3  Data and Methods 
 
This chapter outlines the data, methodology and potential shortcomings for testing the pro-
posed hypotheses. First, I present the data and explain the reasoning for my case selection. 
Second, I depict potential challenges associated with individual-level, survey data as well as 
other, more general problems like the lack of availability of data, for example. Third, I outline 
the operationalization of my dependent and independent variables, respectively. Here I also 
depict control variables that I include to address potential confounding factors. Last but not 
least, I explain the reasons for employing a binary logistic regression model for my analysis.  
3.1 Data and Cases 
To understand how motivations and opportunities led to a mobilization of Arabs participating 
in the protest movements, I analyze survey data from four Arab countries, namely Yemen, 
Jordan, Tunisia and Algeria. The data derives from the second and third waves of the Arab 
Barometer survey.
36
 The Arab Barometer (AB) is a regional barometer of Arab countries with 
the objective to produce scientifically reliable data on the politically-relevant attitudes of or-
dinary citizens (Arab Barometer, 2014). More specifically, the Arab Barometer is conducted 
in national survey waves that seek “to measure and track over time citizen attitudes, values, 
and behavior patterns relating to pluralism, freedoms, tolerance and equal opportunity; social 
and inter-personal trust; social, religious and political identities; conceptions of governance 
and an understanding of democracy; and civic engagement and political participation” (Ibid). 
The latest wave was released in October 2014. Table 3.1 illustrates the countries that were 
included in the different waves of the Arab Barometer.   
3.1.1 Case Selection 
My case selection is based on choosing diverging cases to account for external validity and 
generalizability. This is because I do not only want to explain Arab protest movements and 
outcomes in the selected countries, but rather for the entire Arab world; potentially even gen-
eralizing the causal inferences that I will establish here to social movements in general. The 
four countries of Algeria, Jordan, Tunisia and Yemen were chosen for various reasons, both 
theoretical and practical. The first and most obvious reason regards data availability. As I em-
                                                          
36
 The data and codebooks can be retrieved here: http://www.arabbarometer.org/instruments-and-data-files  
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ploy data from both wave 2 and wave 3, I have to choose countries that were surveyed in both 
waves. Considering Table 3.1, national surveys were conducted in Algeria, Jordan and Yemen 
in all three waves, and for Tunisia in all waves but the first. Kuwait and Morocco do not ap-
pear in wave 2, and Saudi Arabia appears only in wave 2, ruling these countries out altogeth-
er. On the other hand, available countries that I exclude are Lebanon and Palestine which ap-
pear in all three waves, as well as Iraq, Sudan, and Egypt which appear in the last two waves. 
The unique status of Iraq (2003 war and its aftermath) and Palestine (ongoing Palestine-Israeli 
conflict) suggest that results for these cases might be quite biased by external factors. Sudan is 
arguably another unique case, with the secession of South Sudan in 2011 having impacted 
citizens’ perceptions uniquely. Similarly, Lebanon’s representativeness vis-à-vis the MENA 
region is highly contested, as Lebanon’s relatively weak state apparatus makes it an exception 
in the region (Stel, 2013:7). Finally, I exclude Egypt for its dominant role in already existent 
literature regarding explaining the Arab Spring. Also, Egypt is something like a hybrid case in 
regards to the “outcome” of the Arab Spring. In general, some leaders were removed from 
power and replaced, while others were not. In Egypt, however, the newly democratically 
elected leader, Mohamed Morsi, was replaced by a coup. Including Egypt would thereby in-
crease the variation on the binary outcome of comparing leaders remaining in power or not.  
Table 3.1: The Arab Barometer Waves – Countries Surveyed 
Wave I 
(2006-2008) 
Wave II 
(2010-2011) 
Wave III 
(2012-2014) 
 
Algeria 
Palestine 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Morocco 
Lebanon 
Yemen 
 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Lebanon 
Palestine 
Saudi Arabia 
Sudan 
Tunisia 
Yemen 
 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Morocco 
Palestine 
Sudan 
Tunisia 
Yemen 
Source: Arab Barometer, 2014 
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A second reason for my case selection relates more specifically to the different “outcomes” 
caused by the Arab Spring movements. Two of the countries experienced regime change 
(leaders removed from power): Tunisia and Yemen; while the leaders of the other two coun-
tries, Jordan and Algeria, remained in power. This is important because I do not simply want 
to investigate the motivations and opportunities for protest participation, but also attempt to 
analyze if diverging means and attitudes of protest participants lead to different outcomes in 
social movements (e.g. regime change versus remaining in power). The third reason regards 
geographical proximity. Jordan and Algeria are geographically very close positioned to the 
two countries that gained the earliest momentum of the Arab Spring, Tunisia and Egypt. With 
the contagion effect discussed above, one could have expected these two countries, if any, to 
follow suit. Especially for Jordan, with the additional burden of vast amounts of Syrian and 
Palestinian refugees, one could have assumed that the demand for change could have been 
greater. Finally, in order to mitigate potential bias in the results due to the factor of monarchal 
exceptionalism (Jordan) – since all overthrown countries were presidential regimes – it makes 
sense to include another presidential country, namely Algeria, which did not experience re-
gime change.  
3.1.2 Case-specific Data Information 
All national surveys of the Arab Barometer represent national representative samples of adults 
18 years or older. All interviews were distributed proportional to population size. These were 
conducted by face-to-face interviews in Arabic, and the sampling employed included stratifi-
cation and clustering. All samples were stratified by governorates, districts, or provinces as 
well as urban-rural. Within each sector, blocks were randomly selected and used as primary 
sampling units. Within each block, households were randomly selected in clusters of 10. All 
cases include a weighting method for the probability of selection in order to produce national-
ly representative results.
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The survey in Algeria was administered from March 13
th
 until April 6
th
 of 2013. A total of 
810 respondents were interviewed in urban areas compared with 410 in rural areas. Accord-
ingly, the sample size amounts to 1,220. The survey in Jordan was administered from De-
cember 27
th
, 2012 until January 6
th
, 2013. A total of 1,365 respondents were interviewed in 
urban areas and 430 in rural areas. Accordingly, the sample size amounts to 1,795. The Tuni-
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 For more detailed information, consult the codebook’s technical information (Arab Barometer, 2014).  
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sian survey was administered from February 3
rd
 to February 25
th
, 2013. Within each house-
hold, individuals were selected randomly using a Kish table informed by quotas for gender 
and age. Thus, an additional weight for post-stratification weighted by age and gender was 
introduced. In total, 780 respondents were interviewed in urban areas and 419 in rural areas. 
Accordingly, the sample size amounts to 1,199. The survey in Yemen was administered from 
November 2
nd
 to December 4
th
, 2013. A total of 410 respondents were interviewed in urban 
areas and 790 in rural areas. Accordingly, the sample size amounts to 1,200. An additional 
weighting method regarding post-stratification weighted for age, gender and education. 
3.2 Data-related Challenges  
Since my data is based on a complex sampling design, using both cluster sampling and strati-
fication, all regression models in this thesis use weights (probability of selection and potential 
post-stratification weight) to account for the sampling design (Daniel, 2012:134). This should 
adjust for potential biases in the random sampling methods and thereby increase the internal 
validity of causal inferences (correctness of the causal relationships). 
Some of the most common problems with survey techniques relate to non-response and social 
desirability bias (Furnham, 1986). Non-response is always an issue, as a specific part of the 
population (e.g. single, middle aged working class) might be less respondent and thereby un-
derrepresented in a study. As representativity is not necessarily improved by increasing the 
response rate further, this challenge can be adjusted by weighting for probability of selection, 
as is done here.  
The problem of social desirability bias is especially an issue in face-to-face interviews and 
can impact validity and reliability (Ibid). It refers to the idea that respondents answer in a way 
that pleases the interviewer, providing answers the latter wants to hear or that make the re-
spondent look good. While it is impossible to completely rule out social desirability bias, the 
settings of the interviews (e.g. being in Arabic, administered by local citizens, etc.) and the 
large amount of respondents should have mitigated this potential bias.  
Other challenges with valid and reliable survey responses include no-opinion response as in 
satisficing, non-differentiation, acquiescence, and rank-order effects (Krosnick et al., 1996; 
Podsakoff et al., 2003). Satisficing behavior usually occurs in long and complex surveys. Af-
ter a while, respondents might get tired of the time-consuming survey or the difficulty of an-
swering questions. Thus, they might answer in the way they perceive to be easiest or quickest, 
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just to get the survey over with (Ibid). Cognitive costs and tiredness of respondents can there-
by lead to respondents answering “don’t know” or “refuse to answer” most of the time. To 
avoid this problem, the interviewers conducting the Arab Barometer surveys did often not 
provide the answer options of don’t know and refuse to offer directly when reading the ques-
tions, but made these options available if a respondent intuitively answered in such a fashion. 
Non-differentiation is a very strong form of satisficing which refers to respondents repeating 
the same response all the time, e.g. giving a rating of a 3 on a scale from 1 to 5 to all ques-
tions (Ibid). Since I exclude the answers of don’t know and refuse to answer from my analy-
sis, and trust interviewers to have limited non-differentiation responses, those challenges 
should only have a minor impact, if any, here.  
Acquiescence is a similar challenge to survey validity, as it refers to respondents tending to 
agree with the interviewee; for example by answering yes all the time (Ibid). Rank-order ef-
fects can also impact the validity as the order of questions or answers can play a psychologi-
cal role of respondents tending to answer some over the other (Ibid). For example, the first or 
last answer option might be preferred to one in the middle; or the answers to a question at the 
end of the survey might be influenced by answers already given to a related question at an 
earlier point of the survey. Since I neither created nor conducted the surveys myself, I cannot 
completely rule out any of these challenges. However, I trust that the surveys were adminis-
tered in a fashion to avoid most if not all of these problems. Overall, the number of questions 
per sections was limited and the questions appeared rather simple, which should have reduced 
potential cognitive costs and tiredness of respondents. And since the surveys were conducted 
by national citizens and in Arabic, respondents were probably more prone to answer correct-
ly.  
3.3 Operationalization 
This section deals with the operationalization of variables and to that effect with the reliability 
and validity of my research design. Operationalization refers to the process of defining varia-
bles as strictly as possible into measurable factors which can be empirically tested (Adcock 
and Collier, 2001:530-1; Mueller, 2004). Often concepts, like religiosity for example, are not 
observable, which means that one cannot measure them directly. Thus, indirect measurements 
allow us to operationalize concepts into testable variables. Naturally, the aim is to improve 
reliability and validity of the research design as much as possible by establishing replicable 
variables that capture the hypotheses as closely as possible (King et al., 1994:151).  
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3.3.1 The Dependent Variable 
As the dependent variable should account for actual participation in the Arab Spring, it is 
measured as follows. Respondents were asked the following question: “The Arab Spring led 
to some demonstrations and rallies in (country name). Did you participate in any of these 
events? (in 2011 and 2012)” Respondents were given the options to answer “Yes, I did.” or 
“No, I did not.” This dependent variable is therefore binary, coded 0 for No and 1 for Yes. 
The distribution for this variable is shown in the Appendix (Figure A.3.). 
This variable is a very direct measurement of Arab Spring participation; but it is limited to 
wave 3 of the AB. This posits a problem because feelings of frustration and dissatisfaction as 
a result of relative deprivation might have changed from the time of actual protest participa-
tion (e.g. January 2011) to the time of the survey conduction of wave 3 in late 2012/2013. 
Thus, I use wave 2 of the Arab Barometer to test for potential differences in protest participa-
tion resulting from changed feelings of relative deprivation; thereby checking for the robust-
ness of my results from the analysis with wave 3. Due to the absence of the question asking 
directly for Arab Spring participation in wave 2, I employ an alternative question here. Re-
spondents were asked the following: Here is a set of activities that citizens usually take part 
in. During the past three years, did you participate in a protest, march or sit-in? Respondents 
were given the options to answer “Once”, “More than once”, and “I have never participated.” 
Since I am only interested in if the respondent participated in protest activity or abstained 
from it, I combine the first two answers into “I have participated once or more than once”, 
coded 1; thus establishing a second binary dependent variable, coded 0 for “I have never par-
ticipated.”  
Correlation tests of the two dependent variables show that they are relatively highly correlated 
(Pearson r = 0.491). Thus, it is reasonable to use the latter dependent variable as a substitute 
for the former (which directly asks for Arab Spring participation) when using wave 2.  
Among all countries surveyed in the third wave of the Arab Barometer, the acknowledged 
participation in the events of the Arab Spring was relatively low: only 13% (or 1,923) of the 
respondents answered yes, while 84.3% (or 12,459) answered no.
38
 Yemen showed the high-
est participation with more than a third of the respondents having participated in protests (427 
of 1,200). Nevertheless, an overall tendency of non-participation over protest participation in 
                                                          
38
 Some respondents also answered “don’t know” or refused to answer. Among all surveyed participants in the 
Arab Barometer wave 3, which amount to 14778, 29 answered “don’t know”, 367 refused to answer and 1 ob-
servation was missing. I excluded these cases as missing data, as they amount only to 2.7% of the total. 
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the Arab world appears reasonable to assume, as no country had higher participation than 
non-participation. Table 3.2 illustrates this by showing (non-)participation per country.  
Table 3.2: Protest Participation per Country (waves 2 and 3) 
 
Country 
Participation in the Arab Spring 
(AB wave 3) 
Participation in protest, march, or 
sit-in (AB wave 2) 
 Yes No Yes No 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Morocco 
Palestine 
Sudan 
Tunisia 
Yemen 
Saudi Arabia 
46 
139 
74 
49 
101 
36 
407 
104 
134 
156 
250 
427 
 
1089 
1044 
1109 
1728 
905 
1134 
811 
974 
1030 
1009 
945 
681 
 
220 
 
215 
94 
 
319 
 
 
289 
445 
 
387 
28 
964 
 
996 
1059 
 
1059 
 
 
892 
1036 
 
766 
1291 
Total 1923 12459 1997 8063 
 
Source: Arab Barometer, 2014 
 
The apparent low participation could be the result of social desirability bias. Respondents 
might have tried to please the interviewers by answering in ways that the latter wanted them 
to. Respondents might have also feared the threat of repercussions by governments if ac-
knowledging protest attendance. However, such problems were probably mitigated by the fact 
that the surveys were conducted anonymous and corresponding reassurances of safety made 
by the interviewer. In fact, it is reasonable to assume that fear has played a minor role, if any, 
in explaining non-participation. This is because the answers to the follow-up question of 
“Why did you not participate?” showed that only 7.3% of the respondents were afraid to par-
ticipate in these demonstrations; while about half (48.8%) did simply not care or found it not 
important to do so. Figure 3.1 reviews the reasons for non-participation in more detail. 
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Figure 3.1: Responses to the Question “Why did you not participate?” (Wave 3) 
 
Satisficing or non-differentiation might explain non-participation answers, too. As these is-
sues are never easily dismissed, the large amount of respondents should mitigate these poten-
tial biases. On the other hand, positive answers might be biased too. For example, respondents 
that participated in the Arab Spring might have done so due to group pressures or bandwagon-
effects rather than actual feelings of relative deprivation. Such bandwagoning or “being part 
of the group” could entail participants wanting to uphold their social image among neighbors, 
friends or families. Another follow-up question that addressed participants asked “Why did 
you participate?” Figure 3.2 shows that only a minority participated because of everyone 
else’s participation, while the majority was convinced in the objectives of these protests.39  
Figure 3.2: Responses to the Question “Why did you participate?” (Wave 3) 
 
                                                          
39
 I excluded the options of “don’t know” and “refuse to answer” because they were almost non-existent. More 
detailed values for these two graphs are available in the Appendix, Table A.11. 
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3.3.2 The Independent Variables 
3.3.2.1 Motivational Variables 
Recalling the theoretical chapter, the first hypothesis concerned the perceptions of unfair 
treatment.
40
 Respondents were asked the following: “To what extent do you feel that you are 
being treated equally compared to other citizens in your country?” Answer options included 
to a great extent, to a medium extent, to a limited extent, and not at all. Since “to a limited 
extent” and “not at all” are rather negative perceptions of being treated equally, I recoded this 
variable into a binary form with these two answers referring to feelings of being treated une-
qually, coded 0; and the answers of “great” and “medium extent” relating to feelings of being 
treated equally, coded 1. The corresponding distributions are shown in Figure 3.3 below. 
Figure 3.3: Respondents’ Perception of Being Treated Equally (per country) 
Algeria Jordan 
  
Tunisia Yemen 
  
                                                          
40
 This hypothesis could also be measured by the question “Generally speaking, how would you compare your 
living conditions with the rest of your fellow citizens?” Possible answers included much worse, worse, similar, 
better, and much better. Unfortunately, most respondents (about 60%) answered “similar”, while the remaining 
40% split into 20% each perceiving conditions to be better or worse, respectively. Hence, this question is not 
very useful to measure feelings of relative deprivation. This will be further discussed in Chapter 5 (5.2.1).  
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The second hypothesis related to an interaction term of unemployment and youth. Respond-
ents were asked “Do you work?” with options of answering yes or no. This includes both 
part- and full-time employment. To capture real unemployment, the measure excludes status-
es such as being retired, a housewife, or a student. The variable is recoded 0 for being em-
ployed and 1 for no employment, since unemployment is of interest. Concerning the youth 
variable, I created a binary variable coded 1 for respondents being below the age of 25. Since 
all respondents were at least 18 years old, this coding then takes the youth segment of 18 to 
25 years of age into account. The interaction term of these two binary variables thus tests for 
Hypothesis 2. Figure 3.4 depicts the distributions for unemployment and youth variables in 
clustered bar graphs. 
Figure 3.4: Unemployment and Youth (per country) 
Algeria Jordan 
  
 
Tunisia 
 
Yemen 
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Hypothesis 3 involved education. Respondents were given the following options regarding 
their level of education: illiterate/no formal education, elementary, preparatory/basic, pre-
high school diploma (Yemen only
41
), secondary, mid-level diploma/professional or technical 
(not in Tunisia), BA, and MA or above. To test for education being relevant for protest partic-
ipation, I include this variable in binary form with all categories up to secondary coded as 0, 
and all categories above secondary coded as 1. The variable’s distributions are shown in Fig-
ure 3.5. 
Figure 3.5: Education (per country) 
Algeria Jordan 
  
 
Tunisia 
 
Yemen 
  
 
The fourth hypothesis concerned the perception of the status of freedom of expression in the 
respondent’s country. A potential question to evaluate this perception might be the following: 
“How much do you support individual political freedoms such as freedom of the press, free-
dom of expression, and freedom to establish associations?” Answers ranged from I strongly 
support to I strongly don’t support. But while this question captures the support for more 
                                                          
41
 Education is not included for Yemen, since the weight variable for this country adjusts for education. 
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freedoms, it does not necessarily entail feelings of deprivation. To merely support a concept 
like freedom of the press does not mean that the respondents necessarily perceive themselves 
as being deprived of that freedom. They might perceive freedoms to be established and sub-
sequently support them, for instance. A better measure for this hypothesis provides the fol-
lowing question: “To what extent do you think that’ freedom to express opinions’ is guaran-
teed in your country?” Respondents were asked to answer various items in a listed order, 
namely freedom to express opinions, freedom of the press, freedom to join political parties, 
freedom to participate in peaceful protests and demonstrations, freedom to join civil associa-
tions and organizations, freedom to sue the government and its agencies, and freedom to vote 
(parliamentary, municipal and provincial elections). For each of these items, respondents 
were given the options of guaranteed to a great extent, guaranteed to a medium extent, guar-
anteed to a limited extent, and not guaranteed. I conduct a Cronbach’s Alpha reliability anal-
ysis of these seven items relating to measures of freedom to express opinions, because I in-
tend to combine the aggregated scores of these items. The Cronbach’s Alpha score of 0.856 
indicates 85.6% reliability in a composite score of combining the seven items. The inter-item 
correlations and corrected item-total correlations are overall very high too. Thus, I take the 
aggregate of all seven measures to combine them into a single variable measuring how much 
“freedom of expression is guaranteed.” The answer options are connected to form a binary 
variable, with great and medium extent coded as 1; and limited extent and not guaranteed 
coded 0. Figure 3.6 illustrates the distributions for this variable. 
Figure 3.6: Respondents’ Perception of Free Expression (per country) 
Algeria Jordan 
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Tunisia Yemen 
  
 
Hypothesis 8 related to religion playing a motivational role for protest participation. This fac-
tor of religiousness could be measured by the question “Do you pray daily?” However, 
Hoffman and Jamal (2014:598) as well as Jamal and Tessler (2008) have argued that 
measures like daily prayers are often subject to social desirability bias – resulting in over-
whelmingly affirmative answers and thus providing little variation to exploit. Thus, they ar-
gue that Qur’an-readership offers the most reliable predictor of religiosity among the ques-
tions asked in the Arab Barometer, as there is little to no social stigma against people who do 
not read the Qur’an (Ibid). Figures 3.7 and 3.8 illustrate the discrepancy in variation on aver-
age by taking into account all surveyed countries of the Arab Barometer wave 3.  
  
Figure 3.7: Daily Prayers (all countries) 
 
Figure 3.8: Qur’an Reading (all countries) 
 
Consequently, I use the Qur’an-readership variable to test Hypothesis 8. Respondents were 
asked how often “Do you listen to or read the Qur’an/the Bible?” Possible answers included 
never (only in some countries), rarely, sometimes, most of the time, and always. I could use 
this variable as a quasi-metric variable, a common strategy when using a Likert scale with 
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approximately equal intervals (Chimi and Rusell, 2009; Yusoff and Janor, 2014). But this 
method is also widely contested, as distances between categories are not equally comparable. 
Thus, I include this variable in categorical form with rarely (plus never if available) as base-
line variable. Thus, all categories use rarely/never as reference of comparison. Figure 3.9 de-
picts the distributions of this variable. 
 
Figure 3.9: Qur’an Reading (per country) 
Algeria Jordan 
  
Tunisia Yemen 
  
 
3.3.2.2 Opportunity Variables 
The opportunity-based hypotheses related to societal platforms that allowed citizens to con-
nect, interact and share their feelings of relative deprivation, thereby supplying resources and 
opportunities that make protest participation more likely. Therein, the fifth hypothesis con-
cerned the membership of political parties or civil organizations. Respondents were asked 
“Are you a member of a political party?” with answer options of yes and no. The distribu-
tions of this variable are shown in Figure 3.10. 
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Figure 3.10: Membership of Political Party (per country) 
Algeria Jordan 
  
Tunisia Yemen 
  
 
Regarding the membership in a civil organization, I conduct a Cronbach’s Alpha reliability 
analysis of five items that identified potential membership. These include being a member of 
a charitable society, of a professional association/trade union, of a youth/cultural/sports or-
ganization, of a family/tribal association, or of any other civil society organization. The 
Cronbach’s Alpha score of 0.852 indicates 85.2% reliability in the established composite 
score of the new variable. Overall correlation among the five measures was very high, too. 
The newly established, aggregate variable of the five items thus measures average “member-
ship in a civil organization” in binary form, with the coding of 1 relating to membership. The 
variables of membership in a political party and membership of a civil organization are only 
weakly correlated (Pearson r = 0.127), thus allowing to include both variables simultaneously 
without much threat of multicollinearity. Figure 3.11 illustrates the distributions of this varia-
ble. 
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Figure 3.11: Civil Organization Membership (per country) 
Algeria Jordan 
  
 
Tunisia 
 
Yemen 
  
 
Hypothesis 6 concerned the usage of Facebook as a tool for facilitating protest movements. 
The corresponding question was “Are you a member of or participant in a Facebook page?” 
with answer options of yes and no. As will be discussed in more depth in the ensuing chapter, 
one might presume that Facebook usage does not reflect adequate public debate among citi-
zens, as it is rather a tool to chat and entertain. Hence, an alternative variable that takes inter-
net usage for political matters into account might be more appropriate.
42
 With the confirming 
reliability of a Cronbach’s alpha test, I combined the following three variables. Respondents 
were asked “Do you use the internet in order to (a) find out about political activities taking 
place in your country, (b) express your opinion about political issues, and (c) find out about 
opposing political opinions in your country. Answers include yes coded 1 and no coded 0. I 
                                                          
42
 Only people that actually used the internet (a preliminary question) were asked about usage of Facebook and 
the internet for political purposes.  
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use this as an alternative variable to Facebook for testing new social media’s impact on pro-
test participation. Figure 3.12 and 3.13 depict the distributions for these two variables. 
Figure 3.12: Usage of Facebook (per country) 
Algeria Jordan 
  
Tunisia Yemen 
  
 
Figure 3.13: Internet Usage for Political Matters (per country) 
Algeria Jordan 
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Tunisia 
 
Yemen 
  
 
Another opportunistic aspect relating to the increased likelihood of protest participation re-
ferred to attending religious meetings, such as Friday Prayers (Hypothesis 7). The correspond-
ing question asked respondents “How frequently do you attend Friday prayer/Sunday ser-
vices?” Possible answers included never (only in some countries), rarely, sometimes, most of 
the time, and always. Corresponding to the argumentation of the more individual acts of wor-
ship as operationalized by Qur’an reading in the section on motivations above, I use this vari-
able in categorical form with rarely (plus never if available) as baseline variable as well. 
Thus, all categories use rarely/never as reference of comparison. The distributions for this 
variable are shown in Figure 3.14. 
Figure 3.14: Attending Religious Meetings (per country) 
Algeria Jordan 
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Tunisia Yemen 
  
 
3.3.2.3 Control Variables 
In order to address potential confounding factors and avoid spurious relationships among the 
findings, I include control variables in the model. Age is included because older generations 
are less likely to participate in physical activities like protests, as they are more likely to have 
responsibilities like jobs and families. The gender variable should account for the discriminate 
status of women compared to men in Muslim societies, making it less likely that women are 
allowed to participate in public events like protests (at least not without the permission of a 
male guardian). Another control variable accounts for the respondent’s interest in political 
affairs. This variable is included because citizens that are more interested in politics should be 
more likely to partake in protest activity – representing their opinions – than those who are 
less politically devoted. Respondents were asked the following two questions: “In general, to 
what extent are you interested in politics?” with answer options of very interested, interested, 
slightly interested, and not interested; as well as “To what extent do you follow political news 
in your country?” with answers of to a great extent, to a medium extent, to a limited extent, 
and I don’t follow political news at all. A Cronbach’s Alpha reliability analysis identified 
high correlation and reliability of combining these two variables, accounting for an aggregate 
measure of “interest in political affairs.” Thus, I created a binary variable of the aggregate of 
these two measures to include as a control for interest in politics.
43
  
 
 
                                                          
43
 Note that my variable coding can be reviewed in Appendix 2. 
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3.4 Model 
The adequate statistical model for my analysis consists of binary logistic regressions, because 
the dependent variables are dichotomous (Stock and Watson, 2012:423-49). In other words, 
the dependent variable is a dummy variable with two categories, in this case yes and no. Lo-
gistic regression estimates parameters to solve an equation by fitting models, which are based 
on predictors of observed data. The actual model reflects the case when predictors are closest 
to observed values. Therein, the parameters are estimated using maximum-likelihood estima-
tion.  
Since the dependent variable can take on only two values, 0 and 1, a logistic regression is 
more reasonable to use than standard OLS. This is because logistic regressions produce an s-
shape curve that is bounded below by 0 and above by 1, which is appropriate since I am inter-
ested in predicting the value of a probability which naturally ranges between 0 and 1 (Ibid). 
Logistic regression uses maximum likelihood estimations after transforming the dependent 
variable into a logarithmic form (Ibid:438). Probit and Logit regression are such nonlinear 
regression models specifically designed for binary dependent variables, as they ensure that the 
predicted probability of the dependent variable is between 0 and 1 (Ibid:429). The mathemati-
cal description of the s-shape curve with the predictor (x) and probability ( ) of the success 
of the binary dependent variable Y is shown in the following equation (Ibid:434). 
                    
 
                           
           Equation 3.1 
Logistic regression does not directly calculate probabilities but rather the odds of one out-
come over the other. Probability refers to the percentage of an outcome to occur, calculated 
by dividing the chance of an event happening by the total number of event measures 
(            
                 
                                       
), taking on values between 0 and 1. On the other 
hand, odds refer to a ratio of the likelihood of an event happening compared to the likelihood 
of an event not happening (     
                 
                     
). Unlike probability, odds can thereby 
range from 0 to infinity. Odds ratios correspondingly refer to a ratio of odds, or the factor by 
which the odds change. This relative measure of odds ratios is essential for logistic regres-
sions, as these regressions produce logit values that – standing by themselves – do not neces-
sarily entail a lot of meaning. In order to allow for an adequate interpretation of the nonlinear 
s-curve relationship, we can apply the natural logistic function on Equation 3.1 to establish a 
linear model: 
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                    (
 
   
)                         Equation 3.2 
Given this linear relationship between the natural logarithm of  , which is the probability of 
the interested outcome, and the predictors x, we can now use the common OLS approach and 
estimate the usual intercept and slope parameters. But because the linear relationship utilizes 
the logistic function, the regression estimates are on the log-scale which impacts the interpre-
tation of the coefficients. In order to be able to actually interpret these changes in the natural 
logarithm of  , one can transform the slope estimates so that they have a reasonably intuitive 
interpretation as odds ratios. This is done by simply exponentiating (or using the antiloga-
rithm of) both sides of the Equation 3.2:     
                       
 
   
                              Equation 3.3 
Thus, the exponentiated values of the unstandardized logit values are odds ratios that can be 
used to predict the likelihood of the successful outcome in the dependent variable (Y=1). It is 
important to note that these odds ratios are relative and not absolute measures, as each expo-
nentiated value reflects a likelihood of odds relative to or controlling for individual differ-
ences in the other explanatory variables.  
3.4.1 Assumptions of Binary Logistic Regressions 
In order to avoid biases and make valid inferences in the analysis, any model must satisfy 
certain assumptions. Unlike OLS regressions, logistic regression does not assume linearity 
between the raw values of dependent and independent variables, does not assume homosce-
dasticity, does not require variables or error terms to be multivariate normally distributed, and 
the measurement level of independent variables does not need to be metric.  
The following assumptions have to apply for logistic regression models (Agresti, 2002:219-
30). First, the dependent variable must be binary, with the success (Y=1) reflecting the out-
come of interest (Ibid). Second, the model should be correctly fitted, which means to avoid 
omitted variable bias as well as excluding irrelevant variables (Ibid). Third, observations and 
error terms need to be independent which entails avoiding dependent sample designs (Ibid). 
Fourth, independent variables should not reflect linear combinations of each other, thus avoid-
ing multicollinearity (Ibid). Fifth, any independent continuous variables need to be linearly 
related to the log odds because the true conditional probabilities are a logistic function of the 
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independent variables (Ibid). Last but not least, the independent variables should be measured 
without errors and strongly influential observations need to be accounted for (Ibid).   
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter provided a descriptive account of the data, variables and model used for my 
analysis. With the variables and model at hand, my analysis includes binary logistic regres-
sions separately for each of the selected four cases. This should allow for the most conserva-
tive test of my hypotheses, as it allows every coefficient in the models to vary by country and 
not load onto each other. As the number of cases is quite small (mostly due to data availabil-
ity), multilevel modelling is not advisable here since there exists typically not enough infor-
mation to accurately estimate group-level variation with less than five cases (Gelman and 
Hill, 2006:247). Hence, I analyze each country individually, allowing for each country’s 
unique characteristics influencing its population differently; and still try to identify potential 
similarities in protest activity among the countries. The following chapter continues with a 
comparative approach of simply eyeballing the results of the respective logistic regressions 
and comparing them with each other – which is the best possible choice, since the different 
waves of the Arab Barometer do not reflect panel data. Eventually, robustness tests will ac-
count for the validity and reliability of the results. 
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4  Findings and Discussion 
 
This chapter outlines the findings of my analysis and discusses respective results. Using dif-
ferent models, I show that perceptions of unequal treatment, the lack of freedom to express 
opinions, better educational achievements, as well as being a member in a political party or 
civil organizations all contributed at least to some extent to the likelihood of participation in 
the Arab Spring. On the other hand, youth unemployment appears to have hardly any explana-
tory power. And while Facebook did not contribute to explaining protest participation at all, 
using the internet for political purposes did so. Moreover, unlike expected, less frequent 
Qur’an reading appeared to have increased the potential to participate in the Arab Spring. And 
finally, only countries that experienced regime leadership change indicate a significant posi-
tive relationship between the frequency of attending religious gatherings and Arab Spring 
participation. These results are also fairly consistent if adjusting for potential time lags (using 
wave 2). 
All in all, the results and corresponding goodness-of-fit tests indicate that both motivational as 
well as opportunistic factors play a role in explaining Arab Spring participation. While it thus 
appears that both relative deprivation theory as well as resource-mobilization theory played a 
part in motivating and facilitating protest participation in the Arab uprisings, feeling relatively 
deprived seemed to have had a more consistent impact on participation than opportunistic 
factors did. Overall, it appears fair to assess that at least some of my theoretical assumptions 
are confirmed by the findings of my analyses. 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, I present and discuss the results of the models that 
include variables for all hypotheses established in Chapter 2, testing these with the most re-
cent data of AB wave 3. Second, I adjust for potential time lags by evaluating results for cor-
responding regressions using data of AB wave 2. Third, based on the initial results for AB 
wave 3, revised models are presented to account for more stable and confident measures. 
These models exclude the social media variable; and they include one more case for both a 
country that experienced regime leadership change (Egypt) and one that did not (Morocco). A 
brief fourth section will summarize all findings by highlighting which hypotheses were cor-
roborated and discussing corresponding implications for my theoretical assumptions. Finally, 
various goodness-of-fit tests are conducted to assess the predictive power of the models.  
66 
 
Table 4.1: Arab Spring Participation including Facebook (Binary Logistic Regression) 
  Algeria Jordan Tunisia Yemen 
Motivations 
      Equal Treatment -0.18 -0.93** -0.27 -0.03 
 
(0.64) (0.40) (0.25) (0.35) 
  Unemployment 0.59 -18.28 0.69* 0.84 † 
 
(1.21) (9,392.80) (0.41) (0.57) 
  Youth 0.92 1.12 0.96 † -0.29 
 
(1.37) (0.89) (0.59) (0.74) 
  Unemployment*Youth -0.77 18.06 -0.86 † -0.78 
 
(1.57) (9,392.80) (0.57) (0.87) 
  Higher Education -1.11 0.39 0.53** 0.78* 
 
(0.85) (0.46) (0.27) (0.46) 
  Free Expression -0.94 † 0.23 0.61* 0.50 
 
(0.58) (0.44) (0.35) (0.36) 
  Qur'an Reading 
         ...Sometimes -0.81 0.69 -0.68 -0.72* 
 
(0.68) (0.78) (0.66) (0.43) 
     ...Most of the time -1.48 † -0.41 -0.02 0.37 
 
(1.01) (0.83) (0.65) (0.45) 
     ...Always -1.69 0.16 -0.41 0.78 † 
 
(1.60) (0.81) (0.64) (0.51) 
Opportunities 
      Political Party -18.35 5.32*** 1.02 † 0.95*** 
 
(12,431.83) (1.61) (0.67) (0.35) 
  Civil Organization 1.78 1.01 3.56* 0.91 † 
 
(34,912.47) (1.04) (1.86) (0.59) 
  Facebook 1.24 0.51 0.20 -0.004 
 
(1.04) (0.49) (0.29) (0.40) 
  Friday Prayers 
         ...Sometimes -0.65 0.15 0.54 1.13 
 
(0.99) (0.79) (0.41) (1.12) 
     ...Most of the time 0.09 -0.54 0.11 1.43 
 
(0.85) (0.93) (0.51) (1.08) 
     ...Always -0.10 0.04 0.54* 1.94* 
 
(0.94) (0.66) (0.33) (1.08) 
Controls 
      Age 0.10 0.09 -0.17 -0.14 
 
(0.35) (0.19) (0.12) (0.23) 
  Age² -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
  Gender 1.55** 0.55 0.91*** -1.05*** 
 
(0.74) (0.51) (0.29) (0.36) 
  Political Interest -0.19 0.62 1.14*** 0.95*** 
  (0.96) (0.45) (0.28) (0.34) 
Constant -5.33 -6.16 †  -0.15 0.45 
 (6.41) (3.77) (0.25) (4.16) 
Observations 307 635 300 326 
Pseudo R² (Nagelkerke) 0.21 0.22 0.27 0.35 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance level indicated by * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.   
† refers to near 90% statistical significance (or above 85%; p<0.15) 
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Table 4.2: Arab Spring Participation (Binary Logistic Regression) 
     
  Algeria Jordan Tunisia Yemen 
Motivations 
      Equal Treatment -0.87 -1.74*** -0.63** -0.73 † 
 
(0.73) (0.58) (0.28) (0.50) 
  Unemployment 0.24 -18.55 0.71 † 0.75 
 
(1.20) (8,456.96) (0.47) (0.82) 
  Youth 1.36 2.22 † 0.83 -0.32 
 
(1.50) (1.28) (0.67) (1.06) 
  Unemployment*Youth -0.24 17.46 -0.27 -0.39 
 
(1.57) (8,456.96) (0.64) (1.28) 
  Higher Education -0.20 0.85 1.01*** 1.03* 
 
(0.84) (0.66) (0.30) (0.57) 
  Free Expression -0.69 0.54 0.42 0.35 
 
(0.66) (0.60) (0.35) (0.49) 
  Qur'an Reading 
         ...Sometimes -2.03** -0.07 -0.91 -0.66 
 
(0.82) (0.92) (0.65) (0.61) 
     ...Most of the time -1.48* -1.70 † -0.04 1.19* 
 
(0.87) (1.07) (0.64) (0.66) 
     ...Always -1.43 -2.00** -0.67 0.91 
 
(1.65) (1.00) (0.63) (0.66) 
Opportunities 
      Political Party -18.92 5.23*** 0.44 0.91* 
 
(16,915.97) (2.16) (0.77) (0.47) 
  Civil Organization 2.51 0.05 21.61 0.78 
 
(36,748.88) (1.58) (17,011.51) (0.72) 
  Internet for Politics -0.98 1.73*** 0.94*** 1.38*** 
 
(1.29) (0.65) (0.30) (0.50) 
  Friday Prayers 
         ...Sometimes -1.54 18.23 1.03** 0.97 
 
(1.41) (3,863.71) (0.45) (1.66) 
     ...Most of the time 0.09 16.53 -0.08 2.17 
 
(0.92) (3,863.71) (0.52) (1.54) 
     ...Always -0.68 18.36 0.43 2.66* 
 
(1.08) (3,863.71) (0.37) (1.54) 
Controls 
      Age 0.48 0.25 -0.18 -0.24 
 
(0.49) (0.27) (0.14) (0.29) 
  Age² -0.007 -0.003 0.003 † 0.003 
 
(0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
  Gender 1.82** 0.33 1.02*** -1.21** 
 
(0.85) (0.72) (0.32) (0.51) 
Constant -9.49 -26.27 0.46 1.44 
  (7.97) (3,863.71) (2.82) (5.58) 
Observations 257 511 252 228 
Pseudo R² (Nagelkerke) 0.27 0.42 0.31 0.47 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance level indicated by * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.   
† refers to near 90% statistical significance (or above 85%; p<0.15) 
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4.1 Results  
Table 4.1 presents the results of the binary logistic regressions for participation in the Arab 
Spring in wave 3. The variable Facebook appears to have no explanatory power for Arab 
Spring participation. As argued in the previous chapter, using Facebook could be associated 
with entertainment rather than a discussion of political issues (Melki, 2010). Thus, I replace 
Facebook with the alternative variable of using internet for political purposes. This change of 
variables is also reasonable if taking into account recent data on social media usage, which 
shows that a median of 34% of social network users said they shared views on politics online, 
with that figure being even higher in Arab countries like Tunisia or Jordan (Pew Research, 
2013a). Logically, a person that uses internet for political matters must implicitly be interest-
ed in politics. Thus, the new media variable accounts for the formerly control variable of po-
litical interest. This is also indicated by the relatively high correlation (Pearson r=0.61) of 
these variables. Correspondingly, I drop the political interest control variable to avoid multi-
collinearity. The ensuing discussion focuses on the new findings, outlined in Table 4.2.
44
  
4.2 Findings and Discussion  
4.2.1 Motivational Factors 
Among all countries, the perception of being treated equally appears to be negatively related 
to Arab Spring participation. This finding reflects prior expectations of Hypothesis 1, which 
presumed that the perception of being treated less equal compared to other citizens induces 
protest participation. This variable is statistically significant for Jordan at a 99% confidence 
level and for Tunisia at a 95% confidence level. As discussed in the previous chapter, expo-
nentiating the beta values in Table 4.2 allows for a proper interpretation. For Jordan, the odds 
of participating in protests are 0.83 (Calculation: 1-(exp(-1.76))) times less likely for citizens 
who perceived themselves as being treated equally compared to those that perceived them-
selves as being treated unequally, while controlling for other variables. With a large Wald 
statistic and a correspondingly high significant p-value, we can be very confident (99%) in 
this result. For Tunisia, the odds of protest participation are 0.44 (Calculation: 1-(exp(-0.58))) 
                                                          
44
 Note: Some coefficients and corresponding standard errors are very large, which indicates that the iteration 
process of the maximum likelihood estimation could not predict the best model. This means parameters are not 
converging for respective variables. Increasing the number of iterations did not produce different results. I found 
these failures of convergence to be the result of quasi-complete separation (by running regressions leaving the 
respective variables out). Since the predictor variables are still relevant for other countries, I decided to leave 
them in and report results, interpreting them with caution. For more details, see Allison, 2008; Field, 2009:274-5. 
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times less likely for people who perceived themselves as being treated equally compared to 
other citizens than those that perceived themselves as being treated unequally, holding every-
thing else constant. The significance level indicates that we can be 95% confident in the accu-
racy of this result for Tunisia. For Yemen, the significance level is very close to 90%, and the 
odds of Arab Spring participation correspond to 0.52 (Calculation: 1-(exp(-0.73))) times less 
likelihood for Yemeni who perceived themselves treated equally, ceteris paribus.  
This indicates that feelings of relative deprivation as a cause of perceived unfair treatment 
were motivational triggers for protest participation in Jordan, Tunisia, and Yemen. For Alge-
ria, perceptions of unequal treatment appear to play no significant explanatory role. However, 
we have to be cautious of overestimating this result, as Algeria has the lowest variation on the 
dependent variable; with only 46 out of 1135 respondents stating that they participated in the 
Arab Spring (Table A.2).
45
  
Thus, in at least three Arab countries, measures of inequality in form of perception of unequal 
treatment appear to have played an important part for Arab Spring participation. These find-
ings indicate that Hypothesis 1 is predominantly supported. This result is in line with the ar-
gument that subjective perceptions rather than objective or aggregate realities promote griev-
ances that lead to action. However, I do not intend to underplay the role of the latter. Indeed, 
it would be premature to deny the importance of established aggregate contentions, such as 
Yitzhaki’s (1980) argument which states that measures of aggregate relative deprivation can 
be expressed as the product of the Gini coefficient and the mean income. But while those 
measures account for some explanations, subjective feelings of relative deprivation appear to 
play at least a supplementary part to explain protest participation. This is further highlighted 
by Breisinger et al.’s (2012:28) findings that poverty and income inequality levels in the Arab 
countries are higher than official numbers suggest; in particular, inequalities regarding em-
ployability prospects between age groups (young versus old) and along the gender divide are 
among the highest on the globe. Hence, frustrations due to perceived inequalities seem to 
have played an essential role in Arab Spring participation. In Tunisia, for example, a report in 
2006 indicated that over half of Tunisian elites were personally related to Ben Ali, reflecting 
systematic nepotism throughout Tunisians civil society – causing feelings of relative depriva-
tion which eventually lead to widespread demands for equal treatment (Anderson, 2011).  
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 Similarly, results for Jordan should be viewed in a correspondingly cautious approach. 
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Hypothesis 2 presumed that unemployed young citizens were more likely to participate in the 
Arab Spring. This hypothesis cannot be confirmed by the results of Table 4.2. Only in Jordan, 
youth is near 90% statistically significant; and unemployment is near statistically significant 
for Tunisia. This could indicate, for instance, that unemployed young Tunisians were 1.55 
(Calculation: exp(0.71-0.27)) times more likely – to participate in the Arab Spring than their 
counterparts, ceteris paribus.  
Overall however, there is little support for Hypothesis 2. This does not dispel the youth bulge 
argument per se, but indicates a previous overstatement by academia in regards to its rele-
vance in the Arab Spring.
46
 el-Meehy (2014:5) argues, for example, that the youth bulge ar-
gument is empirically inaccurate since the demographic peak of youth in the Arab region has 
already passed and corresponding dependency ratios have started to decline. And even if the 
youth bulge plays a determinant role, this must not be solely the result of dissatisfaction with 
unemployment. Ben Moussa (2013:55) argues that young people are also protesting “against 
political, social and cultural conservatism and stagnation, as well as older generations’ and 
elites’ preference for a status quo and compromise.” As respect for elderly people is sacro-
sanct in the region, the youth faces deeply rooted cultural barriers to expand their ideas and 
creativity (Ibid).
47
 Thus, the protests must not have been necessarily led by young people; and 
even if that was the case, these young Arabs must not have been necessarily deprived due to 
hardships of unemployment – but other, more profound obstacles like social marginalization.  
The educational variable testing Hypothesis 3 appears mostly positively related to Arab 
Spring participation. This reflects the presumed causal direction of better educated citizens 
being more prone to participating in protests. Higher education is statistically significant for 
the countries that experienced regime change, Tunisia and Yemen, with 99% and 90% confi-
dence levels, respectively. This means that Tunisians and Yemeni who possessed higher edu-
cational achievements (diploma, Bachelor, MA or above) were 2.75 and 2.80 times more like-
ly to participate in Arab Spring demonstrations than their counterparts that had only second-
ary or less education, respectively and ceteris paribus. Education is neither statistically signif-
icant for Algeria nor for Jordan. The significant result for the case of Tunisia appears reason-
able because the country possesses arguable one of the best educational systems in the Arab 
region, which produced many educated citizens that might have felt the repression of Ben 
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 The Brookings Institution provides an interactive map for Youth Labor Force Participation in the MENA-
region: http://www.brookings.edu/research/interactives/2014/arab-world-learning-barometer  
47
 For a more comprehensive review of youth movements in the Arab region, see Herrera and Bayat, 2010. 
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Ali’s tightly restricted rule (Anderson, 2011). For Yemen, the result should be considered 
with more caution. As Yemen is the poorest country in the Arab world – which implies low 
educational standards – the overall number of higher level graduates is relatively low (about 
5% compared to about 20% of the other countries). Nevertheless, the overall tendency of bet-
ter education promoting protest participation is in line with the assumptions made by Runci-
man. As argued in the theoretical chapter, Runciman linked the feeling of relative deprivation 
to more general, objective inequality such as class, wealth, power, etc. which are embodied in 
society implicitly (Akpeninor, 2012:538). Runciman (1966:92) found that self-perceived dep-
rivation and objective inequality must not correlate, but can even contradict each other. This 
means that while overall inequality within a society might be decreasing, relative deprivation 
can simultaneously increase (Ibid:96). He further asserted that better educational achieve-
ments can increase the sense of relative deprivation (Ibid:102). For the two cases that experi-
enced regime leadership change, my results for education appear to correspond with Runci-
man’s findings: Higher levels of education seem to cause more intense feelings of relative 
deprivation that are reflected in the increased likelihood of Arab Spring participation. Thus, 
Hypothesis 3 is supported for Tunisia and Yemen, but not for Algeria and Jordan. 
The perception of lacking freedoms to express opinions was depicted in Hypothesis 4. How-
ever, freedom to express opinions appears to have no statistically significant causal relation 
with protest participation in the Arab Spring. This result is somewhat surprising, as one of the 
two main reasons for the occurrence of the Arab Spring as cited by respondents in the four 
respective countries were “civil and political freedoms, as well as emancipation from oppres-
sion” (see Table A.11 in the Appendix). This non-significance of the politically-motivated 
factor of freedom to express opinions suggests that socio-economic motivations, such as per-
ception of unequal treatment due to unfair food or fuel prices, job opportunities or wages, and 
so forth, played a more dominant role in promoting Arab Spring participation. As Tables 4.3 
and 4.4 below will show, however, we should not prematurely dismiss this politically-
motivated variable of free expression yet.  
The final motivational variable included in my model tests for robustness of Hoffman and 
Jamal’s (2014) account on individual religiosity promoting protest participation, which was 
established by Hypothesis 8. In an earlier study, Hoffman and Jamal (2012) investigated the 
impact of youth cohorts in the Arab Spring and found – unlike expected – that although the 
younger population tends to be less religious, “young Arabs are generally more supportive of 
political Islam than their older counterparts, and tend to support Shari’a law more than older 
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citizens do” (Ibid:184). As many protesters were arguably young Arabs, Islam in particular 
appeared to have offered an ideological impetus for protest mobilization, bridging class divi-
sions and connecting people from all parts of society (Ardiç, 2012, Hoffman and Jamal, 
2014). Slogans like “God is Great” and other Islamic rhetoric seemed to have transformed 
faith into a motivational wheel to spur protest movements (Eghdamian, 2014). This suggests 
that religion represents a part of the Arab struggle for justice.  
Table 4.2 shows that individual piety measured by the frequency of reading the Qur’an is 
overall significantly related to Arab Spring participation among Algeria, Jordan and Yemen, 
but not Tunisia. Moreover, the causal direction for Yemen appears to be positive, while Alge-
ria and Jordan show a negative relationship. This could suggest that for countries which did 
not experience regime leadership change, rather a decrease than an increase in the frequency 
of Qur’an reading moved Arabs to participate in protests and demonstrations.48 For Algeria, 
citizens who read the Qur’an sometimes or most of the time were 0.87 and 0.77 times, respec-
tively, less likely to participate in the Arab Spring compared to Algerians who never or rarely 
read the Qur’an, ceteris paribus. Jordanians who most of the time or always read the Qur’an 
were correspondingly 0.82 and 0.86 times less likely to participate in comparison to those that 
never or rarely read the Qur'an, ceteris paribus. For Yemen, however, the positive relation-
ship indicates that citizens who read the Qur’an most of the time were 3.29 times more likely 
to participate in protests than those who read the Qur’an never or rarely, ceteris paribus.  
These results diverge from the presumption made in Hypothesis 8. An explanation for the 
divergent outcomes might be grounded in the fact that the findings reflect the diversity of re-
ligious commitment in the Arab world and its complex role in promoting people’s desires for 
change (Pew Research Center, 2012). At least in the Western media, the Arab Spring was 
depicted as a struggle for democratization. But among other scholars, Tessler (2004) argues 
that religious piety in the sense of Islamic attachment cannot be strongly associated with polit-
ical opinions such as the demand for more democracy.
49
 Islam and democracy (the latter as 
especially in the traditional Western sense established through secularization) are often argued 
to be incompatible and incapable to coexist, as the place of Islam in the modern nation-state 
has still not been resolved (WFD, 2014). In many Arab societies, secularism is therein a taboo 
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 This could also just be a result of Yemen having a large part of the population being illiterate and thus simply 
unable to read the Qur’an (see adult literacy rate, Table A.10 in the Appendix).  
49
 I focus on Islam because the majority (over 90%) of the population of most MENA countries is Muslim (Pew 
Research Center, 2009). Also, in all surveyed countries (except Lebanon) of the Arab Barometer wave 3, the 
majority of respondents (>90%) were Muslims (AB, 2014). 
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word and practicing Muslims do not want Islam in politics (Ibid). But the traditional (West-
ern) tendency to relate democracy with secularization appears misleading in the context of the 
Arab region.
50
 For instance, Filali-Ansary (2012) contends that many revolutionary Arabs 
strive for a fusion between Shari’a law and democracy.51 While demanding more rights – 
which is often associated with favouring democratization – Arabs do not appear to want to 
move away from religion, but hope to attain some kind of arrangement between democracy 
and Shari’a law (Hoffman and Jamal, 2014:605). 
This posits a puzzle that requires rethinking of the traditional relationship between democracy 
and religion in the Arab region. As argued in the previous chapters, most scholars suggest that 
the Arab Spring is manifested in demands for democratic values and governance (Arab Re-
form Initiative, 2014). As Figures A.4 and A.5 in the Appendix illustrate, however, there was 
an overall decline in the perception of respondents’ home countries being democratic as well 
as perceiving democracy being suitable for the countries (except for Algeria, which can be 
explained by the fact that Algerian public opinion is changing on multiple issues in recent 
years).
52
 This suggests that democracy was not necessarily a key demand in the uprisings by 
itself, but rather an implicit side effect of the struggles to overcome perceived inequalities, 
such as unequal treatment. The struggle for democracy in the Arab world is therein not neces-
sarily a means to an end, but an end in itself; notably one that does not have to contradict the 
deeply-seated cultural and religious foundations of Arab countries. That argument is support-
ed by Figure A.6 in the Appendix, which further highlights that participation in the Arab 
Spring was not based on the perception that democracy contradicts the teachings of Islam. 
Furthermore, the diverging effect of religion in different Arab countries might also be a result 
of a contemporary crisis between religious leadership and authority in the Arab region. Tradi-
tional leaders are being increasingly challenged by more and more educated, literate-affluent 
populations with access to religious knowledge and philosophical sophistication (WFD, 
2014). Any mid-ranking cleric of either Sunni or Shia camp can, with the help of new social 
media and corresponding internet tools, such as Youtube, easily undermine the ecumenical 
efforts made by more senior figures (Ibid). As everybody seems to be quoting God, many Ar-
abs are skeptical about which interpretation is actually authoritative. Therefore, charismatic 
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 el-Nawawy and Khamis (2009:30-2) argue in their study of online Islamic discourse, for example, that “Ha-
bermas’ original distinction between private and public sphere reflects a Eurocentric bias that does not necessari-
ly apply to the experience of Muslim-majority societies and to Islam as a religion that questions any rigid divi-
sion between the two realms.” (Ben Moussa, 2013:49). 
51
 For more information on the Islam-Democracy nexus, see also Tessler (2002).  
52
 For a more comprehensive review of Algerians transition, see among others Robbins, 2014. 
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religious leaders become increasingly important. The same goes for religious organizations in 
which ordinary people have much more voice and choice nowadays; which will be discussed 
in more detail below in regards to Hypothesis 7 (Ibid). 
4.2.2 Opportunistic Factors 
Regarding opportunistic elements that facilitated Arab Spring participation, Hypothesis 5 
stated that being a member of a political party would enhance the likelihood of Arab Spring 
participation. Political party membership is positively related with protest attendance for Jor-
dan and Yemen.
53
 For Jordan, membership in a political party increased the odds of partici-
pating in the Arab Spring vastly by 186.79 times over non-membership, ceteris paribus. For 
Yemen, the corresponding increased likelihood was 2.48 times compared to non-members. 
This result suggests that political party membership can, but not must, promote protest partic-
ipation through opportunities to interact on political platforms and arenas. Hypothesis 5 is 
therein at least to some extent supported. 
Hypothesis 5 also contended that being a member in a civil organization promotes Arab 
Spring participation as well. Membership in a civil organization appeared to be positively 
related, as presumed, but overall non-significant. However, the lack of variance on this varia-
ble as indicated by the distributions in the methodology chapter makes it also difficult to as-
sess any real impact of this variable, for now.  
Hypothesis 6 established another opportunistic platform for promoting Arab Spring participa-
tion, namely new social media. Unlike the initial (non-significant) social media variable of 
Facebook in Table 4.1, the usage of internet for political matters appeared positively and 
strongly associated with Arab Spring participation. Except for Algeria, all countries have a 
significant positive causal relationship of internet usage for political matters with the protest 
participation. For Jordan, Tunisia, and Yemen, using the internet increased the likelihood of 
participating in the Arab Spring by 5.64, 2.56, and 3.97 times, respectively and ceteris pari-
bus. These results reflect the presumed assumption of new social media, or more particular 
the internet, playing an essential role in facilitating protest movements; while the often pro-
posed “Facebook-Revolution”-analogy appears misplaced in the context of the Arab Spring. 
Thus, Hypothesis 6 stating that new social media platforms such as the internet facilitated 
Arab Spring participation is supported. 
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 However, the Algerian result should be viewed cautiously, as there were no observations for citizens being 
both member of a political party and protest participant. 
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The opportunistic factor of a more frequent attendance at religious meetings, such as Friday 
Prayers, promoting protest participation was presumed in Hypothesis 7. The variable that 
accounts for the frequency of the attendance at such rallying points is only significant for 
countries that experienced regime change, Tunisia and Yemen. The causal direction is, as 
expected, positive in both cases. For Tunisia, attending Friday prayers sometimes rather than 
rarely or never increased the odds of participating in the Arab Spring by 2.43, ceteris paribus. 
Yemeni who attended Friday prayers always were 11.39 times more likely to participate in 
the Arab Spring than those who attended them rarely or never, ceteris paribus. 
Compared to Qur’an reading, the alternative measure of religiosity as in mosque attendance 
appears to have had a stronger impact of promoting Arab Spring participation. This argument 
only holds for Tunisia and Yemen though. Thus, it appears that only in countries that experi-
enced the removal of former presidents, religious meetings that served as rallying points for 
protesters played an essential part in encouraging participation in the Arab Spring. It is possi-
ble that those meetings at religious institutions and platforms not only supported participation 
through rallying citizens, but also encouraged a psychological pervasion of a changed quoting 
mechanism through high-ranking clerics, manifesting in a re-interpretation of the Qur’an in 
favor of protesting to demand leadership change. This might also explain the unique positive 
direction of more frequent Qur’an reading promoting Arab Spring participation in Yemen. 
Nonetheless, for Tunisia and Yemen the support of Hypothesis 7 indicates an active role of 
religious institutions as a platform for meetings and providing opportunities in forming collec-
tive liberation ideologies and activism, as suggested by Eghdamian (2014). In order to pro-
mote participation in Arab movements, Friday prayers appear to have been used as rallies to 
motivate old as well as new citizens to join the movements (Ibid). Religion functioned therein 
as mobilizing factor in Tunisia and Yemen, providing platforms for citizens to interact with 
each other through the attendance at Friday prayers, the use of mosques and participating in 
Islamic discourses around martyrdom (Benhabib, 2011; Ardiç, 2012; Halverson and Ruston, 
2013). Support for the Arab protests in Yemen and Tunisia appeared to have been fostered 
through the frequent contact between members of religious groups through their pre-existing 
social networks, as well as the provision of trained leadership and moral justification in form 
of facilitating the legitimizing element of the movements (Beckford, 2001, Smith, 1996:9). 
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4.2.3 Control Variables 
Among the control variables, age appears to have no confounding effect on Arab Spring par-
ticipation at a 90% confidence level, while gender does. In Algeria and Tunisia, men were 
more likely to participate in the protests than women by an odds ratio of 6.17 and 2.77, re-
spectively and ceteris paribus. Yemeni men, on the other hand, were 0.70 times less likely to 
participate in the Arab Spring than women were, ceteris paribus. In fact, there was an unprec-
edented civic engagement by Yemeni women, facilitated in supportive (providing food/water 
or volunteering at field hospitals) as well as participative, organizational and lobbying roles. 
This might be due to the fact that Yemen has the worst gender gap index among Arab coun-
tries (see Table A.10 in the Appendix), moving Yemeni women being most desperate in their 
desire for change and gender emancipation. 
4.3 Adjusting for Potential Time Lags – Comparing the Findings 
with Data from AB Wave 2 
As highlighted by the operationalization of the dependent variable in the previous chapter, I 
employ the second wave of the Arab Barometer to adjust for potential time lags. The inter-
views of wave 2 were conducted in December 2010 in Jordan and throughout 2011 in the oth-
er three countries, which might indicate a more direct link of immediate frustrations or feel-
ings of relative deprivation resulting in protest behavior. As mentioned in the previous chap-
ter, the dependent variable of wave 2 does not directly measure Arab Spring participation, but 
rather participation in protests, marches, or sit-ins during the past three years. This means 
that the results do not account solely for protests referred to as the Arab Spring (that began in 
the end of 2010 in Tunisia and which did not spread to many other countries before 2011), but 
prior protest movements as well (especially for Jordan, since interviews here were conducted 
in late 2010). With this limitation in mind, Table 4.3 provides the new findings regarding 
wave 2.  
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Table 4.3: Protest Participation of Wave 2 (Binary Logistic Regression) 
     
  Algeria Jordan Tunisia Yemen 
Motivations 
      Equal Treatment -0.37* -0.89*** -0.58** -0.29 
 
(0.22) (0.31) (0.27) (0.33) 
  Unemployment 0.38 -0.42 0.02 0.30 
 
(0.37) (1.02) (0.47) (0.57) 
  Youth -0.32 1.27** 1.14** 0.06 
 
(0.46) (0.62) (0.56) (0.58 
  Unemployment*Youth -0.34 -1.43 -0.29 -1.26  
 
(0.56) (1.44) (0.65) (0.87) 
  Higher Education 0.05 0.25 -0.01 0.27 
 
(0.21) (0.32) (0.27) (0.32) 
  Free Expression 0.17 -0.12 0.61** -0.58* 
 
(0.22) (0.31) (0.29) (0.30) 
  Qur'an Reading 
         ...Sometimes 0.55** 1.13* 0.19 0.57 
 
(0.27) (0.66) (0.49) (0.71) 
     ...Most of the time 0.46 † 0.62 0.41 0.94 
 
(0.31) (0.68) (0.52) (0.71) 
     ...Always 0.20 1.09 † 0.94 † 0.68 
 
(0.37) (0.68) (0.58) (0.71) 
Opportunities 
      Political Party 1.38*** 1.95** 1.50** 1.12*** 
 
(0.50) (0.81) (0.62) (0.32) 
  Civil Organization 0.62 † 0.91 0.38 1.22*** 
 
(0.42) (0.95) (0.83) (0.43) 
  Internet for Politics 1.04*** 0.78** 0.86*** 0.75** 
 
(0.25) (0.34) (0.27) (0.30) 
  Friday Prayers 
         ...Sometimes 0.06 -0.47 -0.22 0.03 
 
(0.33) (0.66) (0.35) (0.75) 
     ...Most of the time -0.35 -0.03 -0.02 0.62 
 
(0.38) (0.56) (0.50) (0.80) 
     ...Always -0.002 -0.38 0.13 0.25 
 
(0.28) (0.53) (0.38) (0.60) 
Controls 
      Age -0.09 0.18 0.05 -0.06 
 
(0.08) (0.13) (0.12) (0.17) 
  Age² 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
  Gender 0.33 † 1.02*** 1.69*** 0.98*** 
 
(0.22) (0.39) (0.32) (0.34) 
Constant -0.37 -7.21*** -3.94* -1.38 
  (1.61) (2.67) (2.83) (3.10) 
Observations 659 491 382 294 
Pseudo R² (Nagelkerke) 0.11 0.17 0.27 0.33 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance level indicated by * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.   
† refers to near 90% statistical significance (or above 85%; p<0.15) 
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4.3.1 Motivations 
The results show that perception of equal treatment is mostly significant and negatively relat-
ed to protest participation, though slightly weaker. This variable is now also significant for 
Algeria and still significant for Jordan and Tunisia, but not for Yemen, which suggests that 
feelings of relative deprivation assume a relevant role in explaining protest participation on 
average. Thus, these results indicate further overall support for Hypothesis 1. 
Regarding Hypothesis 2, it appears that youth unemployment had a diverging impact on Jor-
dan and Tunisia. In Jordan, young unemployed citizens appear to have been 0.15 times (Cal-
culation: 1-(exp(1.27-1.43))) less likely to participate in protests, ceteris paribus. On the other 
hand, young unemployed Tunisians were 2.34 times (Calculation: exp(1.14-0.29)) more likely 
to participate in protests, ceteris paribus. For Yemen and Algeria, youth unemployment ap-
pears to be non-significant. This suggests that Hypothesis 2 is only somewhat supported.  
Better educational achievement appears to have no significant explanatory power on protest 
participation. Thus, there is no support for Hypothesis 3.  
Hypothesis 4 is only supported for Yemen and Tunisia. Thus, the perception of having free-
dom to express opinions guaranteed is significantly influencing protest behavior in the coun-
tries that experienced regime change. In Yemen, the relationship is, as expected, negative 
which indicates that having more freedoms guaranteed made citizens 0.44 times less likely to 
participate in protests, ceteris paribus. Thus, a lack of perceived freedoms spurred protest in 
Yemen. In Tunisia however, the positive relationship suggests that citizens who perceived 
their freedoms to be guaranteed were 1.84 times more likely to protest, ceteris paribus. This 
indicates that the developmental status of a country might impact the motivations for protest 
participation. Tunisia’s general living standards are among other development indicators 
much better than those of Yemen (see Table A.10 in the Appendix). Hence, general liberties 
such as free voting are less likely to be available in countries like Yemen than in Tunisia. Ac-
cordingly, Tunisians might have used these preexistent structures of freedom to act and speak 
to organize and advance their protest activities – reflecting the positive causal direction of the 
variable. On the other hand, Yemeni could have felt deprived of not being able to access such 
free structures and opportunities; correspondingly they protested for attaining these, indicat-
ing the negative causal relationship.  
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Concerning Hypothesis 8, Qur’an reading remains significant for Algeria and Jordan (and 
close to significant for Tunisia) in explaining protest participation. But the causal direction is 
now positive. This change is in line with the findings of Hoffman and Jamal (who also used 
the second wave of the Arab Barometer). In Algeria, people that read the Qur’an sometimes or 
most of the time were 1.73 and 1.58 times more likely to participate in protests than those who 
read the Qur’an rarely or never, respectively and ceteris paribus. In Jordan, citizens who read 
the Qur’an sometimes and always were 3.10 and 2.97 times more likely to participate in pro-
tests compared to those who never or rarely read it, respectively and ceteris paribus. Tunisi-
ans who read the Qur’an always as compared to never or rarely were about 2.56 times more 
likely to participate in protests, ceteris paribus. The change in the causal direction might indi-
cate that general protest participation (wave 2) was spurred by individual piety in some Arab 
countries, while Arab Spring participation (wave 3) was less driven by religious affiliations of 
Qur’an reading. As the variable of Qur’an reading is significantly contributing to protest par-
ticipation in almost all of the selected countries, Hypothesis 5 is overall supported by the re-
sults of wave 2. 
4.3.2 Opportunities  
The wave 2 results regarding opportunities suggest that membership in political parties as 
well as usage of internet are significantly positive related to protest participation in all four 
countries, thus supporting Hypotheses 5 and 6. Being a member in a political party increased 
the likelihood of participating in protest by about 3 to 7 times, and using the internet for polit-
ical matters increased it by about 2 to 3 times, ceteris paribus. Membership in civil organiza-
tion was also significant for Yemen and close to significant for Algeria, increasing the corre-
sponding odds of protesting by about 3.4 and 1.9 times, respectively. These findings further 
support Hypotheses 5. Attending Friday prayers did not contribute significantly to protest 
participation in any of the countries, contradicting Hypothesis 7 and therein confirming the 
results of Hoffman and Jamal’s (2014) article. Overall, the opportunistic factors of being a 
member in a political party and using the internet for political purposes appear to play a sig-
nificant role vis-à-vis grievance-based motivations for protest behavior in the region general-
ly. 
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4.3.3 Control Variables 
For wave 2, age seemed to assume no significant role once again. Gender, on the other hand, 
appears to be significantly positively related to protest participation in all four countries. In 
Algeria, Jordan, Tunisia, and Yemen, men were about 1.4, 2.8, 5.4, and 2.7 times more likely 
to protest than women, respectively and ceteris paribus. This confirms the assumed gender 
inequality factor of women not participating in public sphere as much as men (due to status, 
guardianship, etc.), which is especially prevalent in the Arab region (see also Table A.10 in 
the Appendix).  
4.4 Improving Results – Taking New Social Media Out 
As indicated by Model 1 and Model 2, Facebook appears to have no significant effect on pro-
test participation, while the usage of internet for political matters seems to be significantly 
increasing the likelihood of participating in protests. However, one needs to be cautious with 
these results. In my opinion, social media can have diverging effects, as each country pos-
sesses a unique developmental status that includes corresponding access limitations, such as 
broadband coverage or the number of citizens able to access the internet. The social media 
indicators in Table A.10 in the Appendix show, for example, that Yemen is much less devel-
oped in that area (among others) than other Arab countries. Thus, it is difficult to verify that 
new social media is a determinant factor for protest participation in countries that have low 
levels of internet penetration and access structures. Another problem relates to whether (and 
to what extent) the government controls the internet infrastructure through censorship, which 
includes blocking or privatizing webpages. These limitations indicate that the new social me-
dia variable could have a strong impact on the results for countries like Yemen, possibly in-
troducing bias.  
Further, it is important to recall that new social media plays a more accelerating than causal 
role in regards to protest participation.
54
 While using the internet – or new social media in 
general – can facilitate democratic movements to resist authoritarian regimes, it will not lead 
to the same outcome in every Arab country (Samin, 2012). One cannot simply comprehend 
the role of social media in political struggles without first understanding the political context 
it is operating in. The impact of new social media should thereby be based on underlying so-
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 For a more comprehensive review of the debate on new social media‘s role in the Arab Spring, see among 
others: Asseburg, 2012; Ben Moussa, 2013; Brown et al., 2012; Eltantawy and Wiest, 2011; Howard, 2011; 
Wihbey, 2013; Wharton, 2012. 
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cial and political dynamics of individual countries (Ibid). This argument is further highlighted 
by a widely cited aphorism: “Twitter doesn’t cause revolutions, but revolutions are tweeted” 
(Lynch, 2011). In the same vein, scholars like Shirky (2011) or El Difraoui (2012) contend 
that revolutions do not depend on society adopting new tools, but society adopting new be-
haviors. Bishara (2012:92) supports this view by arguing that there was vast overemphasis of 
new social media, which, “all the while ignoring other components of the revolutions, became 
a cliché intended to fascinate and entertain, not to inform.” 
This is not to say that we should neglect the role of new social media completely, as it has 
allowed diverse segments of society to access and produce information, narratives and frames 
that reorganize collective identities or the meaning of citizenship; and therein reshape power 
relations between gender, ethnic and religious groups and generations (Ben Moussa, 
2013:56). But rather acknowledging its supportive rather than deterministic impact, the poten-
tial problem of an endogenous causal relationship with protest participation adds to the chal-
lenges of new social media’s role in the Arab uprisings. Endogeneity means that the depend-
ent variable (protest participation) might cause the independent variable (usage of social me-
dia), reflecting the inverse causal direction of a prior assumed exogenous flow. Indeed, it is 
very likely that protest attendants used online tools to keep up to date with regional events 
after they participated in protests (Wolfsfeld et al., 2013).  
These challenges of endogeneity and the diverging impact of internet in different countries 
(due to different developmental status, for instance) support the argument of re-running re-
gressions without a new social media variable. The results of such regressions will further 
benefit from increased number of observations, because the previous regressions (Tables 4.1 
to 4.3) only included respondents that used the internet. This is because respondents were 
priorly asked how frequently they use the internet, and those respondents who answered I do 
not use the internet were subsequently not asked the questions on the two variables of Face-
book and internet usage for political matters that I included in the models so far. 
To further adjust for the stability of the results, I decided to include two more cases: Morocco 
and Egypt. I do this mostly to account for the limited results of the case of Algeria, as it has 
the lowest number of actual Arab Spring participants among the selected cases, as well as low 
variation on other explanatory variables that might impact the reliability of the results.
55
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 Extreme splits on the frequency distribution of either the dependent or independent variables can often lead to 
convergence failure in logistic regression (Allison, 2008:5). 
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Table 4.4: Arab Spring Participation (excluding Social Media)   
       
  Algeria Jordan Morocco Tunisia Yemen Egypt 
Motivations 
  
  
  
  
  Equal Treatment -0.43 -0.75** -1.26*** -0.39** -0.26 0.08 
 
(0.43) (0.35) (0.31) (0.19) (0.19) (0.25) 
  Unemployment -0.23 -0.38 0.20 0.24 0.88** 0.69 
 
(0.84) (1.05) (0.53) (0.29) (0.37) (0.58) 
  Youth 0.85 1.92** 1.13* 1.38*** 0.11 0.95 † 
 
(0.90) (0.81) (0.66) (0.43) (0.36) (0.58) 
  Unemployment*Youth -0.57 0.19 0.15 -0.76* -0.55 -1.71* 
 
(1.23) (1.25) (0.70) (0.45) (0.57) (0.93) 
  Higher Education 0.05 0.97*** 0.33 0.84*** 0.59* 0.58** 
 
(0.49) (0.38) (0.41) (0.22) (0.35) (0.27) 
  Free Expression -0.67* 0.05 -0.47 † 0.21 0.61*** -0.73*** 
 
(0.41) (0.38) (0.30) (0.25) (0.18) (0.27) 
  Qur'an Reading 
  
  
  
  
     ...Sometimes -0.38 0.97 -0.35 0.41 -0.74*** -1.71*** 
 
(0.44) (0.77) (0.46) (0.49) (0.24) (0.51) 
     ...Most of the time -2.18*** 0.25 -0.54 0.64 -0.12 -0.65 † 
 
(0.76) (0.78) (0.50) (0.48) (0.24) (0.45) 
     ...Always -2.62** 0.64 -0.66 0.31 0.17 -1.11** 
 
(1.49) (0.79) (0.54) (0.47) (0.25) (0.47) 
Opportunities 
  
  
  
  
  Political Party -17.81 5.00*** 1.91*** 1.03** 0.89*** 1.56*** 
 
(7,656.89) (1.40) (0.57) (0.52) (0.17) (0.45) 
  Civil Organization -0.71 1.03 -1.22 3.25*** 1.46*** -0.91 
 
(33,510.57) (0.97) (0.99) (1.13) (0.42) (2.17) 
  Friday Prayers 
  
  
  
  
     ...Sometimes -0.64 -0.26 -0.43 0.02 0.47 2.00** 
 
(0.66) (0.67) (0.55) (0.32) (0.41) (1.00) 
     ...Most of the time -0.01 -1.00 -0.32 0.33 0.68* 1.83* 
 
(0.58) (0.78) (0.56) (0.35) (0.39) (0.96) 
     ...Always -0.45 -0.80 0.02 0.78*** 1.04*** 1.56* 
 
(0.63) (0.55) (0.52) (0.24) (0.37) (0.94) 
Controls 
  
  
  
  
  Age 0.37* 0.18 0.31** 0.03 0.06 0.13 
 
(0.21) (0.13) (0.12) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) 
  Age² -0.005* -0.002 -0.004*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.002* 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  Gender 1.16** 0.89** 0.15 1.13*** 0.29* 1.05*** 
 
(0.47) (0.43) (0.31) (0.21) (0.17) (0.29) 
  Political Interest -0.05 0.95** 1.59*** 1.16*** 0.53*** 0.93*** 
 
(0.62) (0.39) (0.31) (0.21) (0.19) (0.28) 
Constant -8.34** 
-
8.59*** -7.37*** 
-
4.17*** -2.94** -6.03*** 
  (4.08) (2.92) (2.55) (1.34) (1.36) (2.28) 
Observations 676 1339 776 898 813 817 
Pseudo R² (Nagelkerke) 0.22 0.23 0.27 0.32 0.29 0.25 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance level indicated by * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.        
† refers to statistical significance being very close to p<0.10.  
The three countries to the right experienced regime leadership change, while the other three countries did not. 
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I include Morocco and Egypt to have one additional case for a country that experienced re-
gime leadership change (Egypt) and one that did not (Morocco). Overall, these cases are pri-
marily included to strengthen the confidence in the accuracy of my results.
56
 Table 4.4 depicts 
the findings that exclude the new social media variable and account for the two additional 
countries of Egypt and Morocco.  
4.4.1 Motivations 
While keeping in mind that the effect of using internet for political matters is significant, as 
indicated in Table 4.2 and 4.3, I now discuss the improved findings of excluding this variable. 
The new results are somewhat consistent with what has been identified so far. Grievances 
through the perception of unequal treatment (Hypothesis 1) compared to other citizens re-
mains significant in promoting Arab Spring participation for Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. 
However, the other three countries that do not support Hypothesis 1 do support Hypothesis 4, 
namely political grievances of being deprived of freedom of expression promoting Arab 
Spring participation. This suggests that in some countries (Algeria, Yemen, Egypt) Arab 
Spring participation was rather motivated by perceptions political grievances, while in other 
countries (Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia) perceptions of socio-economic inequalities played a 
more important explanatory part.
57
 The results of Table 4.4 are thus in line with Ben Mous-
sa’s (2014) findings, which state, for instance, that in Tunisia the lack of jobs and impover-
ishment were the root causes for protest activity while the Egyptian protests were originally 
spurred by political grievances.  
Youth unemployment (Hypothesis 2) is a significant indicator for protest participation in 
those countries that experienced protests mostly on socio-economic grievances, namely Jor-
dan, Morocco and Tunisia. This finding makes intuitively sense, as perceptions of socio-
economic inequality might have also been caused by being young and unemployed.
58
 
Better educational achievement significantly increased the likelihood of Arab Spring partici-
pation in most of the countries in Table 4.4, thereby supporting Hypothesis 3. This is greatly 
                                                          
56
 Although included in the Model, goodness of fit and robustness tests will not be included for Morocco and 
Egypt. Nonetheless, these measures are available on request.  
57
 As Table A.11 in the Appendix shows, respondents were asked Which of the following were the main three 
reasons that led to the Arab Spring? The two main reasons were “betterment of the economic situation” and 
“civil and political freedoms”. My results appear in line with these responses. The third most-cited reason, cor-
ruption, is excluded in my analysis due to theoretical presumptions of multicollinearity between corruption and 
freedom to express opinions and/or unequal treatment. This will be tested for in Chapter 5, though. 
58
 This does not mean, however, that these variables correlate highly with each other (see Appendix 1). 
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diverging from the results of Table 4.3, in which higher education was non-significant. These 
findings suggest that educational achievements have no explanatory power for general protest 
activity in the Arab region (using the alternative dependent variable and wave 2), while they 
do seem to contribute to explaining Arab Spring participation (using wave 3; Tables 4.2 and 
4.4). However, these results might be influenced by potential biases through issues like multi-
collinearity or the lack of interaction terms; hence, this will be tested for in Chapter 6.  
The findings for the religiosity measure of individual piety (Hypothesis 8) are mixed. In line 
with the results of Table 4.2, reading the Qur’an more frequently made citizens less inclined 
to participate in the Arab Spring. This was the case in Egypt, Yemen and Tunisia, where more 
religiously-attached citizens (those who read the Qur’an more frequently) appeared to be less 
motivated to participate in the Arab Spring. This finding contradicts the results of Table 4.3 
and therein the argument made by Hoffman and Jamal (2014). A potential explanation for this 
divergence might lie in the argument that the countries experienced some reforms and/or up-
heavals that interrupted the daily routine of Arabs in the time period of 2010/11 (wave 2) to 
2013/14 (wave 3), which gave citizens naturally less opportunities or incentives to simply 
read the Qur’an frequently. Another explanation could be rooted in the upsurge of radical re-
ligious groups like ISIL, which might have contributed to a social desire to distance oneself 
from those groups and correspondingly giving respondents incentives to answer that they read 
the Qur’an less frequently than they actually do. However, these are only hypothetical expla-
nations and require more detailed investigation by future research. 
Eventually, all motivational results are in general quite mixed for countries that experienced 
regime change vis-à-vis those that did not. It is undoubtedly clear, however, that feelings of 
relative deprivation played an essential role in motivating Arab Spring participation, at least to 
some extent, in all selected countries. 
4.4.2 Opportunities 
In regards to the opportunity-based explanations, being a member in a political party appeared 
to have facilitated protest participation in all countries except Algeria, overall supporting Hy-
pothesis 5. Being a member in a civil organization had the same expected positive effect, but 
only for Tunisia and Yemen. Participation in religious gatherings, such as Friday prayers, 
seemed to have facilitated protesting mostly in countries that experienced regime change, 
such as Tunisia, Yemen, or Egypt (Hypothesis 7). As previously outlined in the discussion of 
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Table 4.2, this suggests that this opportunistic variable of attending religious meetings might 
have played an important role in facilitating the ousting of regional leaders. Unsurprisingly, 
regarding the perception of the outcome of the Arab Spring, more citizens in countries that 
ousted their rulers (Tunisia and Yemen) felt victorious compared to those that had perceptions 
or feelings of personal loss; while this was vice-versa for the countries that did not oust their 
rulers (Algeria and Jordan) – which is depicted in Table A.11 in the Appendix. 
Overall, the results are in line with the hypothesized presumptions. They suggest that oppor-
tunities, especially being a member of a political party, facilitated the propensity of Arabs to 
participate in the Arab Spring. 
4.4.3 Control Variables 
All control variables appear to be essential, as they are all significantly related to protest par-
ticipation. The negative causal direction of age² indicates that younger citizens were more 
likely to participate in the Arab Spring than older citizens were. This variable is statistically 
significant for Algeria, Morocco and Egypt, which suggests that age did not play an overly 
deterministic role in the other countries. The positive direction of both gender and political 
interest shows that males were more likely to attend protests than females, as well as that 
people who are more interested in politics were more likely to participate than those who 
were not (except for Algeria). These results are in line with prior expectations. 
4.5 Bringing It All Together: A Summary of the Findings 
To sum up, it appears that both motivations based on feelings of relative deprivation as well 
as opportunistic elements have promoted Arab Spring participation. Overall, the perception of 
being treated unequally was the most consistent significant explanatory variable on the moti-
vational spectrum; while being a member of a political party was the most consistent explana-
tion for protest participation among the opportunistic factors. The social media variable of 
using internet for political purposes was, if included, also a very consistent significant con-
tributor to explaining Arab Spring participation. Table 4.5 provides an overview of these find-
ings, depicting the aggregate confirmation or rejection of all hypotheses. 
These results indicate that feelings of relative deprivation should not be dismissed so easily in 
playing a critical part in explaining protest participation, as appears to be often the case in 
academia. Motivations due to feeling relatively deprived appear to go a long way in contrib-
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uting to explaining what moves citizens to participate in protests. But as highlighted here, 
motivations are not exclusive factors for such phenomena, as they rather complement than 
contradict opportunistic elements that facilitate protest participation. Thus, there appears to be 
a need to reconsider the rather perseverant positions of some tenacious parties in both camps 
(relative deprivation advocates vs. opportunity-based proponents) in academia to move to-
wards a reconciliation of these two theories. I showed here that instead of playing a contradic-
tory role, both relative deprivation and opportunity-based resource mobilization theories 
complement each other; and these should therefore be used in such a complementary way to 
analyse real world phenomena like protest participation more accurately.  
 
Table 4.5: Assessment (Confirmation/Rejection/neither) of the Hypotheses 
Motivations Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 4.4 Overall/Aggregate 
 Hypothesis 1 ✔ ✔ ~ ✔ 
 Hypothesis 2 X ~ ~ ~ 
 Hypothesis 3 ~ X ✔ ~ 
 Hypothesis 4 X ~ ✔ ~ 
 Hypothesis 8 X ✔ X X 
Opportunities     
 Hypothesis 5 ~ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
 Hypothesis 6 ✔ ✔ (not included) ✔ 
 Hypothesis 7 ☨ X ☨ ☨  
 
Notes: ✔ refers to confirmation of a Hypothesis. X indicates the rejection of a Hypothesis. ~ means that the 
Hypothesis can be neither completely confirmed nor rejected (sit-on-the-fence situation). ☨ indicates that there 
is support for the Hypothesis, but only for countries that experienced regime leadership change (e.g. Yemen). 
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4.6 Assessing the Goodness of Fit 
With different models at hand, it is worth investigating how well these actually predict protest 
participation. To do so means to analyze measures of model fit for the binary logistic regres-
sion models.  
Similar to OLS, logistic regression provides r-squared (R²) values as a measure of fit.
59
 An 
R²-value is calculated by accounting for the difference of the loglikelihood for the empty 
model            and for the loglikelihood for the model that includes the independent var-
iables        . Equation 4.1 depicts the formula for calculating Nagelkerke’s R². 
    
   
        
     
 
 
 
            
 
 
    Equation 4.1 
The R²-value indicates how much variation in the outcome is explained by the model. Re-
viewing the last rows in all the logistic regression tables above, the Nagelkerke’s pseudo-r² 
values are listed. For Table 4.2 the values are quite high, explaining from 27% of the variation 
in the outcome for Algeria up to 47% for Yemen. The results for protest participation meas-
ured in Table 4.3 have significant lower respective values, ranging from 11% for Algeria to 
33% for Yemen. For Table 4.4, these values improve again, now ranging from 22% explained 
variance in the outcome to 32%. If solely based on Nagelkerke’s pseudo-r² measure, the re-
sults indicate that Table 4.2 contained the best measures of fit for the models, as most per-
centage of the variation in the outcome is explained by these models. 
However, the pseudo-r² measure should be interpreted with caution, as they are approxima-
tions and should not be overly emphasized. An alternative goodness of fit measure is provided 
by the Hosmer and Lemeshow (HL) test, which reflects a chi-squared test that predicts 
whether or not observations correspond to expectations in subgroups of the model data. A 
significant test corresponds to the model not being a good fit, which means that a non-
significant test is desired as it supports the model’s goodness of fit. This is because we want 
to reject the test’s null hypothesis which states that there is no difference between observed 
and predicted values in the model. For Algeria and Jordan, the HL tests were non-significant 
(p-values above 0.05), thereby indicating overall good fit for most models. For Tunisia and 
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 I focus on Nagelkerke pseudo-r² since it varies from 0 to 1; unlike Cox and Snell’s pseudo-r² which maximum 
is usually less than 1.  
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Yemen, the HL tests indicated in most cases rather bad model fit though. The individual p-
values are shown in Table 4.6.  
Table 4.6: Hosmer-Lemeshow Test 
 Algeria Jordan Tunisia Yemen 
Table 4.2 0.834 0.901 0.006 0.010 
Table 4.3 0.935 0.556 0.004 0.062 
Table 4.4 0.452 0.285 0.614 0.050 
Note: The numbers represent p-values. Non-significance as in p>0.05 indicates that the model has a good fit. 
Nevertheless, the HL test is also limited in explaining the model’s goodness of fit. Firstly, it 
only assesses whether the model fits or not, lacking information about the extent of the poten-
tial fit. Secondly, it is based on a chi-squared statistic that is heavily dependent on sample 
size, which makes any interpretation without accounting for the size less telling. For example, 
very small differences in large samples (as I use here) can easily lead to significance. Thirdly, 
the resulting p-value can easily change when interactions are included in the model (Allison, 
2013).  
Another measure of fit consists of comparing classification tables. This allows a more direct 
way of investigating the extent to which the independent variables of the model accurately 
predict the dependent variable by comparing predicted scores with actual group membership 
scores. In order to assess a predicted outcome to the actual value on the dependent variable, a 
threshold or cut-off point is required to account for the respective probabilities of the two out-
comes in the dependent variable. This cut value is usually 0.5 and it indicates whether a case 
becomes classified in the yes category (greater or equal to 0.5) or no category (less than 0.5) 
of the dependent variable. Thus, to assess the effectiveness of predicted classifications against 
actual classifications means to compare sensitivity and specificity of the model to attain over-
all percentage accuracy in classification, or PAC (Leard Statistics, 2013). Sensitivity refers to 
true positives, or to the percentage of cases that contained the observed characteristic (“yes” 
for protest participation) which were correctly predicted by the model (Ibid). Specificity refers 
to true negatives, or the percentage of cases that did not have that observed characteristic 
(“no” for protest participation) and were correctly predicted as not having that observed char-
acteristic (Ibid).  
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Running binary logistic regressions provides two classification tables, one for the null model  
         which does not include independent variables (simply calculates the percentage 
based on the larger group membership) and one for the model that accounts for individual 
variables. The comparison of the PAC of the null models with the PAC of the actual models 
thereby assesses the extent by which the model improves the prediction of group membership. 
If the model with independent variables predicts more group membership accurately than the 
null model which merely assumes that correct classifications belongs to the largest group, 
then the former is good fitting. Table 4.7 provides an overview of classification accuracy for 
Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. 
Table 4.7: Classification Accuracy (in percentage) 
 Algeria Jordan Tunisia Yemen 
                                                     
Table 4.2 94.6 95.3 95.5 95.8 57.7 74.8 60.2 77.1 
Table 4.3 78.4 79.1 88.4 88.5 68.7 74.0 53.9 71.0 
Table 4.4 95.5 95.5 96.9 97.2 77.6 82.1 58.6 71.5 
Note:       are null models (without any independent variables); Model include independent variables. 
The results of Table 4.7 indicate that the change from the null models to the models with in-
dependent variables did not greatly enhance classification accuracy for Algeria and Jordan. 
This is not necessarily unexpected, as these two countries have a relative low number of pro-
test participants compared to the other two countries. For Tunisia and Yemen, the models help 
quite a bit with accurate classification. For Table 4.2, for example, the models improve accu-
rate classification by about 17% for both Tunisia and Yemen. 
While this method of assessing accuracy of the models by comparing classification tables is 
reasonable, the cut off value of 0.5 is chosen rather arbitrarily which poses questions about 
the reliability of this method. To overcome this challenge, I calculate receiver operating char-
acteristic (ROC) curves with the help of predicted probabilities from the logistic regression 
models. These ROC-curves help to interpret the trade-off between sensitivity and specificity 
levels of my diagnostic tests as they simultaneous measure the sensitivity (true positive val-
ues) and the specificity (true negative values) for all possible cut-off points. The ROC-curve 
then plots sensitivity (y-axis) over 1-specifitiy (x-axis), which depicts an aggregate measure 
of overall predictive power. An overall indication of the diagnostic accuracy of a ROC-curve 
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is termed the area under the curve (AUC). AUC values closer to 1 indicate the screening 
measure reliably distinguishes among subjects that have or do not have the outcome of inter-
est (in my case protest participation), respectively. This means that an area of 1 represents a 
perfect test, with perfect sensitivity and specificity. An AUC value of about 0.5, on the other 
hand, is very much a meaningless test as it reflects that predictions are mostly random and the 
model does not add much explanation. Table 4.8 illustrates the AUC values for the respective 
models. Figures 4.1 to 4.4 illustrate the corresponding ROC-curves by country, with each 
graph including three curves (one for each of Table 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4).  
 
Table 4.8: AUC-values of ROC-curves 
 Algeria Jordan Tunisia Yemen 
Table 4.2 0.845*** 0.880*** 0.763*** 0.788*** 
Table 4.3 0.640*** 0.728*** 0.772*** 0.783*** 
Table 4.4 0.825*** 0.812*** 0.796*** 0.751*** 
Note: An area under the curve (AUC) of 1 represents a perfect test, while an AUC of 0.5 is a worthless test. 
Thus, a larger value indicates better fit of the model. Statistical significance at a 95% confidence level of the 
ROC-curve is indicated by ***. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: ROC-Curves for Algeria 
 
Figure 4.2: ROC-Curves for Jordan 
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Figure 4.3: ROC-Curves for Tunisia 
 
Figure 4.4: ROC-Curves for Yemen 
 
Notes: For the Figures 4.1 to 4.4, the red ROC-curves are for the results of Table 4.2, the blue curves corre-
spond to Table 4.3, and the orange curves relate to the regressions of Table 4.4.  
The AUC-values are overall fairly high and all statistically significant at a 95% confidence 
level, which indicates that the curves are significantly different from the 0.5 baseline model. 
Thus, the logistic regressions appear to classify groups significantly better than by chance, but 
in some cases still far from perfectly (e.g. 0.640 for Algeria in Table 4.3 or the respective blue 
curve in Figure 4.1). 
In order to account for how good the full models really fit vis-à-vis models that include only 
motivational or opportunistic variables, I re-run regressions and calculate respective AUC-
values for the following cases. First, I create AUC-values for a baseline model that only in-
cludes control variables as predictors. Secondly, AUC-values are created for a motivation 
model that includes motivational and control variables, but excludes opportunistic variables. 
Third, the AUC-values for an opportunity model will include opportunistic and control varia-
bles, but exclude motivational variables. I will compare these AUC values then with the re-
sults of full models that include all independent variables. The full models are based on Table 
4.2 (and thereby wave 3), because the respective goodness of fit measures such as AUC-
values and Nagelkerke’s r² values analyzed so far were among the highest (except for Tunisia) 
for Table 4.2 in comparison to Tables 4.3 and 4.4. The comparison of AUC values is shown 
in Table 4.9. 
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Table 4.9: Comparison of AUC values with Limited Models 
 Algeria Jordan Tunisia Yemen 
Baseline Models 0.708*** 0.668*** 0.759*** 0.633*** 
Motivation Models 0.817*** 0.743*** 0.776*** 0.687*** 
Opportunity Models 0.782*** 0.813*** 0.706*** 0.762*** 
Full Models (Table 4.8) 0.845*** 0.880*** 0.763*** 0.788*** 
Note: Statistical significance at a 95% confidence level of the ROC-curve is indicated by ***. All values are 
based on variables included in Table 4.2 (thus, the Full Model values are equal to the first row in Table 4.8).  
The first observation to note is that almost all motivation models and opportunity models in-
crease the AUC-values (and therein goodness of fit) compared to the baseline models. This is 
not the case for the opportunity model of Tunisia, however. In fact, the model that only in-
cludes motivational and control variables appears to be better fitting for Tunisia than the full 
model. A similar, but not so extreme case is highlighted by Algeria, for which the motivation 
model adds more to the goodness of fit than the opportunity model. On the other hand, for 
Jordan and Yemen, opportunities appear to play a more important role in increasing goodness 
of fit than motivations. This suggests, as previously assumed, that both motivations as well as 
opportunities play an important, often mutually reinforcing part in explaining protest partici-
pation. In summary, it appears fair to say that the full models have an overall good – but by 
no means perfect – predictive power of Arab and protest participation. 
4.7 Conclusion 
To conclude, this chapter showed through statistical analyses of binary logistic regressions 
that both motivational, grievance-based factors as well as opportunistic elements play a role in 
explaining Arab Spring participation. More particularly, perceptions of unequal treatment, the 
lack of freedom to express opinions, better educational achievements, as well as being a 
member of a political party and/or civil organization all seem to contribute significantly to 
explaining recent protest participation in the Arab world. The hypothesis that unemployed 
youth were more prone to participate is not extensively supported, except for some sporadic 
cases. The two religious measures of frequency of Qur’an reading and attending religious 
rallies also indicated mixed results. Using the same data as Hoffman and Jamal (2014), name-
ly wave 2 of the Arab Barometer, I was able to confirm their findings for most of my selected 
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countries. However, using the new data of wave 3 provides a different picture, as Table 4.2 
and 4.4 indicated that actual Arab Spring participation – in contrast to general protest partici-
pation before 2011 – was promoted by less rather than more frequent Qur’an reading (at least 
in the countries in which it significantly contributed to participation). Furthermore, using the 
new data of wave 3 shows that attending religious meetings, such as Friday prayers, appeared 
to have had a significant effect on Arab Spring participation, but only in countries that ousted 
their rulers. Finally, while using Facebook made no significant contribution to Arab Spring 
participation, using the internet for political matters in general was almost always significant; 
if it was included. All in all, the full models appear to be relatively good fitting, as various 
goodness-of-fit tests indicated overall good predictive power. 
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5  Robustness Diagnostics 
 
This chapter assesses the robustness in form of reliability and validity of the results depicted 
in Chapter 4. Robustness assessments are crucial, as unreliable or invalid results produce un-
warranted conclusions from the analyses, which can lead to potentially giving wrong advice 
to policy-makers (Agresti, 2002). The robustness assessment of this chapter includes checking 
for possible violations of the assumptions for binary logistic regressions, as outlined at the 
end of Chapter 3. 
This chapter is divided into two parts. First, I briefly discuss the reliability of my results. 
Then, I analyze three forms of validity: construct validity, internal validity, and external valid-
ity. I conclude that my results are quite robust, being overall fairly reliable as well as internal-
ly valid. The corresponding generalizability (external validity) presumably holds fairly well 
for countries of the Arab world, but should be considered cautiously in regards to – and con-
tingent on – other parts of the world. 
5.1 Reliability 
A first robustness assessment concerns reliability and relates to the efficiency of the results 
(King et al., 1994:151). In other words, reliable findings are consistent measures with mini-
mal random errors which ensure that the reproduction of the same analyses yields the same 
(or at least very similar) results (Ibid). In this, replicability is essential in making valid infer-
ences, as unreliable results might suppress any proper assessment of validity (Dawis, 
2000:78).   
As previously outlined in Chapter 3, the interviews were conducted by regional experts and 
academics whose surveys should have yielded sufficiently adequate data to make the Arab 
Barometer measures overall reliable. Systematic and non-systematic (random) measurement 
errors are most commonly caused by issues such as social desirability bias, non-response bias, 
recall bias, and so forth – and such errors can never be completely ruled out (Bhattacherjee, 
2012:80-2; Gleser, 1992). But due to the vast experience of the staff that conducted the inter-
views as well as the primary objective of the conduction itself – namely to establish reliable 
data – I trust that the Arab Barometer surveys were conducted in such a manner that produced 
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satisfactory reliable data.
60
 This can be further supported by the argument that common tech-
niques – such as test-retest, split-half methods, intercoder reliability checks and other follow-
up checks – were most likely conducted to confirm the reliability of the data (Ibid:56-8).  
In order to allow for full transparency as in enabling the replication of the analyses conducted 
in this thesis, the respective coding syntax I employed is available upon request, as well.  
5.2 Validity  
Using reliable data by itself does not automatically ensure accurate results. This is because 
reliability does not assure accuracy or unbiasedness. Instead, validity refers to the extent that 
operationalized indicators actually reflect what one intends to measure, and therein assesses 
the unbiasedness of results (King et al., 1994:151). There exist different threats to validity 
which can potentially bias results, such as model misspecification or the presence of highly 
influential observations, also called outliers or residuals. In the following sections of this 
chapter, I investigate construct validity, internal validity (causality), and external validity 
(generalizability) of my models in order to support the robustness of my analytical findings of 
Chapter 4.  
5.2.1 Construct Validity 
Construct validity refers to the extent to which independent variables actually measure what 
they are supposed to measure. In other words, this form of validity assesses how well the op-
erationalizations of the included variables reflect their theoretical foundations. Among other 
scholars, Adcock and Collier (2001) argue that each variable should incorporate all theoretical 
aspects it operationalizes; only those and no others. In order to account for the potential threat 
of having measures included which do not cover all aspects of their theoretical foundations, I 
provide alternative operationalizations of the most essential concepts to improve the confi-
dence in (and therein robustness of) my findings. With reference to the results from Table 4.2 
in the last chapter, the findings of alternative operationalizations for motivational variables 
are shown in Table 5.1.
61
 For pragmatic reasons, the results are only depicted for the case of 
                                                          
60
 “The Arab Barometer is a multi-partner collaborative project housed at the Arab Reform Initiative (ARI) es-
tablished to produce reliable data on the politically-relevant attitudes of ordinary citizens.” (my emphasis) Arab 
Reform Initiative. 2014. 
61
 Alternative operationalizations are only provided for motivational variables, because these are latent variables 
(perceptions and attitudes). Opportunity variables are observable and provide thereby more solid results that do 
not necessarily need robustness tests. Thus, I provide alternative measures only for motivations. 
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Algeria. Nevertheless, each alternative operationalization was employed for all four countries 
and corresponding results are available upon request. Although not shown here, the findings 
from all four countries are discussed in some detail below.  
In Table 5.1, each new Model includes one alternative operationalization for an independent 
variable, with the other variables remaining consistent with the original model of Table 4.2. 
Model 2 and Model 3 show alternative operationalizations for the measure of perception of 
unequal treatment. Model 2 uses a binary variable for the evaluation of the current economic 
situation in one’s home country (very good/good versus bad/very bad). Model 3 employs the 
alternative dichotomous variable of the extent to which citizens compare their living condi-
tions with the rest of their fellow citizens (much worse/worse versus similar/better/much bet-
ter). For any of the four countries, both Model 2 and Model 3 show very similar results to the 
original findings of Table 4.2.  
In Model 4, an additional interaction term of higher education and unemployment is included. 
Except for Algeria, the interaction term is non-significant and all results remain overall the 
same as in Table 4.2. This suggests that among the four countries, only Algerians who both 
achieved higher education and were unemployed were more likely to participate in the Arab 
Spring than those who were employed and had lower or no education, ceteris paribus.  
Model 5 replaces the variable that measured free expression being guaranteed or not with the 
alternative measure of support for individual political freedoms such as freedom of the press, 
freedom of expression, and freedom to establish associations (strongly/somewhat support 
versus do not/strongly do not support). For Jordan, Tunisia, and Yemen, the alternative varia-
ble does hardly change any of the original results of having free expression included as in 
Table 4.2. For Algeria, the variation on this variable was very low – only 13 respondents an-
swered that they do not (strongly) support individual freedoms, while 1165 answered they do 
support them.
62
 As previously discussed in the beginning of Chapter 4, this low variation ex-
plains the overly large odds ratios and standard errors, which should be considered with cau-
tion.  
 
 
                                                          
62
 In comparison, for Jordan, Tunisia and Yemen, the amount of non-supporters amounted to at least 100 re-
spondents.  
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Table 5.1: Alternative Operationalizations for Motivations - Algeria 
  
                   Alternative Independent Variables 
 
  Original (4.2) Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Motivations 
        Equal Treatment -0.87 
  
-1.05 -0.83 -0.63 
 
(0.73) 
  
(0.78) (0.64) (0.67) 
  Economic Situation 
 
-1.21 
    
  
(0.81) 
    
  Living Conditions (compared) 
  
1.12 
   
   
(1.17) 
   
  Unemployment 0.24 -0.19 0.77 -0.52 0.53 -0.04 
 
(1.20) (1.59) (1.20) (1.44) (1.17) (1.15) 
  Youth 1.36 1.77 0.94 1.83 1.31 1.09 
 
(1.50) (1.56) (1.43) (1.63) (1.31) (1.37) 
  Unemployment*Youth -0.24 0.02 0.12 -0.16 -0.72 0.13 
 
(1.57) (1.93) (1.51) (1.72) (1.52) (1.50) 
  Higher Education -0.20 -0.53 -0.34 -0.88 0.47 -0.25 
 
(0.84) (0.85) (0.80) (0.98) (0.72) (0.82) 
  H. Education*Unemploy. 
   
4.79** 
  
    
(2.19) 
  
  Free Expression -0.69 -0.59 -0.59 -0.66 
 
-0.82 
 
(0.66) (0.67) (0.67) (0.68) 
 
(0.62) 
  Support for Political Freedom 
    
18.81 
 
     
(19,902.58) 
 
  Qur'an Reading 
           ...Sometimes -2.03** -2.25*** -2.16** -2.18** -1.67** 
 
 
(0.82) (0.87) (0.85) (0.87) (0.70) 
 
     ...Most of the time -1.48* -1.83* -1.58* -1.47* -1.74** 
 
 
(0.87) (0.95) (0.90) (0.89) (0.83) 
 
     ...Always -1.43 -1.59 -1.31 -1.14 -1.53 
 
 
(1.65) (1.69) (1.66) (1.67) (1.62) 
 
         Self-perception of being…  
    (Reference: …Not religious) 
           …Somewhat religious 
     
-0.75 
      
(1.12) 
     …Religious 
     
0.02 
      
(1.36) 
       Opportunities 
        Political Party -18.92 -18.56 -18.74 -18.63 -19.25 -18.79 
 
(16,915.97) (16,792.94) (16,909.16) (16,589.29) (16,839.80) (16,685.05) 
  Civil Organization 2.51 1.58 1.98 3.63 2.76 2.42 
 
(36,748.88) (36,692.41) (36,745.75) (36,599.66) (36,713.88) (36,643.16) 
  Internet for Politics -0.98 -0.06 -0.66 -1.94 -1.31 -0.93 
 
(1.29) (1.22) (1.17) (1.52) (1.23) (1.35) 
  Friday Prayers 
           ...Sometimes -1.54 -0.69 -1.04 -1.91 -1.74 -2.14 † 
 
(1.41) (1.41) (1.35) (1.47) (1.28) (1.31) 
     ...Most of the time 0.09 0.79 0.09 -0.08 0.26 -0.52 
 
(0.92) (1.00) (0.92) (0.93) (0.79) (0.86) 
     ...Always -0.68 -0.51 -0.18 -1.28 -0.88 -1.52 † 
 
(1.08) (1.09) (1.03) (1.17) (0.93) (0.12) 
Controls 
        Age 0.48 0.62 0.41 0.52 0.40 0.39 
 
(0.49) (0.49) (0.47) (0.50) (0.43) (0.45) 
  Age² -0.007 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 
(0.007) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
  Gender 1.82** 1.75** 1.85** 1.94** 2.23*** 1.89** 
 
(0.85) (0.85) (0.81) (0.88) (0.82) (0.87) 
Constant -9.49 -12.15 -9.78 -9.93 -27.73 -7.98 
  (7.97) (8.15) (7.76) (8.17) (19,902.58) (7.55) 
Observations 257 262 262 257 268 255 
Pseudo R² (Nagelkerke) 0.27 0.29 0.26 0.32 0.28 0.21 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance level indicated by * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. † refers to statistical significance 
being close to p<0.10 
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Last but not least, Model 6 includes an alternative assessment of religious affinity. Instead of 
the frequency of Qur’an reading, I include a variable that measures the self-perception of be-
ing religious (reference category: not religious; categories: somewhat religious, religious). 
Contrary to Qur’an reading, this alternative variable has hardly any significant results for any 
of the four countries but Yemen. This indicates that self-perception of attitudes such as religi-
osity can be misleading, because respective findings are probably affected by survey chal-
lenges such as social desirability bias. 
But for Yemeni, being somewhat religious or being religious compared to being not religious 
increased the odds of participating in the Arab Spring by a factor of 25 and 34 at a 99% con-
fidence level, respectively and ceteris paribus. This positive relationship between religious 
affinity and Arab Spring participation was already evident in the results of Qur’an reading in 
Table 4.2, while however not that strong. For the other three countries, the relationship was 
negative, even if almost entirely non-significant. A possible explanation for this discrepancy 
could be the religious division between Shia Northerners (Houthi minority) and Sunni South-
erners (majority) in Yemen – while the other three countries of Tunisia, Jordan, and Algeria 
have an extensive majority of Sunni population (above 95% Sunni). 
As with the independent variables, it is equally important to account for the dependent varia-
ble measuring what it intends to measure. In the previous chapter, I used an alternative de-
pendent variable to measure protest participation for wave 2. This variable measured if re-
spondents have participated in protests, marchs or sit-ins (never versus at least once); and it 
is also available in wave 3 of the AB. Thus, it provides a good alternative measure for a ro-
bustness check of the dependent variable. Table 5.2 depicts the results for the alternative op-
erationalization of the dependent variable for all four countries. The original columns are 
equivalent to the findings in Table 4.2 and the new columns show the respective results for 
regressions with the alternative dependent variable. Except for a few diverging findings, the 
overall tendency illustrates that the results for the new dependent variable are mostly con-
sistent with the original findings. One discrepancy that appears to be standing out, however, is 
that perception of (un)equal treatment is not significantly explaining protest participation for 
any of the four countries anymore. An explanation for this rather surprising result might be 
that the original variable measured predominantly more active protest participation (of rallies 
and demonstrations in the streets), while the new variable also includes sit-ins.  
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Table 5.2: Alternative Operationalization for the Dependent Variable 
         
 
Algeria Jordan Tunisia Yemen 
  Original New Original New Original New Original New  
Motivations 
        
  Equal Treatment -0.87 -0.19 -1.74*** -0.14 -0.63** -0.24 -0.73 † -0.66 
 
(0.73) (0.46) (0.58) (0.50) (0.28) (0.31) (0.50) (0.54) 
  Unemployment 0.24 -1.93 † -18.55 -0.42 0.71 † 0.54 0.75 2.00* 
 
(1.20) (1.31) (8,456.96) (1.28) (0.47) (0.52) (0.82) (1.08) 
  Youth 1.36 -1.32 2.22* 0.66 0.83 1.40* -0.32 1.32 
 
(1.50) (0.92) (1.28) (1.07) (0.67) (0.72) (1.06) (1.11) 
  Unemployment*Youth -0.24 2.05 17.46 1.73 -0.27 -1.27* -0.39 -2.61* 
 
(1.57) (1.55) (8,456.96) (1.43) (0.64) (0.71) (1.28) (1.52) 
  Higher Education -0.20 -0.03 0.85 0.74 1.01*** 1.29*** 1.03* 0.88 
 
(0.84) (0.48) (0.66) (0.59) (0.30) (0.32) (0.57) (0.62) 
  Free Expression -0.69 -0.69 † 0.54 0.54 0.42 -0.11 0.35 0.23 
 
(0.66) (0.43) (0.60) (0.56) (0.35) (0.37) (0.49) (0.53) 
  Qur'an Reading 
        
     ...Sometimes -2.03** -0.79 † -0.07 2.06 † -0.91 0.70 -0.66 -1.49** 
 
(0.82) (0.53) (0.92) (1.30) (0.65) (0.80) (0.61) (0.69) 
     ...Most of the time -1.48* 
-
1.25** -1.70 † 1.65 -0.04 0.98 1.19* 0.60 
 
(0.87) (0.61) (1.07) (1.33) (0.64) (0.79) (0.66) (0.70) 
     ...Always -1.43 -0.34 -2.00** 0.32 -0.67 0.75 0.91 1.73** 
 
(1.65) (1.01) (1.00) (1.41) (0.63) (0.78) (0.66) (0.78) 
Opportunities 
        
  Political Party -18.92 -0.48 5.23*** 23.05 0.44 1.28* 0.91* 0.98* 
 
(16,915.97) (1.74) (2.16) (23,179.96) (0.77) (0.75) (0.47) (0.53) 
  Civil Organization 2.51 3.97* 0.05 2.74** 21.61 1.74 † 0.78 0.82 
 
(36,748.88) (2.13) (1.58) (1.13) (17,011.51) (1.13) (0.72) (0.82) 
  Internet for Politics -0.98 -0.31 1.73*** 0.96* 0.94*** 1.17*** 1.38*** 2.00*** 
 
(1.29) (0.71) (0.65) (0.57) (0.30) (0.32) (0.50) (0.50) 
  Friday Prayers 
        
     ...Sometimes -1.54 -1.27 † 18.23 19.47 1.03** 0.53 0.97 -0.54 
 
(1.41) (0.85) (3,863.71) (4,028.72) (0.45) (0.49) (1.66) (1.85) 
     ...Most of the time 0.09 -0.06 16.53 18.01 -0.08 0.22 2.17 -1.88 
 
(0.92) (0.59) (3,863.71) (4,028.72) (0.52) (0.55) (1.54) (1.79) 
     ...Always -0.68 -0.25 18.36 17.61 0.43 0.47 2.66* -0.93 
 
(1.08) (0.65) (3,863.71) (4,028.72) (0.37) (0.41) (1.54) (1.77) 
Controls 
        
  Age 0.48 0.22 0.25 0.10 -0.18 -0.02 -0.24 0.12 
 
(0.49) (0.29) (0.27) (0.17( (0.14) (0.12) (0.29) (0.32) 
  Age² -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 0.003 † 0.0001 0.003 0.0001 
 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
  Gender 1.82** 0.64 0.33 0.29 1.02*** 1.16*** -1.21** -2.28*** 
 
(0.85) (0.48) (0.72) (0.55) (0.32) (0.36) (0.51) (0.61) 
Constant -9.49 -2.63 -26.27 -26.23 0.46 -4.17† 1.44 -1.49 
  (7.97) (5.07) (3,863.71) (4,028.72) (2.82) (2.66) (5.58) (5.83) 
Observations 257 274 511 512 252 251 228 234 
Pseudo R² (Nagelkerke) 0.27 0.21 0.42 0.39 0.31 0.32 0.47 0.52 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance level indicated by * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. † refers to statistical significance 
being very close to p<0.10. Original from Table 5.2 
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While I am not certain how much emphasis was put on sit-ins during the survey conduction, 
this form of rather passive protest participation could have influenced the results in such a 
manner as to underplay the role of grievances. This is because contrary to active forms of pro-
test participation (as measured in the original dependent variable), more passive forms of pro-
tests are unlikely to be built on strong emotions such as frustrations or feelings of relative 
deprivation. If respondents understood this question (measuring protests, marches, and sit-ins) 
as a more moderate or passive form of protest participation compared to the original (Arab 
Spring participation) question, this could explain the new-found non-significance of the vari-
able that accounts for unequal treatment (Hypothesis 1).  
All in all, the alternative operationalizations of both independent and dependent variables 
provide overall quite robust results. Thus, the construct validity of my original measures is 
fairly satisfactory. Besides construct validity, it is also essential to assess the internal and ex-
ternal validity of my models. The following sections will investigate these in some depth. 
5.2.2 Internal Validity 
Internal validity relates to causality (causal relationship; cause-and-effect) and assesses if es-
timators are unbiased and consistent. More specifically, internal validity refers to an assess-
ment on if the statistical inferences about causal effects are valid for the population and set-
ting being studied (Stock and Watson, 2012:355). As reliability is a prerequisite for validity, 
strong internal validity refers to having both: reliable measures of independent and dependent 
variables as well as a strong justification that causally links the former to the latter. This caus-
al linkage is important, as correlation does not imply causality (King et al., 1994:192). Thus, 
any extraneous variables or unanticipated causes for the dependent variables should be ruled 
out. Potential threats to internal validity will be discussed hereinafter. These threats are func-
tional form misspecification, measurement errors, omitted variable bias, sample selection bi-
as, and simultaneous causality.
63
 Each of these threats, if existent, introduces correlation be-
tween the regressor and the error term, which can lead to biased and inconsistent results 
(Stock and Watson, 2012:381). 
 
                                                          
63
 Note that autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are potential threats to internal validity as well. They are not 
considered here, however, since I do not use time-series panel data and since there is no homoscedastic assump-
tion in binary logistic regression.  
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5.2.2.1 Model Misspecification 
In order to attain valid results, one assumes that both the independent variables as well as the 
dependent variable are correctly specified. A misspecified model will not only be incon-
sistent, but also biased. Therein, the misspecification of any variables included in the models 
can potentially lead to biased results. I use the term “misspecification” according to Begg and 
Lagakos’ (1990) definition, which includes the problems of measurement errors, discretizing 
continuous explanatory variables, as well as omitted variable bias. 
The problem of measurement errors was already discussed to some extent in section 5.1 and 
variable specification was investigated in some depth in section 5.2.1. Furthermore, any po-
tential threat of misspecification due to mismodeling the functional form of a variable, and/or 
mismeasuring or discretizing a continuous variable can be rather easily discarded, since the 
only continuous variable in my models (for which the “linearity in the logit” assumption has 
to hold) is the control variable of age – which functional form specification is accounted for 
by an inverted u-shape of its squared term. 
Excluding relevant variables or including irrelevant variables can also lead to biased and/or 
unreliable results. Including irrelevant variables should not be an issue for my analyses, as all 
variables in my models underlie fundamental theoretical foundations to be included – as dis-
cussed extensively in Chapter 2. On the other hand, excluding relevant variables is also 
known as omitted variable bias and posits a greater challenge than the inclusion of irrelevant 
variables. 
5.2.2.2 Omitted Variable Bias 
Omitted variable bias is a more serious threat and usually occurs when there exists a model 
misspecification in that an explanatory variable is omitted which determines the dependent 
variable and correlates with at least one explanatory variable (Stock and Watson, 2012:358). 
But contrary to OLS, omitting an important explanatory variable in logistic regressions can 
even bias results when the respective omitted variable does not correlate with another inde-
pendent variables included in the model (Mood, 2010). More specifically, omitted variable 
bias leads to attenuation bias in logistic regression, which means coefficients are drawn to-
wards zero.  
By basing the inclusion of my independent variables on solid theoretical foundations from 
existent academic research as well as including relevant control variables such as age and 
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gender in my models, I should have already prevented the threat of omitted variable bias to a 
great extent. In order to be more confident in that there are no omitted variables in my mod-
els, I include other control variables that might be a cause of omitted variable bias. For prag-
matic reasons, I illustrate only results for Algeria on the basis of Table 4.2 – while, however, 
analyzing and discussing results for all four countries. Table 5.3 shows the results for the 
models that include the additional control variables.  
Each new model in Table 5.3 includes one additional control variable that potentially ac-
counts for confounding factors. The most important observation to make is that all models 
remain overall stable (same variables being significant and coefficients’ values being about 
the same) in comparison to the results of Table 4.2. Thus, it was good to keep those variables 
out, so that the models are as parsimonious as possible. However, for some new models, the 
respective added variables were sometimes significant for individual cases. Thus, it is worth 
to briefly discuss these findings. 
Model 2 uses the binary variable of respondents’ perception of there being corruption in state 
institutions and agencies or not. A recent report by the UNDP (2014) stated that “in the Arab 
states region, data and information on the scope of corruption continue to be limited, and the 
public’s confidence in the State to act against corruption remains fragile.” This might explain 
why corruption is overall non-significant if included. In fact, it is only significant for Tunisia. 
Tunisians who perceived corruption to be existent were about 5 times as likely to participate 
in the Arab Spring compared to those who did not, ceteris paribus. This finding further sup-
ports the argument made in the previous chapter (4.4.1) that in Tunisia socio-economic griev-
ances on issues like corruption played a more determinant role than political grievances. Be-
sides high collinearity with variables like perception of unequal treatment, corruption has also 
conceptual limitations that prompted me to exclude it in my original analyses. As Banik 
(2010) argues, corruption is a rather loose concept or buzzword in the development agenda. 
Corruption is often the single-most cited cause for poor developmental status of a country, 
which is meaningless unless one understands corruption in its broader context (Ibid:81). Thus, 
corruption has usually a divergent meaning in different places and times. 
Model 3 introduces a binary variable that measures respondents’ perception of the govern-
ment blocking media coverage of activities and positions of the opposition of the daily press. 
This variable is significant for Jordan (+5.5) and near-significant for Tunisia (+1.6), but non-
significant for Yemen or Algeria. It has a suppressor effect on other variables, however, as it 
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is highly collinearly related with other variables, such as internet usage or perception of free 
expression.
64
 A suppressor strengthens the predictive capability of another independent varia-
ble (Friedman and Wall, 2005:128). In the case of Algeria (Model 3 in Table 5.3), for in-
stance, age becomes significant once the government blocks media variable is included. 
In Model 4, a binary variable accounts for respondents’ perception of democracy.65 This vari-
able was only significant for Yemen, where citizens that perceived democracy negatively 
were about 3.6 times more likely to participate in the Arab Spring than those who did not, 
ceteris paribus. This finding suggests that, at least in some countries, the prospect of democra-
tization by itself was not a key determinant factor for participation in the Arab uprising by 
itself (see discussion of section 4.2.1 in the previous chapter). 
Model 5 and 6 account for respondents’ opinions on how laws and regulations should be en-
acted. In Model 5, a binary variable assesses if respondents agree or disagree with government 
and parliament enacting laws in accordance with the people’s wishes. This variable was non-
significant for all four countries. Similarly, Model 6 asked respondents if government and 
parliament should enact laws in accordance with Islamic law. This variable was negatively 
significant for Tunisia (-0.39) and positively significant for Yemen (+4.4).
66
  
To account for Model 6’s rather divergent outcome, Model 7 introduces a similar variable 
asking for the role of religion in politics.
67
 This variable was overall non-significant, but im-
pacted the coefficients and significance levels of some other variables, such as age and fre-
quency of Qur’an reading. This suggests a suppressor effect of this new religion variable. 
Models 8 to 10 included variables that assessed respondents’ perceptions of the Arab world 
and international relations. Model 8 adds a categorical variable asking for respondents’ per-
ception of global connectivity being a good, a bad, or neither good nor bad thing. This varia-
                                                          
64
 A suppressor effect occurs when different types of interactions of associations are mixed. A logistic regression 
only estimates unstandardized beta weights β and corresponding odds ratios (exp(β)), which makes it difficult to 
be certain which variable is more important in predicting the outcome. Thus, it is always essential to be careful 
when interpreting logistic regression outputs, to investigate correlation matrices (see Appendix, Tables A.5 to 
A.8) and identify patterns of correlation that could indicate suppressor effects. 
65
 The variable is coded 0 for pro-democracy and 1 for contra-democracy attitudes. Respondents were asked if 
they agree or disagree with the following four statements that I combined based on a positive Chronbach’s Alpha 
reliability analysis: (1) Under a democratic system, the country’s economic performance is weak. (2) Democratic 
systems are indecisive and full of problems. (3) Democratic systems are not effective at maintaining order and 
stability. and (4) Democracy negatively affects social and ethical values in your country.  
I use these measures since I think that simply asking if a respondent supports a democratic regime type or an 
autocratic regime type would more likely include errors due to social desirability bias. 
66
 For a discussion on the positive effect of religion (Islamic law) on protest activity in Yemen, see section 5.2.1. 
67
 Respondents were asked if they agree or disagree with that religious practices are private and should be sepa-
rated from social and political life. (I coded 0=Religion should be private and 1=Religion should be public.) 
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ble was close to 90% significant for Tunisia, with Tunisians who perceived global connectivi-
ty of being good compared to those who perceived it neither good nor bad being about 3.2 
times more likely to participate in the Arab Spring, ceteris paribus. For Yemen, the variable 
was negatively significant for both good and bad perceptions. This suggests that Yemeni who 
perceived global connectivity as being good or bad were 0.84 and 0.94 times, respectively, 
less likely to participate than those who perceived it as neither good nor bad, ceteris paribus. 
For Yemen citizens, it appears that tradition and cultural heritage play a more important role 
than enriched cultural diversity in the society through global connectivity. The emphasis on 
cultural and traditional aspects in Yemen is arguably further enhanced by the religious divi-
sion (Shia Houthi in the North – Sunni South divide) in society – as previously discussed re-
garding the positive significant relationship of the two variables of laws enacted via Islamic 
Law and frequency of Qur’an reading with Arab Spring participation.  
Model 9 and Model 10 introduce binary variables that account for respondents’ opinion on 
whether the Arab-Israeli conflict or foreign interference are obstacles to political reform in 
the country or not, respectively. Neither of these variables is significant for any of the four 
countries and all results for the individual variables remain largely robust. 
Model 11 accounts for respondents’ marital status (being single or not). This binary variable 
is positively significant for Jordan (+4.5) and Tunisia (+3.8). However, as expected, and being 
the reason for the initial exclusion of this variable, marital status is highly correlated with oth-
er variables, such as youth, age and unemployment.  
Last but not least, I tried to include another model that adds a variable which accounts for 
individual-level wealth. I log-transformed the variable of income (including all wages, sala-
ries and rent allowances) and ran regressions accordingly. There were no results for Algeria 
(and therefore it is not included in Table 5.3), because the number of observations was too 
low to produce meaningful results (41% of the respondents answered don’t know and 24% 
refused to answer). For the other three countries, the log income variable was non-significant. 
This was most likely a consequence of income correlating with a lot of other included varia-
bles, such as gender, age and unemployment.  
Overall, none of the tested control variables in this section appears to be significantly or theo-
retically important enough to be included. Thus, my findings are not very likely to be internal-
ly invalid due to the threat of omitted variable bias. 
  
Table 5.3: Adding New Control Variables to Account for Potential Omitted Variable Bias – Algeria 
  
                                                                                 Alternative Control Variables 
       Original (4.2) Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Motivations 
             Equal Treatment -0.87 -0.66 -1.06 -0.96 -0.92 -0.84 -1.01 -0.91 -0.67 -0.83 -0.94 
 
(0.73) (0.74) (0.86) (0.76) (0.73) (0.74) (0.76) (0.76) (0.80) (0.75) (0.74) 
  Unemployment 0.24 0.17 -0.22 0.30 0.43 0.43 -0.63 0.35 0.66 0.20 0.23 
 
(1.20) (1.21) (1.29) (1.18) (1.19) (1.24) (1.61) (1.19) (1.30) (1.19) (1.18) 
  Youth 1.36 1.30 0.96 1.50 1.39 1.56 2.17 1.56 2.07 1.30 1.41 
 
(1.50) (1.50) (1.60) (1.54) (1.47) (1.55) (1.67) (1.54) (1.65) (1.52) (1.50) 
  Unemployment*Youth -0.24 0.16 -0.38 -0.40 -0.37 -0.53 0.47 -0.31 -0.20 -0.24 -0.28 
 
(1.57) (1.58) (1.73) (1.57) (1.56) (1.63) (1.93) (1.56) (1.61) (1.58) (1.56) 
  Higher Education -0.20 -0.20 -0.54 -0.28 0.19 -0.03 -0.33 -0.20 -0.07 -0.25 -0.16 
 
(0.84) (0.85) (1.08) (0.86) (0.89) (0.85) (0.91) (0.84) (0.87) (0.84) (0.84) 
  Free Expression -0.69 -0.69 -1.09 -0.69 -0.66 -0.74 -0.69 -0.91 -0.28 -0.75 -0.71 
 
(0.66) (0.66) (0.85) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.70) (0.70) (0.72) (0.65) (0.66) 
  Qur'an Reading 
                ...Sometimes -2.03** -1.83** -2.17** -2.04** -2.04** -2.04** -1.73** -1.91** -2.37** -2.03** -2.11** 
 
(0.82) (0.82) (1.00) (0.83) (0.83) (0.84) (0.85) (0.83) (0.93) (0.82) (0.85) 
     ...Most of the time -1.48* -1.43 † -1.95* -1.44 † -1.51* -1.61* -1.64* -1.37 † -1.38 † -1.50* -1.45 † 
 
(0.87) (0.89) (1.12) (0.89) (0.89) (0.89) (0.97) (0.88) (0.92) (0.87) (0.90) 
     ...Always -1.43 -0.34 -1.58 -1.47 -1.27 -1.67 -1.38 -1.10 -1.65 -1.42 -1.28 
 
(1.65) (1.87) (1.87) (1.65) (1.67) (1.68) (1.67) (1.68) (1.69) (1.65) (1.68) 
 
           Opportunities 
             Political Party -18.92 -19.22 -18.65 -18.93 -18.78 -18.72 -18.72 -18.96 -19.10 -18.97 -18.89 
 
(16,915.97) (16,909.99) (16,238.51) (16,898.57) (16,665.34) (18,843.55) (19,243.06) (16,756.18) (16,747.95) (16,918.37) (16,943.11) 
  Civil Organization 2.51 2.67 9.17 2.63 2.70 2.08 2.31 3.19 1.78 2.54 2.04 
 
(36,748.88) (36,746.13) (36,442.00) (36,740.87) (36,634.19) (37,675.06) (37,876.45) (36,675.60) (36,671.84) (36,749.99) (36,761.38) 
  Internet for Politics -0.98 -0.94 -1.09 -1.08 -1.16 -1.19 -0.81 -1.13 -0.69 -0.83 -1.00 
 
(1.29) (1.28) (1.48) (1.31) (1.31) (1.33) (1.32) (1.32) (1.27) (1.35) (1.29) 
  Friday Prayers 
                ...Sometimes -1.54 -1.64 -1.52 -1.68 -1.62 -1.89 -2.00 -1.75 -1.78 -1.50 -1.53 
 
(1.41) (1.42) (1.73) (1.44) (1.41) (1.49) (1.50) (1.44) (1.46) (1.47) (1.41) 
     ...Most of the time 0.09 0.25 0.35 0.06 0.09 -0.18 -0.24 0.02 -0.73 0.10 0.07 
 
(0.92) (0.94) (1.30) (0.93) (0.94) (0.99) (0.98) (0.94) (1.07) (0.99) (0.93) 
     ...Always -0.68 -0.65 -0.40 -0.66 -0.75 -0.83 -1.05 -0.66 -0.81 -0.66 -0.59 
 
(1.08) (1.09) (1.46) (1.08) (1.09) (1.10) (1.16) (1.07) (1.11) (1.10) (1.10) 
Controls 
             Age 0.48 0.49 2.19* 0.55 0.51 0.55 0.76 0.61 0.61 0.50 0.45 
 
(0.49) (0.49) (1.30) (0.51) (0.49) (0.51) (0.56) (0.53) (0.54) (0.50) (0.46) 
  Age² -0.007 -0.008 -0.04 † -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.011 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.007 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.03) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
  Gender 1.82** 1.58* 2.54* 1.83** 1.93** 1.90** 1.94** 1.90** 1.86** 1.85** 1.75** 
 
(0.85) (0.86) (1.34) (0.86) (0.87) (0.87 (0.92) (0.86) (0.91) (0.87) (0.86) 
  Corruption 
 
18.30 
         
  
(6,808.15) 
           Government Blocking Media 
  
-0.92 
        
   
(0.88) 
        
1
0
5
 
  
  Against Democracy 
   
-0.54 
       
    
(0.95) 
         Laws Enacted via People's Wishes 
    
0.71 
      
     
(0.70) 
        Laws Enacted via Islamic Law 
     
0.76 
     
      
(1.05) 
       Religion in Politics 
      
0.61 
    
       
(0.72) 
      Global Connectivity (Ref: Neither) 
                …Somewhat Bad/Very Bad 
       
-0.59 
   
        
(1.19) 
        …Somewhat Good/Very Good 
       
0.51 
   
        
(0.69) 
     Arab-Israel Conflict 
        
0.20 
  
         
(0.81) 
    Foreign Interference 
         
-0.22 
 
          
(0.71) 
   Marital Status 
          
0.81 
           
(1.30) 
Constant -9.49 -27.59 -29.68* -10.43 -10.45 -11.11 -14.54 -11.55 -12.68 -9.50 -9.99 
  (7.97) (6,808.15) (16.26) (8.33) (8.03) (8.50) (9.25) (8.54) (8.83) (8.19) (7.76) 
Observations 257 243 213 256 245 241 243 252 251 249 257 
Pseudo R² (Nagelkerke) 0.27 0.30 0.37 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.27 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance level indicated by * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. † refers to statistical significance being very close to p<0.10 
     
 
 
1
0
6
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5.2.2.3 Sample Selection Bias 
Another challenge for internally valid results posits sample selection bias. This form of bias 
occurs when missing data is not missing completely at random, but instead there exists a pat-
tern of missing cases and respective values in the data set. Such a pattern can induce correla-
tion between one or more variables and the error term, causing biased and inconsistent esti-
mators (Stock and Watson, 2012:365). To overcome the shortcomings of earlier ad hoc prac-
tices such as listwise deletion, new procedures like multiple imputation allow for a more rea-
sonable solution to use existing variables to predict new scores that replace missing values 
(Schafer and Olsen, 1998). More specifically, multiple imputation runs simulations on behalf 
of the available data and makes a probability judgment of what the missing values would 
most likely be by taking the average score out of a number of imputations for each variable in 
order to establish values for the missing ones. It therein goes through several iterations and 
comes up with many results of new data to replace the missing data, trying to find the itera-
tion that creates the best fit with the original, non-missing data. 
By analyzing the patterns of missing values in my models, I found that the missing values are 
overall randomly arranged. This indicates that the missing values are missing in a non-
systematic, random pattern. This randomness to the missing values minimizes the potential 
for bias, which would be evident, for example, by a series of questions that respondents sys-
tematically did not answer.  
Nevertheless, I conduct multiple imputation to be more confident that my results are robust 
and therein not biased due to missing data. For pragmatic reasons once again, Table 5.4 pre-
sents the new results in comparison to the original findings of Table 4.2 only. The new find-
ings are the result of pooled analyses in terms of average scores of 5 imputations on missing 
data. 
The new results based on multiple imputation appear to remain overall robust compared to the 
original results of Table 4.2. In fact, they seem to be quite similar to the results of Table 4.4, 
which suggests that taking the internet variable out to improve findings was a worthwhile 
strategy. One of the probably most noteworthy changes due to multiple imputation is that the 
variables of freedom to express opinions as well as age² appear to play a more determinant 
role than was previously ascribed to them. Thus, these variables should not be discarded 
prematurely. All in all, however, it seems fair to say that there appears to be hardly any bias 
due to sample selection in my models. 
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Table 5.4: Results for Multiple Imputation (based on Table 4.2) 
         
 
Algeria Jordan Tunisia Yemen 
  Original M.I. Original M.I. Original M.I. Original M.I. 
Motivations 
        
  Equal Treatment -0.87 -0.27 -1.74*** -0.59 † -0.63** -0.43** -0.73 † -0.28 † 
 
(0.73) (0.32) (0.58) (0.32) (0.28) (0.18) (0.50) (0.18) 
  Unemployment 0.24 0.53 -18.55 -1.07 0.71 † -0.05 0.75 0.52 
 
(1.20) (0.59) (8,456.96) (1.28) (0.47) (0.28) (0.82) (0.36) 
  Youth 1.36 0.85 2.22* 2.65*** 0.83 1.06*** -0.32 0.22 
 
(1.50) (0.72) (1.28) (0.88) (0.67) (0.41) (1.06) (0.39) 
  Unemployment*Youth -0.24 -0.55 17.46 0.49 -0.27 -0.18 -0.39 -0.81 
 
(1.57) (0.82) (8,456.96) (1.45) (0.64) (0.40) (1.28) (0.61) 
  Higher Education -0.20 0.13 0.85 0.90** 1.01*** 1.05*** 1.03* 0.60 
 
(0.84) (0.38) (0.66) (0.39) (0.30) (0.21) (0.57) (0.62) 
  Free Expression -0.69 -0.77** 0.54 -0.11 0.42 0.35 † 0.35 0.45** 
 
(0.66) (0.36) (0.60) (0.37) (0.35) (0.23) (0.49) (0.19) 
  Qur'an Reading 
        
     ...Sometimes -2.03** -0.41 -0.07 0.42 -0.91 0.22 -0.66 -0.67*** 
 
(0.82) (0.38) (0.92) (0.68) (0.65) (0.39) (0.61) (0.23) 
     ...Most of the time -1.48* -1.27** -1.70 † -0.09 -0.04 0.51 1.19* -0.14 
 
(0.87) (0.53) (1.07) (0.68) (0.64) (0.36) (0.66) (0.27) 
     ...Always -1.43 -1.42* -2.00** 0.12 -0.67 0.14 0.91 -0.15 
 
(1.65) (0.78) (1.00) (0.75) (0.63) (0.37) (0.66) (0.24) 
Opportunities 
        
  Political Party -18.92 -11.19 5.23*** 12.86 0.44 0.86 † 0.91* 0.67*** 
 
(16,915.97) (4,359.68) (2.16) (13,903.27) (0.77) (0.53) (0.47) (0.17) 
  Civil Organization 2.51 -14.40 0.05 1.79** 21.61 3.17** 0.78 0.81 † 
 
(36,748.88) (12,323.34) (1.58) (0.88) (17,011.51) (1.37) (0.72) (0.47) 
  Internet for Politics -0.98 0.64 1.73*** 1.41*** 0.94*** 1.07 1.38*** 1.15*** 
 
(1.29) (0.49) (0.65) (0.48) (0.30) (0.24) (0.50) (0.23) 
  Friday Prayers 
        
     ...Sometimes -1.54 -0.69 18.23 0.14 1.03** 0.25 0.97 0.43 
 
(1.41) (0.61) (3,863.71) (0.62) (0.45) (0.28) (1.66) (0.50) 
     ...Most of the time 0.09 -0.08 16.53 -1.23 -0.08 0.28 2.17 0.93** 
 
(0.92) (0.46) (3,863.71) (0.85) (0.52) (0.33) (1.54) (0.37) 
     ...Always -0.68 -0.26 18.36 -0.89 0.43 0.53** 2.66* 1.35*** 
 
(1.08) (0.49) (3,863.71) (0.68) (0.37) (0.23) (1.54) (0.34) 
Controls 
        
  Age 0.48 0.23 † 0.25 0.21 † -0.18 0.03 -0.24 0.06 
 
(0.49) (0.15) (0.27) (0.13) (0.14) (0.05) (0.29) (0.06) 
  Age² -0.007 -0.003* -0.003 -0.002 0.003 † -0.001 0.003 -0.001 † 
 
(0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
  Gender 1.82** 1.15*** 0.33 0.85 † 1.02*** 1.44*** -1.21** 0.30* 
 
(0.85) (0.38) (0.72) (0.55) (0.32) (0.21) (0.51) (0.17) 
Constant -9.49 -6.51** -26.27 -9.59*** 0.46 -3.82*** 1.44 -3.18** 
  (7.97) (2.95) (3,863.71) (3.05) (2.82) (1.25) (5.58) (1.24) 
Observations 257 1198 511 1265 252 1032 228 801 
Pseudo R² (Nagelkerke) 0.27 0.18 0.42 0.24 0.31 0.35 0.47 0.30 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance level indicated by * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. † refers to statistical significance 
being very close to p<0.10. Original from Table 4.2. M.I. refers to Multiple Imputation. 
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5.2.2.4 Residuals  
Highly influential observations can also lead to biased results. Such observations are called 
outliers or residuals, as they are uncommon observations that greatly diverge from the normal 
distribution of the majority of the data points (Belsley et al., 2004). These observations are 
highly influential in that including them can alter estimates significantly. The causes for these 
uncommon observations are manifold, resulting from simple issues like data entry errors or 
reflecting special cases (in my case respondents). The simplest solution to avoid such bias is 
to identify any residuals and correspondingly check results without these observations.  
In order to identify potential outliers, it is worth investigating standardized residuals as well 
as Cook’s distance. The standardized residuals are a useful measure of error as they provide 
comparable standard deviations between the actual outcome and the probability of the pre-
dicted outcome for each respondent. The Cook’s distance statistic provides an alternative op-
tion of identifying observations which might exert an undue influence on the models. Thus, 
while excluding those cases that have a Cook’s distance greater than 1 and/or standardized 
residual values above or below ±2 (95% of the cases of a normally distributed sample should 
have values that lie within ±1.96 standard deviation), I re-run the regressions of Table 4.2 to 
account for potential bias caused by residuals.  
Table 5.5 depicts these models without residuals. For all four countries, respective scatterplots 
depicting standardized residuals over predicted values can be found in Appendix 3, Figures 
A.8 to A.11. For Algeria, 12 observations were identified as outliers and correspondingly ex-
cluded. Further in the case of Algeria, one variable was omitted as the maximum likelihood 
estimation otherwise failed to converge.
68
 For Jordan, Tunisia, and Yemen, the amount of 
residuals excluded were, 17, 11, and 28, respectively. All in all, the exclusion of outliers ap-
pears to not alter results significantly, but mostly improves the strength and significance level 
of already previously significant indicators. Thus, there appears to be no bias due to highly 
influential observations in my models. 
 
 
  
                                                          
68
 Note that for Algeria, the variable of internet usage for political purposes was excluded, since leaving this 
variable in would not produce meaningful results. This is because at least one of the convergence criteria was 
zero or too small (see also footnote Chapter 4, section 4.1). 
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Table 5.5: Excluding Residuals 
         
 
Algeria Jordan Tunisia Yemen 
  Original No R. Original No R. Original No R. Original No R. 
Motivations 
        
  Equal Treatment -0.87 -0.22 -1.74*** -2.89** -0.63** -0.92*** -0.73 † -1.68* 
 
(0.73) (0.46) (0.58) (1.27) (0.28) (0.32) (0.50) (0.91) 
  Unemployment 0.24 -0.36 -18.55 -17.20 0.71 † 0.71 0.75 -0.02 
 
(1.20) (0.91) (8,456.96) (7,798.44) (0.47) (0.51) (0.82) (1.47) 
  Youth 1.36 0.69 2.22* 3.78 † 0.83 0.73 -0.32 -0.63 
 
(1.50) (1.03) (1.28) (2.62) (0.67) (0.74) (1.06) (1.70) 
  Unemployment*Youth -0.24 0.05 17.46 -2.22 -0.27 0.26 -0.39 1.74 
 
(1.57) (1.35) (8,456.96) (8,742.68) (0.64) (0.70) (1.28) (2.18) 
  Higher Education -0.20 0.02 0.85 2.81* 1.01*** 1.48*** 1.03* 1.43 † 
 
(0.84) (0.55) (0.66) (1.50) (0.30) (0.35) (0.57) (0.90) 
  Free Expression -0.69 -0.78* 0.54 1.06 0.42 0.81** 0.35 0.34 
 
(0.66) (0.45) (0.60) (1.20) (0.35) (0.40) (0.49) (0.76) 
  Qur'an Reading 
        
     ...Sometimes -2.03** -0.39 -0.07 -1.86 -0.91 -1.32* -0.66 -3.83*** 
 
(0.82) (0.48) (0.92) (1.47) (0.65) (0.70) (0.61) (1.42) 
     ...Most of the time -1.48* -3.34*** -1.70 † -4.13** -0.04 0.03 1.19* 3.31** 
 
(0.87) (1.28) (1.07) (1.91) (0.64) (0.70) (0.66) (1.34) 
     ...Always -1.43 -1.91* -2.00** -7.33*** -0.67 -0.77 0.91 2.92** 
 
(1.65) (1.12) (1.00) (2.57) (0.63) (0.67) (0.66) (1.20) 
Opportunities 
        
  Political Party -18.92 -17.37 5.23*** 26.34 0.44 0.24 0.91* 3.08*** 
 
(16,915.97) (6,828.91) (2.16) (32,392.00) (0.77) (0.83) (0.47) (1.13) 
  Civil Organization 2.51 -0.94 0.05 1.23 21.61 21.73 0.78 2.86* 
 
(36,748.88) (33,331.13) (1.58) (4.96) (17,011.51) (16,593.22) (0.72) (1.55) 
  Internet for Politics -0.98 (omitted) 1.73*** 2.93** 0.94*** 1.47*** 1.38*** 4.29*** 
 
(1.29) 
 
(0.65) (1.33) (0.30) (0.35) (0.50) (1.33) 
  Friday Prayers 
        
     ...Sometimes -1.54 -0.45 18.23 16.63 1.03** 1.70*** 0.97 21.75 
 
(1.41) (0.74) (3,863.71) (2,936.33) (0.45) (0.51) (1.66) (19,969.27) 
     ...Most of the time 0.09 0.15 16.53 2.19 -0.08 -0.19 2.17 25.34 
 
(0.92) (0.63) (3,863.71) (4,820.60) (0.52) (0.58) (1.54) (19,969.27) 
     ...Always -0.68 -0.29 18.36 20.09 0.43 0.59 2.66* 27.20 
 
(1.08) (0.69) (3,863.71) (2,936.33) (0.37) (0.41) (1.54) (19,969.27) 
Controls 
        
  Age 0.48 0.48* 0.25 0.58 -0.18 -0.28* -0.24 -0.11 
 
(0.49) (0.25) (0.27) (0.64) (0.14) (0.16) (0.29) (0.51) 
  Age² -0.007 -0.006** -0.003 -0.007 0.003 † 0.004** 0.003 0.0001 
 
(0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007 
  Gender 1.82** 1.20** 0.33 1.91 1.02*** 1.48*** -1.21** -3.76*** 
 
(0.85) (0.52) (0.72) (1.92) (0.32) (0.36) (0.51) (1.23) 
Constant -9.49 -10.72** -26.27 -35.94 0.46 0.80 1.44 -25.64 
  (7.97) (4.80) (3,863.71) (2,936.36) (2.82) (3.10) (5.58) (19,969.27) 
Observations 257 795 511 494 252 241 228 200 
Pseudo R² (Nagelkerke) 0.27 0.23 0.42 0.71 0.31 0.43 0.47 0.80 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significance level indicated by * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. † refers to statistical significance being 
very close to p<0.10. Original from Table 5.2. No R. refers to models without residuals. 
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5.2.2.5 Causal Direction, Strength and Independence 
Last but not least, for internally valid results some other statistical assumptions have to hold 
(see 3.4.1). I refer to these assumptions as direction, strength and independence of the causali-
ty.  
The causal direction reflects the assumption that the causality is exogenous. Exogeneity 
means that the independent variables really cause the dependent variable, eliminating the pos-
sibility that the correlation is rather coincidental than causal. A threat to exogeneity is en-
dogeneity bias. Endogeneity occurs when processes cause independent variables to correlate 
with the error term in the population regression of interest (Stock and Watson, 2012:368). 
Biased results as a cause of endogeneity can occur due to omitted variable bias, measurement 
errors, or simultaneity. The former two threats were already discussed in some detail, dispers-
ing the potential of respective endogeneity bias for my models. Simultaneity causality bias 
means that causality flows in both directions: from independent variable to dependent and 
vice versa. It is implausible to assume that motivations or control variables like educational 
achievement, age or gender are caused by Arab Spring participation. The most likely variable 
that has a simultaneous impact is probably internet usage for political matters – which was 
already discussed and consequently excluded in the previous chapter. In order to dismiss sim-
ultaneity causality bias for any variable, it might be worth modelling the endogeneity effect 
with multiple equation systems, such as the 2-Stage Logistic Method or the Generalized 
Method of Moments (Rassen et al., 2009). However, these methods require identifying in-
strumental variables, which are unfortunately not available to me in the existent dataset of the 
Arab Barometer. But as discussed in some length previously (section 4.4), I presume that the 
overall causal direction of the other variables is exogenous.  
The causal strength refers to the statistical power. The power assesses if the model is correct-
ly rejecting the null hypotheses when they are not correct (Ellis, 2010). Therein, statistical 
power is important to avoid Type II errors (false negatives). The most important factors influ-
encing statistical power are sample size and significance criteria (Ibid). The discussed signifi-
cance levels (p<0.1, 0.05, 0.01) are the most commonly used criteria to assess 90%, 95% and 
99% confidence intervals (as well as the near- significance level of 85%, p<0.15), and should 
thereby be sufficiently appropriate. The total sample size of above 1.000 respondents for each 
country is quite large and appears therein adequate. However, the sample size is reduced in 
the main models to some extent due to the inclusion of variables like internet usage for politi-
cal purposes, as only respondents that actually use the internet (prior question) were asked 
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that question (and correspondingly included in my analyses, as other cases were treated as 
missing). This posits a challenge, as an often unexpressed, but important assumption of lo-
gistic regression is “an adequate number of events per independent variable to avoid an over-
fit of the model” (Stolzfus, 2011). As maximum likelihood estimation is less powerful than 
OLS, the recommended minimum of observations per variables is usually at least 10; but 
some scholars recommend as much as at least 30 cases for each variable (Ibid). Nevertheless, 
the results for multiple imputation (Table 5.4) increased the sample size while not altering 
results by much. Furthermore, I employed bootstrapping processes (repeated, random 
resampling of subgroups replacement from the original data) to additionally ensure robust 
estimations of my analyses (Ibid:1102). The bootstrap tests did not alter the results signifi-
cantly, indicating hardly any problem with the strength of my results. Hence, it appears fair to 
assess that the overall causal strength is sufficiently solid, reflecting robust results and not just 
coincidences.  
The causal independence concerns the independence of error terms and the non-collinearity 
of explanatory variables. A potential violation of independent error terms needs only be con-
sidered when the data is clustered hierarchically; which is not the case for my analyses. The 
other threat to independence is multicollinearity, which means that two or more independent 
variables highly correlate. Any such high correlation makes it difficult to assess which of the 
variables causes the real effect on the dependent variable. Also, the coefficient estimates are 
likely to be biased. By investigating tolerance values, eigenvalues and condition indices, I 
found no high correlation among any independent variables of my models. In order to further 
ascertain that multicollinearity does not impact results, I re-ran regressions excluding varia-
bles that correlated moderately with each other one-by-one. The results did not change exten-
sively, indicating that causal independence of my models is sufficiently satisfactory.  
5.2.3 External Validity 
External validity refers to generalizability, which implies an assessment of the extent to which 
inferences can be generalized to other populations and settings (Stock and Watson, 2012:355). 
While internal valid results ensure that the causal relationship is basically correct within the 
context of a specific country and time, external validity indicates to what extent inferences are 
generalizable to other individuals, countries, or time periods. 
One form of external validity regards the population within the specific countries I used in my 
analyses. In other words, how representative are the respondents included in the data of the 
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Arab Barometer for the entire population of a country? As discussed in some depth before, 
threats to this validity of representativeness, possibly caused by problems such as social desir-
ability bias, non-response, or non-random sampling, are unlikely existent because of the expe-
rience and expertise of the Arab Barometer staff that conducted the surveys. Furthermore, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, I used a weight variable that accounted for imbalances in factors such 
probability of selection. Thus, there should be reasonably stable within-case generalizability, 
allowing for generalization of my findings to the entire population of my selected cases of 
Algeria, Jordan, Tunisia, and Yemen.  
The other, more complex form of external validity concerns across-case generalizability. Put 
differently, to what extent do my findings hold for other Arab countries in the context of the 
Arab Spring; or even more extreme: to what extent do they hold for protest participation in 
any country at any given point in time? Assessing such external validity obviously requires 
making judgments about similarities and differences in populations and settings between 
those under study and those to which they are generalized (Stock and Watson, 2012:381). In 
doing so, discretion is advised.  
As evident from Table 4.4, other Arab countries like Morocco and Egypt hold similar results 
to my selected four cases, respectively to each having experienced regime leadership change 
or not. This suggests that findings are to some degree generalizable to other countries of the 
Arab world. However, we need to be cautious to not be over-confident in such generalizabil-
ity. For example, for countries that currently experience ongoing civil war, such as Syria or 
Libya, comparable results are unlikely to hold. In fact, the lack of data on cases like Syria 
makes it infeasible to investigate any potential generalizability. Furthermore, there is a simple 
lack of positive cases that experienced regime leadership change (only four countries, from 
which I already included 3 in Table 4.4). Finally, even if such data, or more available “posi-
tive” cases, would exist, it would also be important to take into account the countries’ unique 
statuses (e.g. developmental progress), individual manifestations, and divergent transitional 
progresses as a result of uprisings in each country, as also previously discussed in section 
4.4.
69
 Regarding the religiosity of all Muslims across the globe, for instance, there exists an 
enormous diversity among the importance of religion, the frequency of prayer, mosque at-
tendance, almsgiving, and so forth (Pew Research Center, 2012). If my model is then applied 
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 Recall that I chose the four countries (Algeria, Jordan, Tunisia, Yemen) not only for pragmatic reasons (data 
availability), geographical proximity and so forth, but also based on them reflecting very divergent cases in the 
region (oil wealth, monarchy, etc.). This discrepancy was chosen intentionally to allow for generalizability. 
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to other (Muslim) countries in the world, this divergence would most likely impact results for 
at least the religious variables included in my analyses. 
This suggests that besides rather weak limitations of generalizing among the Arab countries, 
generalizability beyond the Arab world appears to be more problematic. First, the lack of data 
that includes identical measures of feelings, perceptions and attitudes (such as perception of 
unequal treatment) as measured by the Arab Barometer makes it difficult to conduct corre-
sponding analyses elsewhere in the world. This lack of data is usually attributed to the costly 
(time-consuming, finances, human resources, etc.) and complex foundations, which conduct-
ing surveys in hostile environments is commonly known for. To be clear, there exists expert 
data on public attitudes for other parts of the world, such as the Afrobarometer for African 
country or the Latinobarómetro for Latin American countries. My point here is, however, that 
there are often no identical (or at least very similar and thus comparable) measurements of 
variables that can be reasonably compared with my findings; let alone the divergence of re-
gional distinct matters such as different religions, customs, and traditions throughout the 
world can have. Second, as discussed in the introductory chapter, there appears to be a lack of 
theoretical academic work on movements within the Arab world, as Arab movements are ar-
gued to distinguish themselves from the traditional (Western) sense of social movements. 
Thus, not only differences in populations, but also differences in settings are threats to exter-
nal validity (Stock and Watson, 2012:356-7). Such differences are mostly noticeable in socie-
tal elements such as the role of religion vis-à-vis social media within the Arab public sphere, 
or cultural traditions and values such as the role of women within society (Hellyer, 2013). 
Third, the Arab Spring is a quite recent phenomenon with events still unfolding and repercus-
sions remaining uncertain. As the cases of Yemen, Libya or Syria demonstrate, for example, it 
is difficult to predict the final outcomes of the turmoil in each country that “officially” started 
in Tunisia in late 2010, but really had its origins in the growing frustrations and demands for 
more equal treatment throughout the decade before. 
This argument illustrates that potential generalizability across cases outside the Arab world 
appears too early to acknowledge. Once the consequences of the Arab Spring are interpretable 
in retrospect, and once the corresponding and comparable data is available for other countries, 
it will be possible to investigate in more depth how generalizable my findings are for protest 
behavior in other regions of the world. Suffice it to say, however, that my contribution to the 
grievance-opportunity debate highlights that both approaches should be applied in a comple-
mentary manner if analyzing the root causes for protest participation (and not just civil war 
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scenarios). This approach of grievances and opportunities being partner terms that must be 
understood in a complementary pattern coincides with the findings of Keen’s (2008) causes of 
conflicts for African cases, such as Sierra Leone. All in all, generalizability across cases 
among the region of Arab countries appears fairly satisfactory, while generalizability to coun-
tries outside the Arab world (and/or across time) appears rather weak; at least until new, com-
parable data becomes available that allows testing for such generalizability properly.
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5.3 Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, this chapter investigated the robustness of my analyses made in Chapter 4. By 
evaluating various challenges to the reliability and validity of my models, I conclude that my 
findings are sufficiently unbiased and efficient. My results appear to be overall reliable and 
internally valid – with the single potential limitation of endogeneity bias. Generalizability 
within cases is warranted, but generalizability across cases other than to the region should be 
considered with caution. All in all, the robustness diagnostics appear to stabilize the predic-
tive success of my models sufficiently well. 
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 For a comparison across time, see for instance Anderson (2011).  
116 
 
6  Conclusion 
 
The Arab Spring and its still unfolding repercussions continue to demand worldwide atten-
tion. At the time of writing, a Saudi-led coalition is combating the Houthi takeover in Yemen, 
some countries like Syria and Libya remain deeply entrenched in civil wars causing hundreds 
of thousands of refugees to be displaced, ISIL remains a regional challenge to overcome, and 
few, if any, Arab countries experienced the fulfilment of initial demands made by protesters 
during the Arab Spring, such as the establishment of liberal democratic values and institutions 
or the betterment of economic conditions. That is to say that any current explanation of the 
protest activity and corresponding developments in the Arab region must necessarily remain 
incomplete. Events are still unfolding and it will be some time until all aspects of the highly 
complex regional developments can be fully understood. Nonetheless, some aspects can – and 
indeed should, since they are time-sensitive – already be analyzed and discussed, such as the 
perceptions and attitudes that moved Arab citizens to take to the streets. 
This thesis contributes to the literature on social movements by analyzing the root causes for 
protest participation in the Arab Spring from the participants’ viewpoint. I argued that the 
grievance-opportunity debate does not restrict itself to armed conflict of civil war, but can be 
expanded to (often) non-violent protest activities as well. Within this theoretical foundation, I 
argued – in agreement with scholars like Keen (2008) or Dalton et al. (2009) – that motiva-
tions (based on grievances) and opportunities (that facilitate desire for change) do not neces-
sarily contradict each other, but often play a complementary role in explaining protest partici-
pation. My findings support this contention.  
More specifically, I employed survey data from 2013/14 to statistically analyze the extent to 
which grievances and opportunities contributed to protest participation in the Arab Spring. 
For my cases, I chose two countries that experienced regime leadership change (Tunisia and 
Yemen) and two that did not (Jordan and Algeria). The findings suggest that perceptions of 
being treated unequally in comparison to other citizens were ultimately the most consistent 
motivation for protest participation in all four countries. Other motivations, like youth unem-
ployment, the level of educational achievement, freedom to express opinions, and frequency 
of Qur’an reading – while significantly explanatory in some cases – played a less consistent 
explanatory role. Regarding opportunities promoting protest participation, I found that being 
a member of a political party and/or civil organization and using the internet for political pur-
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poses tend to contribute to explaining Arab Spring participation in all four cases. A more fre-
quent attendance at religious gatherings, such as Friday Prayers, appears to only have in-
creased the likelihood of participation in countries that experienced regime leadership change 
(e.g. Tunisia, Yemen).  
These findings are fairly robust, reflecting internally valid and reliable results. Alternative 
operationalizations and specifications, as well as other robustness diagnostics, indicate that 
there is sufficient reason to be overall confident in the findings of my study. Generalizability 
to other populations and settings within the region is fairly satisfactory; but generalization 
outside the region should be done cautiously, as some explanatory variables carry a high de-
gree of regional specific uniqueness (e.g. frequency of Qur’an reading), for instance.  
Besides this lack of profound external validity, another challenge to my research is the poten-
tial of endogeneity bias. For instance, I cannot be entirely certain that Arabs participated in 
the protests because the opportunity of attending religious gatherings incited them to protest. 
Instead, they might as well just have attended such gatherings after they protested; for exam-
ple to stay informed about events. The same goes for the usage of the internet for political 
matters, as “a significant increase in the use of the new media is much more likely to follow a 
significant amount of protest activity than to precede it” (Wolfsfeld et al., 2013). In a similar 
fashion, motivations such as perceptions of unequal treatment might have spread through dis-
courses among individuals at the actual protests, causing protest participants to be more frus-
trated after they took to the streets as they now had shared feelings of dissatisfaction among a 
larger group.  
6.1 Policy-Recommendations  
Despite these limitations, this thesis makes a considerable contribution to the existent litera-
ture of protest participation by highlighting the motivations and opportunities of actual protest 
participants in the Arab Spring. There are some fundamental issues deducible from my anal-
yses which are worth paying close attention to, especially for policy- and decision-makers 
with influence in the region.  
One such issue regards the question of generational influence in the region. The revolutions 
spread largely by young, technology-savvy Arabs, while the backlash was organized by the 
older generation established in high governmental and other influential positions. This posits 
the question if there is a massive generational shift in society, how will the Arab youth – 
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which is more prone to accept Western norms like human rights, equal participation and citi-
zenship, etc. – from the entire spectrum of society organize themselves in the coming years 
(Al Jazeera, 2015e)? Another issue concerns identity, which entails questions about the possi-
bility of reconciling ethnic and religious nationalism in the pluralist Arab world; a require-
ment to unify the people under a state system that acknowledges both diverging ethnicities 
and religious branches. A further issue regards the extent of impact new social media, such as 
the internet, actually had on the social movements in comparison to traditional social media 
like television (Chorev, 2012).
71
 Moreover, the effect of globalization on social media in the 
MENA-countries might be worth investigating, alluding to questions like to what extent pro-
test participants compare their situations with individuals outside their region, therein poten-
tially perceiving being treated unequally in comparison with Western citizens, for example 
(Haynes, 2010). Besides these issues of youth, identity, social media, and globalization, an-
other issue that policy-makers should be aware of is the unique role of religion and cultural 
traditions vis-à-vis violence and politics in the Arab world (Perumalil, 2004; Snyder, 2011; 
Toft et al., 2011; The Economist, 2013).
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While I have focused on micro-level factors (motivations and opportunities) that play a de-
terminant part in explaining Arab Spring participation, it is crucial to recall that macro-level 
factors (outlined in Chapter 1) are also important. As I have argued before, my micro explana-
tions should be regarded as a complementary part to the macro-level explanations to provide a 
better understanding of participation in social movements. Thus, it is also crucial to not dis-
miss the equally important role of macro-factors. The developments of the Arab Spring signi-
fy how important it is that development agendas are sensitive to political contexts and basic 
geo-political aspects, such as the type of governance system, access to natural resources, alli-
ances or disputes with foreign actors, the degree of rule of law and associated liberties, or the 
justification of state systems. Thus, only a combination of improvements in both government 
(macro-level) and society (micro-level) can overcome the mixture of social, economic and 
political frustrations, vanquishing challenges and needs of the people, and ensuring the estab-
lishment of effective, fair and democratic institutions and societies.  
Accordingly, some policy recommendations that should enable surmounting challenges of 
social movements include the following. In order to mitigate potential future threats of upris-
ings, Breisinger et al. (2012:28-33) suggest to improve the data and capacity for evidence-
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 A forthcoming research project investigates this question; see Roald and Wellbaum (forthcoming). 
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 The Arab Spring led to more global restrictions on religion; see for instance Pew Research Center (2013b).  
For a comprehensive review on the role of Islamism in the region, see amongst others Hall (2003), Toft (2007), 
Lynch (2015).  
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based decision-making, foster growth that enhances food security, and revisit the efficiency 
and allocation of public spending. Among others, Thiemann (2011:25) suggests a variety of 
other reform measures, such as establishing employment generation programs (e.g. support 
for small and medium-sized enterprises, micro finance), supporting the poor, improving gov-
ernance-business relations, promoting regional integration for market extension and diversifi-
cation, supporting local economic development and job creation, and stimulating policy sup-
port as well as macro, fiscal and financial stability. Furthermore, Earle (2011:7) argues that 
international organizations and donors should concentrate on creating supportive environ-
ments for social movements, e.g. by supporting communications beyond capital cities, work-
ing with media outlets, governments, and public agencies to promote equal understanding and 
redress injustice collectively, or promoting avenues for state-society engagement at an early 
stage. While these lists of recommendations are long, they are by no means exhaustive. And 
while it is implausible to suggest that every issue can be solved at once, it is nonetheless es-
sential to be aware of all these problematic issues. After all, a concrete plan to address chal-
lenges can only succeed if the root problems are identified and acknowledged.  
Moreover, what appears evident from my analysis is that opportunities for discussion, dia-
logue and interaction among individuals are as important as individual grievances and frustra-
tions in causing protest participation. Therein, organizations that aim to promote democratiza-
tion and social change in authoritarian regimes should focus on providing platforms for mean-
ingful, intellectual interactions among individuals in society. These interactions are essential 
since they are the motor behind inciting motivations through transforming individual griev-
ances into shared feelings of group dissatisfaction, which in turn spark protest participation. 
Therein, opportunity platforms like the internet will most likely allow for much easier com-
munication in future years to come, once vast broadband coverage has been established 
throughout the region. This will most likely happen within the span of one generation, as the 
youth nowadays already use the internet through mobile phone devices even in very remote 
areas of developing countries.   
Another area of consideration for policy-makers lies in the Arab Spring’s influence on a po-
tential shift in EU (and U.S.) policy, especially in regards to migration, energy security, and 
dynamic stability (Asseburg, 2012). An essential lesson that the Arab Spring has taught us is 
that Western influence on the outbreak or the course of the revolutions was – and still remains 
– limited, at best (Perthes, 2012:67). Two other important lessons that are noteworthy suggest 
that revolutions appear to be contagious (as they have a tendency to migrate regionally) and 
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that external conflicts do not save regimes in that externalization of conflicts offers no protec-
tion against dissatisfied citizens (Ibid:68).
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6.2 Future Research 
In order to further acknowledge the complementary role of grievances and opportunities in 
social movements, comprehensive and comparable data from a wide range of diverging cases 
needs to be gathered, analyzed and discussed. Future research should focus on confirming the 
external validity of my results by gathering comparable data for other regions in order to rep-
licate my results for these. In addition, future research should investigate the potential en-
dogeneity threat of my models by attaining instrumental variables and conducting multiple 
equation system tests, as discussed in Chapter 5.
74
  
Future research should also investigate other issues of contention that I was unable to discuss 
here, mostly due to time and space constraints as well as the lack of available data. One ap-
proach would be to investigate the reforms or other concessions some Arab leaders imple-
mented (or strategies and tactics they employed) to stay in power, and closely analyze corre-
sponding implications these had on social movements. On another note, there seems to be a 
gap of qualitative research on the interaction between social movement members and state 
officials or even movement leaders themselves, which “would allow for greater understanding 
of individual motivations (or lack of) to engage in collective action.” (Earle, 2011:31). Such 
research on the interaction between different actors could, for instance, focus on the relation-
ship between monarchs and their citizens, thereby expanding on the analysis of the resilience 
of Arab monarchies.  
Further research is also needed on the nexus of social movements, violence, and instability, 
which would allow for a deeper understanding of the reasons and factors behind the potential 
of social movements turning into violent conflicts like civil wars (Ibid:31). In which ways 
does violence in social movements contribute to instability of governments and potential re-
gime change, for example? Another approach could also look at previously established demo-
cratic institutions in authoritarian settings and how these impacted citizen’s desires for de-
mocracy. Furthermore, future work should reflect on more multi-level analyses to concretize 
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 Perthes (2012:67-9) identifies 10 lessons and challenges from the Arab revolutions for international politics. I 
only mention the ones I consider to be most important here.  
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 It could also be argued that opportunities are more likely to play a role at a later stage of mobilization for pro-
test, while the initial motivations arise before. Naturally, one would think that one has to be motivated to act 
before searching for opportunities to act upon these motivations. While I argue that motivations and opportuni-
ties reciprocally affect each other, this contention deserves further research as well. 
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the relationship between micro- and macro-level factors and their respective roles in social 
movements. For example, it might be interesting to identify the specific causal mechanisms 
that explain how the global financial crisis affected the Arab countries individually and how 
each country’s citizens dealt with its consequences.  
Also, more in-depth case studies of the history of individual countries and their previous mo-
bilization, including outside the Arab region, are likely to contribute to a better understanding 
on the reasons behind the Arab Spring movements. For example, Lawrence (2012) argues that 
since there exist too few cases that experienced regime transition in the Arab Spring, which 
makes it difficult to concretely evaluate the phenomenon, “engaging in comparative research 
that looks over time and outside the region is a fruitful way to evaluate competing explana-
tions for protest.”75 In fact, I began this thesis by reviewing the notion of the Arab uprisings 
coming at a surprise for many authors (see Chapter 1). However, I contend that these upris-
ings are in fact not that surprising if recounting for previous developments in individual coun-
tries, which led to the growth of dissatisfaction and frustrations among Arabs over decades 
(Ibid). This apparent challenge of not only paying attention to a specific time period (but also 
take into account longer time-series developments) is often undermined by social media’s 
efforts in priming stories that most likely attract the highest audience. The example of the 
disparity of attention and casualties among global conflicts illustrates this argument of such 
social media bias quite fairly (The Economist, 2014c). 
6.3 Final Remarks 
As I hope I have shown in this thesis, the Arab Spring is a highly complex phenomenon 
which aftermath cannot be fully understood yet. However, it appears fair to assess that a com-
bination of various factors impacted the occurrence of uprisings in the Arab world by the end 
of 2010. These factors range from technological developments in social media over decade-
old economic challenges (that worsened with the global financial crisis starting in 2008/9) 
over growing dissatisfactions of unfair treatment as well as other frustrations about corrup-
tion, tactics of fear, suppression of basic freedoms in choosing one’s own destiny or the lack 
of representation in politics, lack of dignity, and injustice in general.
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What will the future hold for the Arab world, especially for those countries that have not yet 
“erupted” significantly? Will they manage the balancing act between upholding traditional 
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 For an overview of estimated deaths of civil wars in the Middle East (1975-2014) as well as a discussion on 
why the “failures of the Arab Spring were a long time in the making”, see among others The Economist (2014d).  
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 For more information on the impact of the global financial crises in 2008/9, see among others Ramady (2014).  
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roles while attempting to adhere to modern political demands? Eyadat (2012:18) argues that 
“based on social conditions, Algeria, Sudan, and Lebanon may likely join the Arab revolu-
tions of 2011.” On the other hand, monarchies of the MENA-region were mostly able to resist 
change through various measures, such as extended family ruling, increased public spending, 
and incremental liberalization. Nonetheless, scholars like Ramady (2014) assert that the GCC 
monarchies are “shielded, but not immune,” reflecting “islands of prosperity [which] are sur-
rounded by hunger and anger.” Thus, it remains uncertain how much the short-term adaptabil-
ity will ensure security and stability for monarchies in the long term (Matthiesen, 2013). Da-
vidson (2014) makes an even bolder prediction, suggesting that the “monarchies and emirates 
of the Arabian Peninsula will collapse within the next five years.” However, even if change is 
to occur in other countries, stable and liberal democratic systems will unlikely be established 
in the short term (Way, 2011; Osman, 2014).  
All in all, I believe it is too early to predict what will happen, as there is a lack of information 
on the highly complex developments in the Arab region and, as noted before, events are still 
unfolding with uncertain repercussions. As recent years have shown, there is a great possibil-
ity for the creation of failed states. International interventions, like that of NATO in Libya or 
the recent Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, and other developments like the vast amount of refu-
gees, sectarian tensions, and great economic challenges all pose difficult problems to the sta-
bility and political legitimacy in the transformative processes of Arab countries. It is im-
portant, however, to acknowledge that these transformations also provide promising opportu-
nities for moderating Islamism and providing peace in the region. Indeed, an article by the 
Arab Reform Initiative (2014:1) stated that “there has been a positive but slow progress to-
wards democratic change” in the Arab world.   As the case of Tunisia with its establishment 
of a new government and constitution suggests, there are political answers to many of the 
problems. In fact, Hegre et al. (2001:44) argue that the “conflict-generating effect of democra-
tization when moving from autocracy to intermediacy produces violence in the short run on-
ly” (my emphasis). But with a high degree of uncertainty of what is to come, history will have 
to judge the Arab uprisings and their consequences. 
Finally, it seems worth remembering that the Arab Spring, as the notion suggests, was a mo-
ment of hope. The fundamental desire for change pushed for by the social movements includ-
ed, at least initially, demands for justice and equal treatment. This established the prospect for 
democracy as a universal value in many parts of the MENA-region. This development alone 
is noteworthy, as it refutes Huntington’s (1996) controversial argument that religion, in par-
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ticular Islam, would set major limitations to further democratization. Furthermore, it could be 
suggested that each country is unique, with its own characteristics and institutions, which 
makes it difficult to compare them with each other. However, as I believe I have shown here, 
there are fundamental similarities in the motivations and opportunities that move people to 
participate in protests. Through direct action of citizens joining grass-root movements, Arabs 
from all spectrums of society overcame collective action problems and made themselves 
heard in the Arab uprisings, creating realities that authorities eventually have to abide by; be 
that through policy reform, incremental liberalization or more radical change. In short, pres-
sure from below was a highly important element for change in the MENA-region, as the ab-
sence of grassroots movements would have most likely been worse for the region (Bayat, 
2000:29). In the end, the developments in the Arab region should – and most likely will – not 
be easily forgotten in the near future.  
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Appendix 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics, Algeria, AB wave 3 
    Observations Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variable 
       Arab Spring Participation 1135 0 1 0.04 0.197 
Motivations 
       Equal Treatment 1157 0 1 0.68 0.467 
  Unemployment 1219 0 1 0.11 0.307 
  Youth 1220 0 1 0.26 0.440 
  Unemployment*Youth 1220 0 1 0.496 0.217 
  Higher Education 1220 0 1 0.18 0.388 
  Free Expression 1093 0 1 0.73 0.445 
  Qur'an Reading 1040 0 3 1.40 0.961 
Opportunities 
       Political Party 1211 0 1 0.03 0.181 
  Civil Organization 1210 0 1 0.01 0.074 
  Facebook 554 0 1 0.73 0.443 
  Internet for Politics 392 0 1 0.14 0.346 
  Friday Prayers 1037 0 3 1.75 1.196 
Controls 
       Age 1220 18 83 38.26 15.344 
  Gender 1220 0 1 0.50 0.500 
  Political Interest 1060 0 1 0.15 0.359 
Robustness Diagnostics: 
     Alternative Operationalizations 
       Economic Situation 1151 0 1 0.70 0.459 
  Living Conditions (compared) 1187 0 1 0.85 0.360 
  Education*Unemployment 1220 0 1 0.01 0.113 
  Support Pol. Freedom 1178 0 1 0.99 0.104 
  Self-perception Religious 1117 0 2 1.17 0.569 
  Protest/Sit-in Participation 1209 0 1 0.08 0.267 
Omitted Variable Bias 
       Corruption 1098 0 1 0.86 0.347 
  Government Blocks Media 869 0 1 0.53 0.499 
  Against Democracy 1122 0 1 0.13 0.338 
  Laws Enacted via People's Wishes 1093 0 1 0.56 0.496 
  Laws Enacted via Islamic Law 1078 0 1 0.86 0.343 
  Religion in Politics 1059 0 1 0.49 0.500 
  Global Connectivity 1141 0 2 1.16 0.900 
  Arab-Israel Conflict 1139 0 1 0.35 0.477 
  Foreign Influence 1138 0 1 0.71 0.453 
  Marital Status 1220 0 1 0.49 0.500 
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Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics, Jordan, AB wave 3 
      
  Observations Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variable 
       Arab Spring Participation 1777 0 1 0.03 0.164 
Motivations 
       Equal Treatment 1775 0 1 0.68 0.465 
  Unemployment 1790 0 1 0.09 0.279 
  Youth 1795 0 1 0.27 0.443 
  Unemployment*Youth 1795 0 1 0.05 0.209 
  Higher Education 1794 0 1 0.21 0.405 
  Free Expression 1657 0 1 0.68 0.468 
  Qur'an Reading 1786 0 3 2.18 0.966 
Opportunities 
       Political Party 1791 0 1 0.01 0.055 
  Civil Organization 1777 0 1 0.01 0.080 
  Facebook 763 0 1 0.62 0.486 
  Internet for Politics 532 0 1 0.16 0.369 
  Friday Prayers 1765 0 3 2.20 1.154 
Controls 
       Age 1795 18 78 36.95 14.489 
  Gender 1795 0 1 0.52 0.500 
  Political Interest 1523 0 1 0.35 0.478 
Robustness Diagnostics: 
     Alternative Operationalizations 
       Economic Situation 1780 0 1 0.45 0.498 
  Living Conditions (compared) 1787 0 1 0.77 0.423 
  Education*Unemployment 1794 0 1 0.02 0.151 
  Support Pol. Freedom 1683 0 1 0.91 0.291 
  Self-perception Religious 1788 0 2 1.33 0.558 
  Protest/Sit-in Participation 1776 0 1 0.04 0.199 
Omitted Variable Bias 
       Corruption 1665 0 1 0.88 0.328 
  Government Blocks Media 1307 0 1 0.62 0.485 
  Against Democracy 1612 0 1 0.42 0.494 
  Laws Enacted via People's Wishes 1697 0 1 0.55 0.498 
  Laws Enacted via Islamic Law 1696 0 1 0.86 0.344 
  Religion in Politics 1639 0 1 0.43 0.496 
  Global Connectivity 1692 0 2 1.65 0.707 
  Arab-Israel Conflict 1598 0 1 0.82 0.387 
  Foreign Influence 1583 0 1 0.86 0.344 
  Marital Status 1795 0 1 0.27 0.445 
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Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics, Tunisia, AB wave 3 
        
  Observations Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variable 
       Arab Spring Participation 1195 0 1 0.21 0.407 
Motivations 
       Equal Treatment 1175 0 1 0.53 0.499 
  Unemployment 1199 0 1 0.24 0.426 
  Youth 1199 0 1 0.24 0.428 
  Unemployment*Youth 1199 0 1 0.09 0.291 
  Higher Education 1199 0 1 0.16 0.367 
  Free Expression 1131 0 1 0.78 0.413 
  Qur'an Reading 1178 0 3 2.22 0.969 
Opportunities 
       Political Party 1195 0 1 0.02 0.141 
  Civil Organization 1190 0 1 0.01 0.073 
  Facebook 438 0 1 0.70 0.458 
  Internet for Politics 0.317 0 1 0.51 0.501 
  Friday Prayers 1174 0 3 1.25 1.319 
Controls 
       Age 1199 18 87 39.39 15.934 
  Gender 1199 0 1 0.49 0.500 
  Political Interest 999 0 1 0.56 0.497 
Robustness Diagnostics: 
     Alternative Operationalizations 
       Economic Situation 1186 0 1 0.12 0.323 
  Living Conditions (compared) 1192 0 1 0.75 0.431 
  Education*Unemployment 1199 0 1 0.04 0.201 
  Support Pol. Freedom 1147 0 1 0.89 0.310 
  Self-perception Religious 1187 0 2 1.17 0.681 
  Protest/Sit-in Participation 1171 0 1 0.15 0.355 
Omitted Variable Bias 
       Corruption 1041 0 1 0.79 0.404 
  Government Blocks Media 1049 0 1 0.57 0.496 
  Against Democracy 1057 0 1 0.45 0.498 
  Laws Enacted via People's Wishes 1138 0 1 0.68 0.468 
  Laws Enacted via Islamic Law 1130 0 1 0.62 0.486 
  Religion in Politics 1087 0 1 0.24 0.429 
  Global Connectivity 1101 0 2 1.76 0.585 
  Arab-Israel Conflict 1077 0 1 0.60 0.489 
  Foreign Influence 1094 0 1 0.73 0.446 
  Marital Status 1199 0 1 0.36 0.480 
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Table A.4: Descriptive Statistics, Yemen, AB wave 3 
         
  Observations Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variable 
       Arab Spring Participation 1107 0 1 0.39 0.487 
Motivations 
       Equal Treatment 1171 0 1 0.36 0.480 
  Unemployment 1200 0 1 0.09 0.293 
  Youth 1200 0 1 0.30 0.460 
  Unemployment*Youth 1200 0 1 0.04 0.202 
  Higher Education 1195 0 1 0.06 0.234 
  Free Expression 1105 0 1 0.54 0.499 
  Qur'an Reading 1180 0 3 1.43 1.100 
Opportunities 
       Political Party 1160 0 1 0.41 0.492 
  Civil Organization 1156 0 1 0.07 0.247 
  Facebook 333 0 1 0.79 0.408 
  Internet for Politics 191 0 1 0.50 0.501 
  Friday Prayers 1151 0 3 2.28 1.015 
Controls 
       Age 1200 18 81 35.46 13.444 
  Gender 1200 0 1 0.51 0.500 
  Political Interest 1032 0 1 0.39 0.488 
Robustness Diagnostics: 
     Alternative Operationalizations 
       Economic Situation 1184 0 1 0.28 0.447 
  Living Conditions (compared) 1184 0 1 0.65 0.477 
  Education*Unemployment 1200 0 1 0.01 0.104 
  Support Pol. Freedom 1151 0 1 0.89 0.317 
  Self-perception Religious 1179 0 2 1.15 0.603 
  Protest/Sit-in Participation 1191 0 1 0.51 0.50 
Omitted Variable Bias 
       Corruption 1134 0 1 0.90 0.305 
  Government Blocks Media 796 0 1 0.49 0.500 
  Against Democracy 1123 0 1 0.33 0.469 
  Laws Enacted via People's Wishes 1157 0 1 0.53 0.499 
  Laws Enacted via Islamic Law 1177 0 1 0.90 0.298 
  Religion in Politics 1146 0 1 0.50 0.500 
  Global Connectivity 1129 0 2 1.30 0.813 
  Arab-Israel Conflict 1113 0 1 0.56 0.497 
  Foreign Influence 1111 0 1 0.78 0.411 
  Marital Status 1200 0 1 0.28 0.448 
 
Note: Descriptive Statistics for each country’s respective variables for AB wave 2 are available upon request.
 
 
Tables A5 to A8 provide correlation matrices for the main variables used in my analyses. Each table provides bivariate (Pearson) correlations. Any further corre-
lation matrices are available upon request. 
Table A.5: Correlation Matrix, Algeria, AB wave 3 
                          
 
Arab 
Spring 
Part. 
Equal 
Treatment Unemploym. Youth 
Youth 
Unemploym. 
Higher 
Education 
Free 
Expression 
Qur'an 
Read. 
Political 
Party 
Civil 
Org. Facebook 
Internet 
for Pol. 
Friday 
Prayers Age Gender 
Arab Spring 
Part. 
               
Equal Treat-
ment 
-0.081** 
              
Unemployment 0.064* -0.220**              
Youth 0.058* -0.075* 0.162**             
Youth Unem-
ployment 
0.035 -0.128** 0.666** 0.383** 
           
Higher Educa-
tion 0.019 0.039 -0.054 0.158** -0.026           
Free Expres-
sion 
-0.110** 0.243** -0.030 -0.026 -0.026 0.027 
         
Qur'an Read-
ing 
-0.140** 0.086** -0.040 -0.156** -0.051 -0.062* 0.206** 
        
Political Party -0.039 0.090** 0.007 -0.014 0.004 0.107* 0.064* 0.015        
Civil Organiza-
tion 
-0,01 0,03 -0,03 0,02 -0,02 0,136** 0,05 -0,04 0,154** 
      
Facebook 0,07 0,01 -0,05 0,293
** 0,00 0,07 0,01 -0,04 0,04 0,06 
     
Internet for 
Politics 
-0,02 -0,01 -0,140** 0,04 -0,09 0,203** 0,06 0,04 0,146** 0,278** 0,184** 
    
Friday Prayers -0,02 -0,06 0,05 -0,137
** 0,00 -0,067* -0,01 0,386** 0,04 -0,06 -0,08 -0,04 
   
Age -0,100
** 0,140** -0,214** -0,638** -0,230** -0,223** 0,01 0,184** 0,05 -0,03 -0,347** 0,02 0,225** 
  
Gender 0,103
** -0,102** 0,108** -0,01 ,072* 0,02 -0,01 0,102** 0,100** 0,00 -0,04 0,00 0,487** 0,02 
 
Political Inter-
est 
-0,01 0,101** -0,080** -0,112** -0,06 0,148** 0,090** 0,06 0,165** 0,089** -0,138** 0,276** 0,131** 0,086** 0,180** 
                
Note: ** means correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * means correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
      
 
          
1
5
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Table A.6: Correlation Matrix, Jordan, AB wave 3 
                
 
Arab 
Spring 
Part. 
Equal 
Treatment Unemploym. Youth 
Youth 
Unemploym. 
Higher 
Education 
Free 
Expression 
Qur'an 
Read. 
Political 
Party 
Civil 
Org. Facebook 
Internet 
for Pol. 
Friday 
Prayers Age Gender 
Arab Spring 
Part.                
Equal Treat-
ment 
-,048* 
              
Unemployment ,001 -,036              
Youth ,060
* ,020 ,185** 
            
Youth Unem-
ployment 
,015 -,022 ,717** ,362** 
           
Higher Educa-
tion 
,102** -,016 ,051* -,064** ,028 
          
Free Expres-
sion 
-,006 ,158** ,015 ,019 ,029 -,033 
         
Qur'an Reading -,042 ,006 -,054
* -,201** -,095** -,007 -,006 
        
Political Party ,282
** -,025 -,017 -,028 -,012 ,067** ,018 -,007 
       
Civil Organiza-
tion ,163
** ,014 ,040 ,034 ,049* ,051* ,032 -,023 ,026 
      
Facebook ,035 -,036 ,021 ,248
** ,058 -,004 -,033 -,159** -,039 ,033 
     
Internet for 
Politics 
,182** -,078 ,069 -,112** -,014 ,187** ,011 ,087* ,165** ,189** ,038 
    
Friday Prayers -,026 ,048
* -,036 -,160** -,070** ,052* -,023 ,351** ,025 ,000 -,119** ,086* 
   
Age -,019 -,022 -,136
** -,653** -,229** -,044 -,028 ,266** ,037 -,031 -,305** ,122** ,197** 
  
Gender ,076
** -,016 ,076** ,021 ,021 ,014 -,023 -,211** ,037 ,061** ,077* ,031 ,173** ,028 
 
Political Inter-
est 
,115** ,033 -,032 -,120** -,045 ,189** ,097** ,094** ,081** ,105** -,077 ,456** ,110** ,045 ,088** 
                
Note: ** means correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * means correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table A.7: Correlation Matrix, Tunisia, AB wave 3 
                          
 
Arab 
Spring 
Part. 
Equal 
Treatment Unemploym. Youth 
Youth 
Unemploym. 
Higher 
Education 
Free 
Expression 
Qur'an 
Read. 
Political 
Party 
Civil 
Org. Facebook 
Internet 
for Pol. 
Friday 
Prayers Age Gender 
Arab Spring 
Part.                
Equal Treat-
ment 
-,046 
              
Unemployment ,060
* -,077** 
             
Youth ,235
** -,014 ,199** 
            
Youth Unem-
ployment 
,101** -,023 ,575** ,570** 
           
Higher Educa-
tion 
,244** ,076** ,024 ,095** ,008 
          
Free Expres-
sion 
,033 ,056 ,001 -,098** ,003 ,033 
         
Qur'an Reading -,015 ,054 -,065
* -,159** -,088** ,024 ,063* 
        
Political Party ,109** ,037 -,054 -,072* -,033 ,092** ,020 ,084** 
       
Civil Organiza-
tion 
,113** ,023 -,041 -,032 -,023 ,081** ,031 ,018 ,078** 
      
Facebook ,064 -,016 -,020 ,090 -,008 ,167
** -,120* -,130** ,061 ,028 
     
Internet for 
Politics 
,189** ,046 -,026 -,046 -,098 ,112* -,086 ,201** ,173** ,073 ,293** 
    
Friday Prayers ,087
** ,073* -,049 -,163** -,065* ,035 ,055 ,290** ,085** -,003 -,097* ,105 
   
Age -,223
** ,045 -,249** -,631** -,353** -,172** ,044 ,147** ,056 ,030 -,163** ,005 ,238** 
  
Gender ,288
** -,062* ,142** ,099** ,046 ,070* -,058 -,149** ,097** ,003 ,020 ,101 ,242** -,017 
 
Political Inter-
est 
,222** ,083** -,044 -,037 -,062* ,119** ,138** ,116** ,104** ,056 -,038 ,300** ,047 ,006 ,111** 
                
Note: ** means correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * means correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table A.8: Correlation Matrix, Yemen, AB wave 3 
                          
 
Arab 
Spring 
Part. 
Equal 
Treatment Unemploym. Youth 
Youth 
Unemploym. 
Higher 
Education 
Free 
Expression 
Qur'an 
Read. 
Political 
Party 
Civil 
Org. Facebook 
Internet 
for Pol. 
Friday 
Prayers Age Gender 
Arab Spring 
Part.                
Equal Treat-
ment 
,083** 
              
Unemployment ,048 ,003              
Youth ,010 ,025 ,102
** 
            
Youth Unem-
ployment 
-,010 -,010 ,653** ,319** 
           
Higher Educa-
tion 
,153** ,086** ,081** -,085** ,012 
          
Free Expres-
sion 
,195** ,338** -,007 -,056 -,044 ,076* 
         
Qur'an Reading ,100
** ,127** ,001 -,075** -,052 ,023 ,048 
        
Political Party ,233** ,064* -,014 -,061* -,037 ,052 ,090** ,011 
       
Civil Organiza-
tion 
,235** ,161** ,015 -,090** ,016 ,134** ,162** ,093** ,104** 
      
Facebook ,036 ,065 -,097 ,045 -,075 ,002 ,104 -,022 ,236
** ,029 
     
Internet for 
Politics 
,361** ,321** -,066 -,312** -,138 ,186* ,282** ,053 ,351** ,335** ,245** 
    
Friday Prayers ,219
** ,151** -,011 -,075* -,052 ,067* ,161** ,395** -,034 ,125** ,013 ,175* 
   
Age -,125
** -,011 -,131** -,672** -,211** -,053 -,044 ,078** ,023 -,014 -,159** ,124 ,065* 
  
Gender ,159
** -,007 ,125** -,005 ,084** ,154** ,068* -,039 ,199** ,085** -,062 -,050 ,066* ,053 
 
Political Inter-
est 
,281** ,207** ,032 -,130** -,023 ,128** ,305** ,010 ,207** ,230** ,115* ,679** ,206** ,011 ,219** 
                
Note: ** means correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * means correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
      
1
5
9
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Appendix 2: Variable Coding 
This section provides an overview of the variables used in my analyses (corresponding information on 
variables used in the robustness diagnostics are available upon request). I recoded all variables in such 
a manner that 0 presents a negative answer and 1 (or higher) a positive response. All variables are 
available by accessing the data of wave 2 and 3 of the Arab Barometer (2014). 
- Dependent Variables 
The Arab Spring led to some demonstrations and rallies in your country. Did you participate in any of 
these events (in 2011 and 2012)? 
- Yes [1] 
- No [0] 
During the past three years, did you participate in a protest, march, or sit-in? 
- Once or more than once [1] 
- I have never participated [0] 
 
- Independent Variables: 
To what extent do you feel that you are being treated equally compared to other citizens in your coun-
try?  
- To a great/medium extent [1] 
- To a limited extent/Not at all [0] 
Do you work? 
- Yes [1] 
- No [0] 
Youth (Age recoded) 
- 18-25 [1] 
- Older than 25 
Education [Level of Education recoded) 
- Above Secondary Education [1] 
- Up to Secondary Education [0] 
To what extent do you think that “freedom to express opinions” is guaranteed in your country? (in-
cludes freedom to express opinions, freedom of the press, freedom to join political parties, freedom to 
participate in peaceful protests and demonstrations, freedom to join civil associations and organiza-
tions, freedom to sue the government and its agencies, and freedom to vote) 
- Guaranteed to a great/medium extent [1] 
- Guaranteed to a limited extent/not guaranteed [0] 
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Do you listen to or read the Qur’an/the Bible? 
- Always [3] 
- Most of the time [2] 
- Sometimes [1] 
- Rarely/Never [reference category; 0] 
Are you a member of a political party? 
- Yes [1] 
- No [0] 
Are you a member of a civil society organization? (includes a charitable society, professional associa-
tion/trade union, a youth/cultural/sports organization, a family/tribal association, any other civil socie-
ty organization that was not mentioned) 
- Yes [1] 
- No [0] 
Are you a member of or participant in a Facebook page?  
- Yes [1] 
- No [0] 
Do you use the internet for political activities (find out about political activities taking place in your 
country, express your opinion about political issues, find out about opposing opinions in your coun-
try)?  
- Yes [1] 
- No [0] 
Do you attend Friday prayer/Sunday services?  
- Always [3] 
- Most of the time [2] 
- Sometimes [1] 
- Rarely/Never [reference category; 0] 
Age 
- Interval variable [18-89] 
Gender [Gender] 
- Male [1] 
- Female [0] 
Are you interested in political affairs? (includes the extent of interest in politics and the extent of fol-
lowing political news in your country) 
- To a great/medium extent / (Very) Interested [1] 
- To a limited extent / Not interested / I do not follow political news at all. [0] 
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Appendix 3: Figures and Tables 
 
Table A.9: Link btw. Food Insecurity, Oil Trade, and Societal/Interstate Conflicts 
 
Source: Breisinger et al., 2012:45 
Note: Two relevant issues appear evident from Table A.9. First, food-security challenged countries (depicted by 
the upper half) appear to have exponentially more major episodes of political violence than food-secure coun-
tries. Second, among the security-challenged countries, oil exporting countries appear to experience more epi-
sodes of political violence than oil importing countries. This suggests that food-insecure, oil exporting countries 
are most prone to experience societal or interstate conflicts. 
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Fig. A.1: Facebook Penetration Fig. A.2: Twitter Penetration 
  
       Source: ASMR, 2013.     Source: ASMR, 2013.  
 
Figure A.3: Respondents’ Participation in the Arab Spring in Selected Countries 
Algeria Jordan 
  
 
Tunisia 
 
Yemen 
  
161 
 
 
Note: Respondents were asked to rank their perception of their home country being democratic on a scale from 0 
to 10. (For some earlier waves from 1 to 10, but I adjusted for that minor divergence.) The lines reflect the mean 
values of all respondents for each country in each wave. Wave 1: 2006-8; Wave 2:2010-11; Wave 3: 2012-14. 
 
 
Note: Respondents were asked to rank their perception of democracy being suitable/appropriate for their home 
country on a scale from 0 to 10. (For some earlier waves from 1 to 10, but I adjusted for that minor divergence.) 
The lines reflect the mean values of all respondents for each country in each wave. Wave 1: 2006-8; Wave 
2:2010-11; Wave 3: 2012-14. 
 
0,00
1,00
2,00
3,00
4,00
5,00
6,00
7,00
1 2 3
M
e
an
 v
al
u
e
s 
Waves 
Figure A.4: Perception of country being democratic  
(mean values on a scale of 0-10) 
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Figure A.5: Perception of democracy being suitable for the country 
(mean values on a scale of 0-10) 
Algeria Jordan 
Tunisia 
Yemen 
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Figure A.6: Democracy-Islam Nexus and Arab Spring Participation  
(AB, wave 3, all countries) 
 
 
 
 
Note: Respondents were asked to rank how much they were satisfied with their government on a scale from 0 to 
10. (For some earlier waves from 1 to 10, but I adjusted for that minor divergence.) The lines reflect the mean 
values of all respondents for each country in each wave. Wave 1: 2006-8; Wave 2:2010-11; Wave 3: 2012-14. 
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Figure A.7: Satisfaction with the Government 
(mean values on a scale of 0-10) 
Algeria 
Jordan 
Tunisia 
Yemen 
Average (all countries) 
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Table A.10: Macro Indicators of Developmental Status by Country 
 
    
 
Algeria Jordan Tunisia Yemen 
General Living Standards 
    .UN Human Development Index, 2010 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.44 
.Inequality-adjusted life expectancy at birth index, 
2010 0.69 0.73 0.75 0.48 
.Percentage of population without access to im-
proved water services, 2008 17 4 6 38 
.Percentage of population without access to im-
proved sanitation services, 2008 5 2 15 48 
.Percentage of population without electricity, 2008 1 0 1 62 
.Intensity of food deprivation (% of shortfall in 
minimum dietary requirements), 2004-2006 10 6 10 16 
.Percentage of population living in urban areas, 
2010 66 79 67 32 
.Percentage of pop. below the poverty line, 1989-
2010 23 14 4 45 
Median Age in Years, 2010 26.20 22.80 29.10 17.80 
Gender 
    .Gender Gap Index (rank out of 142), 2008 126 134 123 142 
.Percentage of seats in parliament held by women, 
2008 65 8.50 19.90 0.70 
Education 
    .Female population with at least secondary educa-
tion (%, 25 and older), 2008 36.30 57.60 33.50 7.60 
.Male population with at least secondary education 
(%, 25 and older), 2008 49.30 73.80 48.00 24.40 
.Adult literacy rate (% of pop. age 15 or older), 
2008 72.60 92.20 78.00 60.90 
Freedom to Express Opinions 
    .Press Freedom Score (lower means more free-
dom), 2009 49.60 31.90 61.50 83.40 
.Number of verified cases of journalists impris-
oned, 2009 0 0 2 2 
.Social Regulation of Religion, 2008 High Low Medium High 
Employment 
    .Employment to population ratio (% of total popu-
lation ages 15-64), 2008 39.20 35.70 40.50 39.00 
Social Media 
    .Percentage of population covered by a mobile 
phone network, 2008 82 99 100 68 
.Internet Users per 100 people, 2008 11.90 27.00 27.10 1.60 
.Number of Internet Hosts, 2010 572 42,412 490 255 
 
     
Sources: ARDA, 2011; WEF, 2014. 
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Table A.11: Reasons for Arab Spring Participation (Wave 3, AB) 
 Yemen Tunisia Jordan Algeria Average 
Participants in Arab Spring 39% (470) 19% (223) 4% (56) 3% (46) 14% (1998) 
      
Reason for Participation      
- Conviction 33% (393) 16% (197) 2% (43) 3% (34) 11% (1656) 
- Group Pressure    5% (63) 2% (26) 1% (12) 2% (18) 2% (317) 
      
Reason for Abstinence      
- Did not agree on the po-
litical changes 
12% (147) 1% (10) 3% (56) 2% (21) 7% (1075) 
- Did not know who to 
support 
  9% (108) 3% (34) 3% (45) 3% (34) 7% (967) 
- Did not know how to 
participate 
  5% (54) 6% (68) 2% (31) 4% (46) 5% (783) 
- Afraid of participating 7% (89) 14% (165) 3% (48) 5% (66) 7% (1053) 
- Did not care / it was not 
important 
13% (150) 42% (508) 75% (1344) 60% (728) 48% (7119) 
- Other 6% (74) 15% (175) 9% (161) 6% (69) 6% (868) 
      
Perceptions regarding Out-
come of Arab Spring 
     
- Feeling of personal loss 18% (220) 26% (308) 27% (490) 13% (152) 19% (2840) 
- Difficult to define 35% (421) 35% (424) 27% (484) 35% (429) 41% (6053) 
- Feeling of victory 21% (250) 34% (406) 13% (230) 9% (108) 19% (2742) 
      
Three Main Reasons that led to 
the Arab Spring * 
     
- Civil and political free-
doms, and emancipation 
from oppression 
First First (only 
one over 
50%: 52%) 
Second Second First 
- Betterment of the eco-
nomic situation 
Second Second First First Second 
- Fighting corruption Third Third Third  Third  Third  
 
 
Note: Numbers in brackets are numbers of respondents. Don’t know or refused to answer responses are exclud-
ed. 
*For all four countries, those three main reasons were followed by “increased social justice”, “rule of law”, 
“dignity” and “social and economic justice”. The two reasons of “weakening the political and economic relations 
with the West” and “weakening the political and economic relations with Israel” were in none of the countries 
even slightly representative. It was also asked, if respondents perceived these “reasons” already realized by the 
Arab Spring yet. For all countries, only about one third of the respondents answered this positively. 
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Figure A.8: Residual Plot – Algeria Figure A.9: Residual Plot – Jordan 
  
Figure A.10: Residual Plot – Tunisia Figure A.11: Residual Plot – Yemen 
  
Table A.12: Freedom House Index Scores, MENA countries, 2004-2014 
 
Algeria Bahrain Egypt Iraq Israel Jordan Kuwait Leb. Moroc Oman Qatar Saudi A. Syria Tunisia UAE Yemen Avg. 
2004 5,50 5,00 5,50 6,00 2,00 4,50 4,50 5,50 4,50 5,50 5,50 7,00 7,00 5,50 6,00 5,00 5,2813 
2005 5,50 5,00 5,50 5,50 1,50 4,50 4,50 4,50 4,50 5,50 5,50 6,50 7,00 5,50 6,00 5,00 5,125 
2006 5,50 5,00 5,50 6,00 1,50 4,50 4,00 4,50 4,50 5,50 5,50 6,50 6,50 5,50 5,50 5,00 5,0625 
2007 5,50 5,00 5,50 6,00 1,50 4,50 4,00 4,50 4,50 5,50 5,50 6,50 6,50 6,00 5,50 5,00 5,0938 
2008 5,50 5,00 5,50 6,00 1,50 5,00 4,00 4,50 4,50 5,50 5,50 6,50 6,50 6,00 5,50 5,00 5,125 
2009 5,50 5,50 5,50 5,50 1,50 5,50 4,00 4,00 4,50 5,50 5,50 6,50 6,50 6,00 5,50 5,50 5,1563 
2010 5,50 5,50 5,50 5,50 1,50 5,50 4,50 4,00 4,50 5,50 5,50 6,50 6,50 6,00 5,50 5,50 5,1875 
2011 5,50 6,00 5,50 5,50 1,50 5,50 4,50 4,50 4,50 5,50 5,50 7,00 7,00 3,50 6,00 6,00 5,2188 
2012 5,50 6,00 5,00 6,00 1,50 5,50 5,00 4,50 4,50 5,50 5,50 7,00 7,00 3,50 6,00 6,00 5,25 
2013 5,50 6,00 5,50 5,50 1,50 5,50 5,00 4,50 4,50 5,50 5,50 7,00 7,00 3,00 6,00 6,00 5,2188 
2014 5,50 6,50 5,50 6,00 1,50 5,50 5,00 4,50 4,50 5,50 5,50 7,00 7,00 2,00 6,00 6,00 5,2188 
Note: For readability, the countries shaded in gray are not included in Figure 1.3. 
